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Democracy And Development - A Geopolitical Instrument In Post-Soviet Space

Todor Kondakov, Ph.D. - 8/25/2006

The development of Russian-American relations has always been in the center of analysts' attention. In this connection, the statements on certain tensions between Washington and Moscow as well as on a potential change in the Russian geopolitical vector from West-bound to East-bound direction cannot but raise significant interest.

It goes without saying that mutual understanding with Russia is of extreme importance for the United States. Washington, though, intends to achieve this understanding chiefly by taking into consideration US strategic interests. As in the last couple of years Moscow has demonstrated a much more hard-line attitudes in the diplomatic sphere, the US became very active in trying to find the adequate instruments for exercising political influence over the Kremlin. Naturally, the Americans have sensibly avoided any rough pressure but still they have not missed a single opportunity for highlighting their capacity to control the situation in Central Eurasia even over Russia's head. This is done in a number of ways, depending on the particular situation or the political culture of the particular high-ranking official from the White House. The approach of the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice is a more polite one, while the Vice-President Richard Cheney, opts for the rougher attitude.

Such circumstances additionally facilitate President Bush, who can select between the two lines of conduct depending on the particular situation. Recently, more and more political experts and geopoliticians have been using the term "limitrophic states" (from the Latin adjective: limitrophus - border) to denote the states, which were established at the periphery of the Russian empire and the Soviet Union in consequence of the revolution from 1917 and the collapse of the USSR in 1991. In the last fifteen years, these "limitrophic states" never managed to become a significant factor in global geopolicy but still they claim to play such a role in Russia - US relations.

To a certain extent, the foreign policy of the newly-emerged states, which came in the place of former Soviet republics, has remained as a whole a derived function of the existence of the Russian Federation. Most of the post-Soviet states from Eastern Europe seem to follow not the standard scheme of global political coordinates but rather the axis Russia - the West, feeding themselves on it in ideologically, politically, economically and financially. Alexei Bogaturov, Deputy Director of the International Security Institute within the Russian Academy of Science, stated that while these states pour various accusations against Moscow incessantly, they still count on Russia for continuing to play the role of a significant geopolitical factor as they are aware of the fact that if Russia ceases to play this role then the Western interest in themselves will immediately cease as well. Let alone the fact that a potential serious economic crisis in their Eastern neighbor would bring catastrophic consequences for limitrophic states by depriving them of their revenue from transit of Russian energy raw materials and of the opportunity to search for Western support against "Russian menace".

Obviously, when monitoring closely the relations between Russia and its immediate neighbors from the post-Soviet space, the US and the EU are guided only by their own geopolitical interests. Thus, in the situation of an upcoming (though, still not definitive) Russian economic boom, many observers see the signs of a reviving, independent foreign policy of Russia and of its intention to act much more resolutely in the energy sphere. This is the last thing that the West would desire. It is true that Western states aim at maintaining stable relations with Russia but they consider that such a stability should be guaranteed not by the readiness of the parties for symmetrical concessions but by a decline on the part of Moscow to conduct its own global energy geopolicy, based on long-term interests of its overall national development.

Thus, tensions, which arose in connection with the deliveries of natural gas to the Ukraine, were regarded by many in the West as a confirmation for their worst misgivings, although everybody were pretty aware of the fact that the parasitizing of "transit limitrophic states" upon Russian economy should have been limited a long time ago. Anyway, the scandal between Russia and the Ukraine in January proved to be quite welcome for certain Western circles (particularly in the US), which were only waiting for an occasion to exercise pressure upon Moscow against any "unexpected actions", which would pose a threat to the established global mechanism for energy supplies.

From this point on, the situation was more than clear. The openly anti-Russian speech of US Vice-President Cheney, delivered at the beginning of May in Vilnius during the summit of the so called Community of Democratic Choice, aimed at suggesting two things. Firstly, the Americans warned Moscow that at the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg in July Moscow would not only be deprived of the position to define the agenda but would be probably compelled to justify itself. Secondly, the statement defined the final range of countries, which will help the US administration find occasions for criticizing Russian foreign policy. This undoubtedly made the leaders of "limitrophic states" happy as the USA openly declared their "usefulness" for American geopolitical strategy. This in itself inspired their further steps in this direction.

It is a well-known fact that at their summit, held at end-May in Kiev, the Heads of GUAM member states (this is an organization, established in 1997, which includes Georgia, the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) renamed the organization into Organization for Democracy and Development (ODD - GUAM). A number of Ukrainian analysts consider that the said organization becomes more and more "a key element of the Baltic - Black sea geopolitical arc" and a branch of the famous pro-American "Community of Democratic Choice" (see, Geopolitika, issue 6/05). Hitherto, it has become clear that apart from the purely mechanical renaming of GUAM into Organization for Democracy and Development - GUAM, the headquarters of which will be in Kiev, its members agree only upon the fact that the transformation will help them resolve their own ethnic problems. It is not just by chance that Moldovan President, Vladimir Voronin, immediately appealed to his counterparts to assist in the quick solving of Transdniestr region issues. Most probably, his Georgian colleague, Saakashvili, has similar plans.

The establishment of the ODD, though, is related to something of much higher importance. Let me recall that immediately before the summit in Kiev, the Ukraine and Georgia almost simultaneously declared their intentions to become NATO members. Let me underline again - NATO, not EU members. We should not forget the fact that recently Brussels has been sending constant negative impulses to these countries - thus, Gunther Verheugen stated that the EU does not have any intentions whatsoever to enlarge after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, while high-ranking officials from the European commission directly explained that the European integration of the Ukraine can be considered only after 20 years (in the best possible scenario). By the way, during the Kiev summit even the Moldovan communist leader (and President of the country), Vladimir Voronin, declared himself in favor of joining the NATO. In this respect, the only exception was the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliev, who understands that if he supports unconditionally the Atlantic orientation of his colleagues from the ODD would risk stirring up a negative reaction not only on the part of Russia but also from Iran, thus putting himself literally between the hammer and the anvil.

Meanwhile, immediately after the Kiev summit and the establishment of the ODD, President Yushchenko signed a decree for the establishment of an inter-ministerial commission on the issues of Ukrainian preparation for NATO membership. Later, the Chief of the General Staff of the Ukraine, Sergei Kirchenko, made a surprising visit in the Armenian capital Yerevan and according to a number of local analysts his visit aimed at checking the probability of Armenia joining the Organization for democracy and development.

Most probably, when acting in this way the "limitrophic states" consider that they are doing exactly what the West and the US in particular expects them to. But is this really so? As James Mann, author in residence at John Hopkins University, recently noted, the US administration in the last few months has irrevocably given up the realistic approach to foreign policy, which dominated in the Republican Party at the time of Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft. A proof to this was the statement, made by the US State Secretary, Condoleezza Rice, during her visit to Great Britain at the beginning of 2006, in which she pointed out that America has abandoned the 60-year-old attempts at "buying stability at the expense of democracy" in the Near East. A much more important sign, though, was the change in the US vision on the world, presented in the new Strategy for national security of the USA, officially published in March.

It is a well-known fact that as regards foreign policy the US Republicans have been divided into two main groups for dozens of years. The first group, members of which are the so called "realists", i.e. people like Nixon, Kissinger and Scowcroft, who stressed upon national interests, not concepts, and underlined the need for maintaining stability and balance of power. In their turn, their opponents - the present neoconservatives (i.e. that wing in the Republican Party, which was lead by the late Ronald Reagan) persistently declare that the US must devote themselves to "a battle against tyranny worldwide".

The previous Strategy for national security of the USA, elaborated in mid-2002 under the guidance of Condoleezza Rice, Counselor for national security at the time, and her deputy, Stephen Hadley (today he is Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs), the White House policy was summed up in the following key phrase: the USA will aim at "a balance of power, favoring the observance of human rights". This was the classic compromise between the two wings in the Republican Party - the "balance of power" satisfied "realists", and the concern for human rights - the neoconservatives.

The Strategy from 2002 included a number of concepts with far-reaching consequences for the war with terrorism - including the appeal for forestalling military attacks. Apart from the Near East, the US policy seemed to be based upon the Kissinger-elaborated strategy, embracing terms such as stability, national interests and balance of power. The US strategy at that time identified China, Russia and India as the three global centers of power.

The current US Strategy for national security, though, is drastically different. It contains some general considerations on freedom and the spread of democracy, but no realistic concept on balance of power. China, Russia and India are no longer regarded as great states but only as three out of many. In other words, for the first time in their history the USA openly declare that their power is so enormous that any considerations for balance of power or stability are obsolete.

What did actually happen in the last four years to cause such a radical change in the vision of US administration? Among the factors here undoubtedly are the consequences from the war in Iraq, where the USA could not find any weapons for mass destruction and embraced the concept for power imposition of democracy as a principal justification for the war. Ever since, this concept has become the main logical line of reasoning in US foreign policy. This means that in Bush's current team for foreign policy there is a particular difference between articulated rhetoric and actual staff. As regards staff, the second cabinet of Bush obviously numbers much less neoconservatives. Undertaking the functions of Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice surrounded herself with cautious pragmatists such as the Under Secretary R. Nicholas Burns and the Deputy State Secretary Robert Zoellick, who are administrative officials, approved by the realists and distrusted by the neoconservatives.

At the same time, "hawks" like Paul Wolfovits and Douglas Feith left the Pentagon, which was additionally weakened in organizational aspects from growing disagreements on war in Iraq between the Secretary of Defense, Ronald Rumsfeld, and the high military officials of the reserve. All of this is true only for the staff of US administration. As regards the fundamental principles of US foreign policy, there neoconservatives dominate while the influence of realists continuously diminishes. Of course, Rice, Hadley and many other Government officials are trying desperately to work in closer contact with Europe, avoiding the staunch and limited approach of the first administration of Bush. The truth, though, is that today they support those concepts, which were launched by neoconservatives at the time. Even more important is the fact that the US administration today does not wish to follow the notions for the balance of power and global stability as it did in 2002. As James Mann points out, this is a conceptual change of enormous significance.

According to a number of eminent Western analysts, a direct consequence of this approach is the transformation of the "guaranteed and unlimited access" to the deposits of energy raw materials worldwide (including those in Russia) into a major geopolitical objective of Washington. Today Iran stands in the way of the accomplishment of this objective and under certain circumstances Iran could become a strategic ally to Russia and China against any further imposition of expansionist policy of the USA.

According to neoconservative strategy, by gaining command over Iranian energy resources, the US will acquire direct access to the Caspian sea. To this end, they are ready to undertake extreme measures, including forceful actions with the participation of US allies from the NATO. In such a situation they will mainly rely upon the so called "new Europeans", with whom Washington maintains relations of particular trust. The latter will play (no matter whether willingly or not) both the role of a US military instrument and the role of a political cover for the execution of the action itself. The negative consequences for Europe - political, economic and humanitarian - are more than obvious. The Ukraine becomes more and more another key factor for the implementation of US geopolitical strategy in Eurasia. Washington seems to rely upon the enforced accession of the country in NATO before the end of the Presidential mandate of Bush. Among US objectives in the case are the acquisition of a strategic maneuvering ground against Russia. The neoconservative strategists are not much concerned about the future of the Ukraine - they do not exclude the possibility for a situation in which its "enforced integration" can result in a deep national disunity and even to the collapse of the state, provoked by this disunity. The most important thing in this case, however, is to include Kiev in the US orbit and ensure control over the Crimea, thus ensuring control over the aquatory of the Black sea.

Washington seems to have no particular concerns about the fact that a possible collapse of the Ukraine and a subsequent deep crisis could lead to an open confrontation with Moscow. Control over the Black sea (in the ideal scenario this would include only the disposition of US military ships) would help overcome the resistance of Turkey, which is concerned about losing its control over the Bosphorus and the Dardaneles, as in the name of their strategic objectives the Americans would hardly hesitate to breach the Montreux convention. Such a conflict between two key allies from NATO would raise the shadow of doubt over the unity (and the future) of the alliance. It is a well-known fact that Ankara protects its interests with much determination, proof of which was its refusal to allow the utilization of Turkish territory during the intervention against Iraq. Nevertheless, neoconservatives consider that control over the Crimea will allow them to break Turkey's resistance, which is trying to balance between the USA, Russia and the Muslim world.

The above shows that in the context of the current US geostrategy the problem with the so called "joint military objects" on the territory of Bulgaria and Romania acquires new dimensions. It may well be that the battle between Brussels and Washington for spheres of influence and access to energy resources would continue to become more and more fierce in the course of the EU enlargement to the East. Furthermore, Russia has demonstrated a definite economic, political and military growth lately, while China is heading impetuously towards becoming and independent pole of power. In this context, the current US difficulties can result in a final dominance of neoconservatives in Washington which would provoke a series of crisis situations in various points on the globe.

Most experts consider that it is impossible to predict who would be the final winner in such a geopolitical clash. As regards Bulgaria, it can turn out to be only a pawn in an extremely dangerous geopolitical game. It is clear that not all US politicians follow the reasoning of "the early Reagan", although many find it beneficial to imitate the behavior of hard-line conservatives from the end of 80s. The most important question here is whether Washington would decide that the current moment is sufficiently suitable for replaying the scenarios from the past, or the vast positive potential in the relations with Moscow, accumulated in the last years, would lead to less trivial developments. In other words, will the current US President decide to act in full synchrony with his deputy Cheney or would he decide to manifest a little bit more geopolitical fantasy this time?