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The West in the Balkans - Part II

Sam Vaknin, Ph.D. - 7/28/2006

Excerpts from an interview granted to www.serbianna.com, May 2004.
The breakup of Macedonia is not inevitable - but Kosovo's independence is. What makes it unavoidable is history. Kosovo is an ethnically homogeneous, clearly demarcated, territory whose denizens fervently aspire to be independent - and are willing to fight for it. Moreover, they have the support of large parts of the international community. Serbia is dilapidated, subjugated, weak, and divided.

If East Timor succeeded to secede and become an independent polity against much bigger odds - so will Kosovo which is practically more than half way there. In truth, Kosovo is already independent in everything but name. It has its own travel documents, currency, flag, and institutions. Kosovo as a part of Serbia is currently unimaginable.

Why do we have a resilient Western demand that democratic standards get established before status talks on Kosovo begin?

It buys the West some time, on the one hand - and guarantees future stability, on the other hand. The West, as it is unwisely wont to do, procrastinates in Kosovo and tries to defer the inevitable outcome of Kosovar independence. It is a typical "not on my watch" mentality of pusillanimous Eurocrats. By demanding in Kosovo what it failed to secure elsewhere, the West hopes to drive the weary denizens of Kosovo and Serbia into a compromise.

Additionally, democracies are considered to be more peaceful than authoritarian, crime-infested regimes. A democratic Kosovo is less likely to become the kernel of a "Greater Albania" and to foment unrest among its neighbors (southern Serbia and Macedonia).

It is important not to get it backwards. Economic dysfunction breeds virulent nationalism which, in turn, exacerbates the economic malaise.

Additionally, we must not forget that, by itself, Kosovo is not a viable economic entity, despite the fact that it has privileged access to the markets of Albania and Western Macedonia. As an autonomous unit within the Federated Yugoslavia, Kosovo survived on massive handouts from the center. The West has now replaced Belgrade as Kosovo’s (and Macedonia’s and Serbia’s and Bosnia’s) sugar-daddy.

The Kosovar leadership is guilty for having delegated and relegated all economic decision-making to the inapt and corrupt bureaucracy of UNMIK. The results?

Vertiginous unemployment and moribund manufacturing and agricultural bases. Only the construction and criminal sectors are thriving.

Inevitably, this translates into frustration and aggression. The specter of independence attains the mantle of a panacea and Serbs (and increasingly Westerners) are viewed as obstinate and infuriating hurdles on the way to happiness and prosperity.

Violent clashes between Albanians and the Macedonian security forces occurred in 1997. This was the culmination of a historical process which commenced decades ago.

Macedonia never really succeeded to integrate its Albanian citizens. They boycotted the 1991 referendum on independence and the attendant census. In January 1992 they held a plebiscite of their own in which they opted for autonomy. They publicly and recurrently rejected the results of the 1994 internationally monitored census (according to which Albanians made up 23% of the population).

Many Albanians in western Macedonia feel closer to their kin and kith in Kosovo than to the Macedonian state. In both 1968 and 1981 they demonstrated in solidarity with the bloody outbursts in Kosovo against the former Yugoslavia. The demand to be annexed to the autonomous Kosovo were often heard between 1969 and 1989. Albanians from Macedonia attended Pristina University where they interacted with radical Maoist students from both Kosovo and Albania. In 1992 the Albanians briefly declared an "Autonomous Republic of Illirida" in a series of demonstrations in Struga.

Macedonians intermittently accused the Albanians of illegal construction, purchases of real estate at inflated prices, mass immigration from Kosovo, re-population of Macedonian villages abandoned by their inhabitants, ethnic cleansing by intimidation of urban neighborhoods, nationalist indoctrination under the guise of religious instruction, pressuring other Moslems to declare themselves as Albanians, and irredentism.

Albanians intermittently accused the Macedonians of discrimination in the labour market, in secondary, and higher education, in outlays on infrastructure (many Albanian villages still lack proper roads and are not connected to the national grids of water and electricity), and in the public administration. Albanians claim that police brutality, discriminatory legislation, and the exclusive use of the Macedonian language violate their human and civil rights. They lost faith in the Macedonian's will to accommodate their demands, however legitimate.
Macedonia's intelligence services were unequivocal in their warnings of gathering trouble in 1998. Inter-ethnic tensions reached fever pitch during the Presidential elections at the end of 1999 when the late president Trajkovski's win was attributed by the opposition - and not only by the opposition - to mass electoral fraud among Albanian voters. There were hints of a collusion at the highest levels involving a web of business interests and meddling Western diplomats.

Their experiences in Kosovo (1999) and Macedonia (2001) taught the Albanians a valuable lesson: terrorism pays. Following the recent spate of violence, Macedonians have come around to accepting many long standing Albanian demands. Terrorism also proved to be a surefire catalyst of social upward mobility: former terrorists are now ministers and high government officials in both territories.


Yet, it is not clear whether the demands made by the Albanians are in preparation for an inevitable breakup of Macedonia, or because they so deeply distrust the goodwill of the Macedonians. If the latter, international monitoring of the implementation of an eventual agreement would go a long way towards assuaging Albanian fears. If the former, no extent of NATO involvement will be able to prevent a ferocious and Balkan wide war.
In summary, the crowning achievement of the Albanians - and a repeat of the 1999 Kosovo scenario - was their success in internationalizing the conflict. In this they were aided by a panic stricken Macedonian establishment. The wise men of West - the same people who brought you Dayton and Operation Allied Force - were called in to mediate. The result is the Ohrid Framework Agreement, Macedonia's Sudeten-like settlement.

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