Home >> Middle East >> Iran

     Email   Print 

Is regime change possible in Iran?

Abolghasem Bayyenat, Ph.D. candidate - 4/23/2006

In a development closely reminiscent of the incidents leading to the catastrophic US-led war against Iraq, some American media have recently unleashed a wave of assaults and tough talks against Iran including calling for regime change in that country. These developments follow the recent approval of $75 million dollars by the US congress to fund anti-Iranian activities and initiatives as well as the US State Department's new approach towards Iran involving democracy-promoting initiatives and outreach programs. What makes these recent developments sound alarming is the fact that they come amid reports by sources close to US intelligence and military officials that the US is considering plans for military action against Iran over its disputed nuclear program.

Given this situation and regardless of whether such speculations hold true, one may wonder whether a possible US-sponsored regime change in Iran would succeed. Or, is the Iranian society breeding seeds of a major social and political upheaval? In order to answer these questions, one needs to examine the public mood in Iran to find out whether the Iranian society is currently poised in a pre-revolutionary stage to either initiate a public struggle of its own or support a US-led political campaign or armed intervention with a view to bringing a regime change in Iran. The analysis of potentially-mobilized social and political groups and forces; namely the youths in general, university students, general public and other related factors, would demonstrate that the existing political situation in Iran entails anything but the slightest symptoms of a society pregnant with a forthcoming regime change.

As what regards the youths, over the past several years, the Islamic government has effectively sought to depoliticize the overwhelmingly young population of the Iranian society. The ruling elites have rightly realized that not all the grievances of the Iranian youths are geared to purely political objectives. In fact, not unlike their fellows in any other country, most Iranian youths are mainly concerned only with their basic living requirements and needs, such as employment, higher education, recreation, etc. There is no doubt that political participation looks rather as a luxury for any people who are preoccupied on a daily basis with meeting their primary economic and social needs. And the Iranian youths prove to be no exception in this respect. The Iranian policy makers have fully capitalized on this reality to overcome potential challenges to their political authority.

Unlike his disappointing record in the political sphere such as the expansion of various political freedoms which was frustrated by the conservative bodies, the former reformist president Mohammad Khatami is generally credited for creating a more open social atmosphere in Iran. Under President Khatami many social restrictions were relaxed and the Iranian youths experienced a far more favorable climate to pursue their personal lives. Just to cite a few examples, as part of this changing atmosphere many formerly banned and stigmatized Western-style recreation centers such as billiard halls mushroomed all around Iran and Western-style dating became increasingly fashionable in urban areas over a relatively short period of time. Nevertheless one should not be tempted to attribute all these changes merely to the success of the former reformist government in realizing its promised reforms. Rather this new atmosphere was mainly the result of the strategic calculation by the conservative authorities that such changes were essential to guarantee the very survival of the Islamic system.

Despite initial fears and concerns that the new fundamentalist government headed by president Ahmadi-nejad would set back the legacy of its reformist predecessor with regard to social reforms thus antagonizing the youth population, this scenario has not thus far been borne out by evidence. To the astonishment of many observers, the record shown by the current government within its short lifetime, indicates the opposite. Rather than challenging the social reforms materialized under his predecessor, president Ahmadi-nejad has embarked upon an ambitious populist social and economic agenda aimed at creating favorable conditions for the realization of social justice through fighting corruption, poverty alleviation, equitable distribution of resources among economically disadvantaged regions and cutting public consumption expenditures and other economic austerity measures by the government agencies. In order to stimulate further economic growth and generate employment opportunities, Ahmadi-nejad has also made sizable withdrawals from Iran's Foreign Exchange Reserve Fund, established under the former government to serve as an emergency fund to help the government face unexpected shortfalls in its foreign exchange income in the event of rapid fluctuations in oil prices, to fund job-creating private investments and public development projects.

If successful, president Ahmadi-nejad's populist measures would further strengthen the foundations of the Islamic government and generate further public support for it in Iran. This would also prevent social and economic demands of the youths from translating into political behavior, such as public demonstrations, riots and other violent behaviors. Such developments would also significantly boost chances of reelection for Ahmadi-nejad and his conservative political allies in the Iranian parliament in the next presidential and parliamentary elections. This is mainly due to the fact that when young Iranians find their main social and economic concerns equally met under the existing powerful conservative government, they would have little incentives to vote for an ineffective reformist political party promising lofty but largely hollow political goals and ideals. This was indeed one of the factors accounting for the humiliating defeat of the reformist parties and political groups in the last Iranian presidential election.

As what concerns student movements, Iranian universities, traditionally a political stronghold of reformist political groups, are currently experiencing a relatively calm political atmosphere. The highly tense political climate prevailing in major universities in Iran in the heydays of the reform movement triggered by the landslide victory of the reform-minded president Mohammad Khatami in May 1997, has long dissipated. In fact the political mobilization of university students which culminated in large scale protests by Tehran University students over the closure of a reformist daily by the hardline Judiciary in July 1999 mainly characterized the early days of the reform movement when enthusiasm and desire for swift democratic reforms were running high among the largely impatient university students. Over the past several years, conservative political groups have gained control over most student associations and the remaining independent student unions no longer pose any serious challenge to the authority of the Islamic regime.

As regards average Iranians, they simply have no appetite for any more political adventures in their country. They have long lost confidence in the merits and effectiveness of revolutionary means to bring about their desired political changes in Iran, as they have proved unsustainable in the past. Most Iranian citizens believe their country cannot afford another revolution, as Iran has had more than its fair share of turbulent times over the past three decades. They accordingly believe any genuine changes should be homegrown and realized through an evolutionary process and peaceful reforms. Daily scenes of explosion, bloodshed and chaos seen next door in post-conflict Iraq also leave them no room for wishful thinking about the prospect of a foreign-led invasion of their country. Additionally, strong sense of nationalism held by most Iranians and their historic devotion to the real political independence of their country also preclude the possibility of a foreign-led or inspired regime change taking place in Iran.

To all the above, one should also add lack of viable alternative political forces to fill in the power vacuum formed after a possible breakup of the existing order and downfall of the current regime in Iran. There currently exists no credible progressive political movement outside Iran to be able to mobilize necessary resources to lead a regime change and to run a post-conflict government installed in Iran. Most of the existing foreign-based Iranian opposition groups also lack the needed legitimacy in the eyes of the vast majority of the Iranian people. Moreover their political influence inside Iran is almost non-existent as their presence does not literally extend beyond their own web pages and Internet chat rooms.

Overall, the chances of a regime change taking place in Iran any time in the near future are nil. The Islamic republic has well consolidated its rule over the past quarter of a century and is currently experiencing its most favorable domestic conditions ever since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The Islamic government still enjoys wide sympathy and support among the vast majority of its citizens. As witnessed in the past, it is not a difficult task for the Iranian government to mobilize tens of millions of its supporters throughout the country to quell any possible insurrections against it. Modern political history of Iran reminds us that any genuine political changes in Iran should be sponsored by the Iranians themselves and come from within the Iranian society and government and be developed through trial and error over time. In the face of these realities, the US government should exercise full prudence in designing its strategy towards Iran and ensure that its approach is fully in line with realities on the ground. Any possible intervention by the US to promote regime change in Iran is likely to create further public backlash against it and further strengthen the hands of the hardline political groups there.