Home >> Europe >> The Balkans  Email  Print Macedonia in Crisis: Interview with Sam Vaknin GP Interviews - 4/19/2007 Q1: Was there any threat of economic sanctions against Republic of Macedonia by the international mediators and/or representatives of EU/US during the crisis of 2001?Were there threat or sanctions by the international community before 2001 due to ethnic tensions within the country? A1: The answers to both parts of your question are in the negative. But one should distinguish overt threats - both official and informal - from "ambient" ones. While no one threatened the Macedonian government explicitly - many hints were dropped that a failure to resolve the ethnic crisis would lead to severe economic consequences. The main bullies were the American Ambassador at the time, Mike Einik, as well as various mediators, both American (notably James Purdew) and European.
Q2: How clear was the threat? Were they verbal or written? What kind of sanctions were brought into the table, such as withholding economic aid, trade sanctions, other financial sanctions etc?
A2: The implied threats pertained to Macedonia's ability to conclude a standby agreement with the IMF and the subsequent receipt of funds from donors. On various occasions, it was made clear that lack of "cooperation" would result in deliberate delays in the delivery of aid and the release of credit tranches agreed with both the IMF and the World Bank. The European Union went as far as actually discussing aid and trade sanctions in one of its inter-ministerial meetings.
The Americans also regarded the conflict as a commercial opportunity. They fumed at Macedonia's weapons purchases from Ukraine and openly warned that all aid and lending will be suspended if we did not switch our business to American suppliers.
Q3: What was the perception about them in the Macedonian Government? Did Macedonian Government took them seriously or only perceive them as "empty" threats?
A3: They were taken very seriously. The Ministry of Finance and the National Bank prepared a contingency plan for the event of sanctions. Its details are now available here: Economic Management in a State of War.
Q4: Were they important in Macedonian Government's decision to sign a peace deal? If yes to what degree they are effective?
A4: Not at the beginning. But, as the economy deteriorated sharply, the country's dependence on prospective injections of funds grew. Moneys forthcoming from a donor conference were deemed crucial to the state's ability to defend itself, or even survive - and the donors conditioned their support on an IMF agreement. We knew that the IMF is under the Americans' thumb, nothing but a long and obsequious arm of the United States. We knew that the Europeans wanted peace at any price. A Macedonian settlement was crucial to the EU's role in a unipolar world. NATO, an alliance is search of a purpose, was also very keen. We had no doubt that Macedonia would pay a dear price if it failed to comply with Western dictates.
Q5: In your opinion was the international pressure is "the" determining factor in reaching a peace deal? What role did threats of economic sanctions played within the context of international pressure?
A5: International pressure combined with a lackluster military performance in the battlefield to yield the Ohrid Framework Agreement. It was not "the" determining factor, though. True, the deal was concluded under strenuous pressure by the euphemistically named "international community" - but mainly because Macedonia ran out of economic resources and its army and police were stretched to the limit and unable to tip the scales.
* This interview was conducted by Balkan Devlen.
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