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India, Nepal and the Voice of Reason: The United States of America

Dipta Shah - 11/28/2005

Initial indications point out that when India decided to “shove” the Maoists and Nepali Parties together, the US prudently stepped up its moderating capacity thereby reducing the “shove” to a measured “nudge.” Had the US not exerted much needed wisdom on the Indian establishment, the haste in which the South Block proceeded to rectify damage to its image would probably have yielded an unacceptable proposition to ending Nepal’s insurgency – at least from the Palace’s perspective.

Coincidental as it may have been, Ambassador Moriarty’s visit to the Indian capital was very timely. Despite the Ambassador not having had “telephonic or telepathic” conversations with the Maoists, he is certain to have had realistic and substantive dialogue with his counterpart in Delhi. His counterpart in turn, would have likely relayed the American message to appropriate parties within the official (and more importantly, unofficial) segments of Indian polity.

The need for the US to remain involved in Nepal (even if it’s through indirect participation) is paramount. As the world’s lone Super Power, American involvement is substantively (and symbolically) important. There is no prevailing view on the situation in Nepal that is more moderately calibrated than the US position. For this reason, extremists resent and make every effort at undermining policies executed by the American embassy in Kathmandu.

Efforts aimed at belittling the outcome of confidence-building workshops held in the US (between 7-Party and Palace representatives) was a clear indication that opponents to a peacefully negotiated solution in Nepal are perennially active. Not unexpectedly, the outcome of the informal proceedings mirrored suggestions that the Americans have continually made to all power-centers in Nepal – suggestions that radicals find unacceptable.

The efficacy of American policy on Nepal is that by-and-large, it is emotionally detached. Nepal’s case is frequently highlighted in US government proceedings but because American soldiers are not in harm’s way (in Nepal), the debate is dispassionate and the outcomes, constructive.

US Senator Patrick Leahy has been vocal and rightfully disparaging of Nepal’s human rights record. His office has issued several statements critical of the RNA (Royal Nepalese Army) and the current government. The significance of these statements are reflected in tactical modifications to the existing moratorium on US arms transfers to Nepal.

However, on a strategic level, the sentiments expressed by Senator Leahy’s office (a necessary component of overall policy) are balanced by other views within the US government. The inclusion of these views completes a holistic assessment of Nepal’s plight.

These balancing views may not be as transparent for public consumption, but they are present nonetheless. More importantly, these balancing views are not contradictory to Senator Leahy’s, but re-enforce his sentiments through alternative options. Differences do not exist in the end-goals, only in the means by which these goals may be achieved. The message here is that America’s strategic vision for Nepal continues to outlive competing contemporary views.

Ambassador Moriarty has gone on record consistently suggesting that the most viable outlet to Nepal’s crisis would be a merger between the Palace and the Parties. In light of recent developments, his insistence on why this alternative should have been pursued becomes apparent. The US appears to maintain (very logically) that a sustainable negotiated solution cannot be had in the absence of the participation of all political forces – the Palace included.

While some interpret this persistence as American leniency on the institution of Monarchy, others view this as a critical, tactical component to a strategic solution. It is rather unfortunate that opponents of all forms of monarchy are quick to hail the Maoist-Party alliance, but slow to consider the consequences of such an alliance resulting from Indian pressure. Let us be clear that Madhav Kumar Nepal and the UML had likely sought such an alliance for some time now but the deal would have never materialized had it not been for Indian “encouragement.”

Having bled through Vietnam, American policy makers are acutely aware of the consequences of radical nationalism and its implications for long-term democratic polity in Nepal. That the 7 Party-Maoist understanding was forged in the supposed absence of Palace participation undeniably reduces the Royal Palace’s best alternative to a negotiated solution. This also significantly alters the construct of the potential negotiated solution itself and constricts options available to the 7-Party and Maoist leaderships. Having enacted the worst-case scenario for the King, the Parties find themselves deprived of additional options to exercise.

America is a nation that understands the value of upholding a sustained strategic vision and the need to calibrate tactical moves in support of realizing overall strategy. After all, the US Armed Forces won every single tactical battle that was fought in Vietnam but lost the war because of their inability to focus on strategic objectives. Participants in Nepal’s politics have a lot to learn from their American counterparts.

Assuming that American interests rest firmly in guaranteeing democratic discourse in Nepal, the cautionary welcome to the 7 Party-Maoist alliance expressed by the USG is understandable. The Indian government’s cautionary welcome is farcical – they should be the ones claiming the credit the 7-Party alliance is flaunting.

Events in Nepal are not likely to test the bonds of the US-Indian alliance. However, if India actions are perceived by a conservative American administration as furthering communist designs for Nepal, a departure from the US reliance on India (to execute its Nepal strategy) cannot be easily dismissed.