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Afghanistan: The Re-Arming Of The Warlords

Antonio Fabrizio - 6/16/2006

A “critical period”1 in military operations, according to Reuters, is expecting Afghanistan this summer, as a large springtime offensive led by Talibans has recently revealed. This one could be the hardest phase for the international forces in Afghanistan since 20012. As a consequence, Afghan government is considering a new strategy to block insurgents, but disquieting foreign analysts and military personnel: the plan is to allow arms to tribal militias.

A proven fact is that Talibans are still effective on Afghan territory: in less than thirty days, more than 400 people have been killed, most of them being suspected Taliban rebels. Suicide attacks and bombings continuously threat coalition forces, killing or wounding soldiers and civilians. The additional peacekeeping troops plan, approved by NATO leaders at Brussels on Thursday, June 8, to increase in July the already deployed troops, could not be enough: only 6,000 have been assigned to southern provinces, but this number, even though it has been doubled, may not be sufficient yet.

As a result, the government is mulling over the use “irregular” or “non-conventional” forces, at least in those districts where international forces are unable to provide protection. Somewhere in Afghanistan, the local situation is getting seriously critical: people are overwhelmed by poverty, and there is an actual risk that they start considering international forces as intruders and opponents: the worst consequence may be that they feel protected by Talibans and start to support them. Therefore, it is a mandatory matter to intervene in some way.

Local authorities feel they have no means to act, but by arming their own people. Some of them say, however, that this is only a temporary measure, and tribesmen’s role would be simply to back up police, not to act independently.

In any case, there’s a wide variety of reactions, opposing supporters and critics, but no final decisions have been made yet on this matter.

Government’s proposal supporters state that tribal forces are nothing else but local people defending themselves: they could actually help - provided that their actions get coordinated by NATO forces or by local police - for they know the territory much better than foreign soldiers do.

There is also an economical concern, which does not sound incorrect in a country where many people are actually starving and where there is a pressing need of basic goods and supplies: tribesmen are much cheaper than regular soldiers (they get paid less than $ 100 per month), they already own their own guns (they have not actually been armed, states the government, because they already have their own arms). Moreover, they wear no uniforms, which means that they can be hidden more easily to insurgents.


Critics too, however, are focused on proper concerns: they are worried that allowing arms to tribal militias, there would be an authentic risk that they create an alternative power basis, which would weaken the central state (where Afghan state basis is already weak, because it is still under construction, in a process that is far from being completed).

Some of these critics also highlight that this policy is simply the opposite of what has been done up to this point: some local tribesmen had - or still have - to give back their guns, whereas others now would be allowed to own them. In addition, the risk to allow guns to local people could bring chaos and disorders in the whole area. And nobody in the coalition wants to jeopardize feeble Afghan order or face a risk of a renewed anarchy.

In any case, the main point remains that it is not a powerfully built policy, over the long-term, to empower local tribesmen, but it could be a positive short-term measure to reinforce existing troops and back up local police; but a careful, balanced plan has to be arranged, since the risk of a civil war – another one – would be disastrous for a country like this one, which has been in war for already more than twenty years.