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Revising Doctrine on the Korean Peninsula

Nicholas M. Guariglia - 11/7/2006

For far too long policymakers in Washington have referred to a possible conflict on the Korean peninsula as “unthinkable” and “inconceivable.” Their characterization of a war with North Korea as not preferable and promisingly catastrophic is not off the mark, but their write-off of such an event as undoable, unlikely, or both, does not help the current crisis one iota. It is their job to think the unthinkable, conceive the inconceivable, and, perhaps in this case, do the seemingly undoable.

It seems as if the sole difference between a Bush and a Clinton, a Cheney and a Gore, or a Rumsfeld and a Kerry is the small distinction between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. We can do better than this; both the naiveté of one-on-one talks with Kim Jong Il and the six-party chit-chats have failed. Do not for a moment dupe yourself into believing any mea culpa from Pyongyang, or return to the talks, is either an act of goodwill or will accomplish anything worthwhile. North Korea has violated, and will continue to violate, all international norms and global prerequisites for a peaceful and diplomatic solution to its belligerence. Our much-cherished Agreed Framework was scoffed at for eight years, although Jimmy Carter still champions it as the end all-be all. The six-country talks have remained static for some forty-eight months, now. Absolutely nothing has come of including, in the manner we have done so, Russia, China, and South Korea –– none of which want to see Kim collapse at this moment –– into the mix. An internal disintegration of the Jong Il regime would be in the interests of the weaker, shorter, lighter, and malnourished North Korean citizen, but not in the near-term economic interests of Moscow, Beijing, or Seoul, which would shoulder much of the financial burden in rebuilding the North.

So we are at a crossroads of sorts. Given geopolitics, the North has been allowed to do some things –– fire missiles and test nukes, for instance –– that we would disallow, say, the Syrians from doing. The man who kidnaps, strips, and chases attractive South Korean and Japanese girls around his palaces –– the man who holds press conferences to proclaim he invented the toasted oven –– has the bomb. If he is not starving two million of his people, he’s reminding them he landed on the moon. For all practical purposes Vlad the Impaler has been reborn, and he not only runs his own country but now has an adequate nuclear arsenal.

It is unfortunate that we have cornered ourselves into ignoring avenues which pursue outcomes our allies may oppose. The ardent follower is aware of the game: China holds our debt and Seoul is held hostage by North Korean artillery, so to play chicken with highly populated Asian capitals is the equivalent of toying with the global economy itself. Angering the Chinese and endangering the South Koreans is, right now, off the table, so we are left discussing how best to deal with a nuclear North and how to live with a better behaved terrorist in Pyongyang, rather than ridding ourselves of his hermit enclave once and for all. But there are more options than the bilateral and multilateral talks. Each would require a serious detraction from current American doctrine.

The first option is what we will call “China Grows Up.” Thomas P.M. Barnett is a dedicated believer that the level of interdependence between the Chinese and the United States –– along with China embracing capitalistic globalization –– will render Beijing more of a twenty-first century strategic partner with the United States than a Soviet Union-to-be. Indeed, the Chinese (as well as the Indians) may one day attempt to challenge American supremacy in certain domains, but for true believers in the liberal economic interdependence theory, this is not only natural, but also does not necessarily mean pending conflict or tension.

It has been the U.S. goal to oversee a peacefully rising China since the Nixon administration, and a distancing between the Chinese and their “allies” in Pyongyang could be a monumental step in this direction. As we all know, Kim Jong Il is reliant upon China for energy, oil, food, and the like; his takedown could very well occur if the Chinese were to cease their propping up of their annoying little satrapy –– and pronto. It is in our interests to make this clear to our Chinese counterparts and to encourage them to be a little harsher than perhaps they feel comfortable with.

This would require China to let go of its inordinate fear of bogeymen refugees. A country of a billion-plus ought not to fear another few hundred thousand. The State Department must make it clear to Beijing: if they go down on Kim, while welcoming North Korean citizens seeking save haven, we will pay for the intern camps, we’ll supply the food, we’ll do all the dirty humanitarian work. The least humanitarian thing Beijing could do, after aligning with all sorts of shady African thugs for cheap oil, is welcome North Koreans seeking aid. If they have a problem with this, we ought to invite the premier’s cabinet to the Mexican border for a tutorial.

This could feasibly be a quid pro quo which would cement a future East Asia that includes a reunified and democratic Korea, a non-nuclear Japan, and a large, blossoming China unopposed by American war-gamers. This, coupled with a steady process of political democratization to go along with China’s economic liberalization, would guarantee that the “new American century” and the “century of Asia” are not mutually exclusive whatsoever. This is admittedly a pie-in-the-sky scenario; an option worth pursuing, but not one to be expected to occur immediately.

The second option deals with a nuclear arms race in East Asia; we’ll call this “Japan Grows Up” –– and makes China mad. This arms build-up should only occur, if occur at all, in the hope that is coerces China to apply adequate pressure on Pyongyang to disarm. Once the desired result is at hand, and the North is free of either nuclear weaponry or Kim or both, then any newly concocted nuclear arsenals in East Asia should be dismantled.

It would be an irony of history that the nation with which Americans have lost the most lives warring against in any war –– the only nation ever to have suffered nuclear bombings –– would be encouraged to rebuild its military, and even perhaps nuclearize itself. Our grandfathers, fighting an imperialistic and expansionist Japan, would never have imagined that the United States would be successful in pacifying the Japanese spirit, defanging their “warrior code,” while rewriting their constitution, dismantling their military, renouncing their sovereign right for an offensive armed forces, and providing a six-decade nuclear umbrella after executing two nuclear strikes.

But all of that has happened. If there was ever any definitive proof that non-Western “others” were capable of succeeding in the global economy in a peaceful and democratic way –– even after a brutal American war campaign and harsh postwar impositions on their society –– it is the Japanese model for the last half-century. So to reverse this beautiful achievement of American idealism and Japanese ingenuity by creating a militaristic and nuclear Japan would be to spit in the faces of the ghosts of MacArthur, Truman, and others. But would it necessarily be a bad thing in the modern world?

In many ways, it makes simple sense. Japan is an economical powerhouse, integral to globalization’s success, and has matured into a responsible, humane, decent, and liberal democracy. Its politics are more introspective and apologetic than racist and supremacist, as they were sixty years ago. A nuclear Japan would not be a threat to anyone or anything excluding the regional aspirations of the ruling party in China. If the Chinese are going to evolve into a strategic competitor and a long-term rival, as opposed to the partners we wish them to be, then the issue of a nuclear Japan to counterbalance China may not be a bad thing at all. In fact, it may even transcend the issue of North Korea.

Of course, the hope would be Japan remains under our nuclear protection. A nuclear arms race, even amongst democracies aiming to protect themselves from a nut like Kim, would not be preferable –– although the outcome as to who would win the race would be certain. This “nuclearization” would probably not stop in Tokyo; the South Koreans could go nuclear and the increasingly nationalist Taiwanese could go nuclear (and perhaps even call Beijing’s bluff and declare independence). Indonesians and Australians would consider weighing the nuclear option; Iran would most certainly feel vindicated in its pursuits, triggering similar scenarios in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. In short, Kim Jong Il has altered the status quo and it is now our job to decide if we attempt to maintain whatever status quo we have left, or if we seek to beat him at his own foolish game. This all hinders on which way the Japanese go in the coming months.


The third option is an eclectic mix of continued variations of diplomacy, while trying to encourage the first option, and publicly toying with the idea of the second option –– all the while preparing for war. John F. Kennedy assured his Soviet counterparts that if Russian missiles on Cuban territory were to be launched, we would ignore the culpable island ninety miles off the Floridian coast and annihilate Moscow. President Bush must assert the same today. If a nuclear device goes off in an American city, or within the territories of our allies, we will hold Kim Jong Il, the man himself, personally responsible.

Until the Iranians obtain nuclear status, North Korea remains the only state in the world irresponsible and unpredictable enough to export nuclear technology abroad. Russia keeps poor track record of its former, rotting arsenal… and Pakistan is just one heart beat away from a seventy-bomb jihadist state. But nevertheless, the sole regime most likely to intentionally export devastating technologies is that of Kim Jong Il’s administration. It would be neither conclusive nor provable –– amidst the radioactive rubble –– that a detonated nuclear device in Manhattan originated in Pyongyang. It needn’t matter. North Korea has intermingled with the likes of A.Q. Khan, Iran, Libya, and shadowy black-market networks involved in the export of weaponry, narcotics, and counterfeit money. That kleptocratic government is in serious need of hard cash, and any Joe Schmo terrorist on earth that wants to make a name for himself is in need of a nuclear weapon. We can only imagine a privileged emir from a Gulf sheikhdom –– a black sheep within one of the supposedly friendly monarchical families –– selling some of his windfall petroleum profit to a cash-stripped DPRK, which in turn sells the prince what he needs. Of course, from there, the device is slipped off to the proverbial Saif al Adel or someone comparable.

We do not know if Kim Jong Il is crazy enough to wheel-and-deal his newfound toys, but the least we could do would be to set conditions where we make it clear to him and his inner circle that they are not in control of events. Already notoriously paranoid, Kim would be forced to go to sleep knowing that if he were to awake in the morning to discover New York or Chicago or Washington has been lost –– by an attack he had no role in or foreknowledge of –– the American government would employ devastating retaliatory measures against his dynasty. This uneasiness alone may convince the North Korean leadership to denuclearize simply to have the United States retract this doctrine of culpability.

While this would be an immediate revision in policy (one in which the Bush administration has thus far not taken, and probably will not publicly take), the crux of the matter rests within the long-term processes of preparing for the worst while trying to stimulate the best. The Chinese must be prodded into turning their backs on Pyongyang, the possibility of an East Asian arms race must be contemplated either as a message to the North Koreans or to nudge along an unwilling Beijing, and U.S. diplomats must make the following clear to their North Korean counterparts through the auspices of secret diplomacy: Americans will not tolerate their nuclear commerce.

Our battle plan calls for a force of some 690,000 foot soldiers to engage in a brutal campaign lasting anywhere from thirty to ninety days (the first day or two predicted to be the bloodiest). While probably not as bad as the 1950 war, a month’s worth of combat on the peninsula, casualty wise, would make three long years in Iraq seem juvenile. To avoid this, we must retake the strategic initiative. We must continue to work on missile defense, with a greater emphasis on regional skirmishes as opposed to intercontinental interception. Although unlikely with a Democratic victory, Congress ought to restart research and development financing for the important, but often caricaturized, Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) program, to develop smarter mini-nukes and more efficient nuclear bunker-busters. We are rapidly entering an unfortunate age where nuclear war need not be the end of the world –– thus losing its wonderful international deterrence value –– but instead a periodic occurrence between two nuclear powers, confined to those powers.

Thankfully, this is not a zero-sum game. All of these scenarios –– Chinese assistance, temporary Japanese and East Asian nuclearization to spur Chinese assistance, revamped U.S. defense measures, and the doctrine of nuclear culpability –– must be implemented simultaneously, so that once the ball drops on the peninsula, it ends with the least amount of violence possible. This is only likely if we first understand and then admit that the status quo has led us nowhere but here. And here isn’t looking too good.