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Terror Glorification In Britain

Dominic Whiteman - 4/30/2007

It has been a criminal offense in Britain for a year now (since 13th April 2006) to directly or indirectly encourage terrorism with those convicted face seven years imprisonment. 'Direct encouragement' is largely the same as the older offence of ‘incitement’. It is 'indirect encouragement' that involves the idea of 'glorifying terrorism' as a part of its definition and thereby introduced an entirely new legal concept on to the statute books a year ago. It is an offence if a statement is issued from which it could reasonably be inferred 'that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated in existing circumstances'. In order to commit an offence, one has either to intend that members of the public be encouraged to commit terrorist acts, or be reckless as to whether members of the public would be encouraged to commit acts by knowingly taking such unreasonable risk that encouragement might occur.

Those who supported the introduction of glorification to the statute books include the Prime Minister, Tony Blair. At a UN Security Council meeting in September 2005, Blair tabled a text on terrorism which became part of resolution 1624. In the resolution, the security council declared its repudiation of attempts at the 'justification or glorification of terrorist acts' and called on states to take measures against such attempts. And, in proposing this resolution, Blair offered the following account of why he believed 'glorification' legislation was necessary: terrorism is 'a movement with an ideology and a strategy... Terrorism would not be defeated until ... [our] defence of freedom was as absolute as their fanaticism, and until [our] passion for democracy as great as their passion for tyranny... Terrorism would only be defeated when the [Security] Council united not only in condemning acts of terrorism but also in fighting the poisonous propaganda that the root cause of terrorism lay with [us] and not them.' He went on: 'The root cause of terrorism was not a decision on foreign policy, however contentious, but was a doctrine of fanaticism.'

Opponents argue along the same lines as they argued against then Home Secretary Charles’ Clarke’s Terrorism Bill in October 2005. They point out that a limit on free speech can only be one that is ‘prescribed by law’. The concept of ‘glorification’ relied on is arguably too vague and imprecise to meet the requirements of that criterion.

They argue the glorification clause is not drafted with sufficient precision to enable a citizen to regulate his conduct effectively. Individuals who call for the use of armed resistance against despotic regimes such as the old Bath Party in Iraq or the military dictatorship in Burma are unlikely to be treated in same way as an Islamic ‘militant’. This opens up the potential for the operation of the law to appear one-sided and aimed at a particular community. So they would say…the very community whose help we most need.

Some argue that existing law already covers the field of incitement well. It has long been an offence of common law to incite others to commit crimes. That - when used in conjunction with the Terrorism Act 2000 - the law is already strong enough to deal with those who espouse support for terrorists. In 2003 in The Queen v. EL-Faisal the infamous defendant was convicted of soliciting murder contrary to section 4 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and of using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to stir up racial hatred contrary to s.18(1) of the Public Order Act 1986. Opponents argue those prosecuted are likely to be lauded by their supporters - that prosecutions will provide the cause of radical Islam with the oxygen of publicity. Their argument is strong in that few within the UK had heard of the extremist Omar Bakri Mohammed before 7/7, but following the widespread coverage of the man and his views since then we can be certain that many more people, including impressionable Muslims, know who he is.

Many of the fears of opponents of the glorification bill have not materialized in the last year. Organized cycle rides “to reclaim the streets” and Armistice day parades have passed by without any unforeseen eventualities. Of course, there may be many hidden uses of the new glorification laws, which have not been publicized, which may have infringed freedom of speech – there are no records, for example, of how many publishers have refused to publish works by Muslim authors for fear of breaking glorification laws.

The glorification aspect of the new terrorism laws seems to have been a success – in the sense that it has helped in the arrests of Islamist extremists in the last year whose groups could not recruit without openly glorifying terrorism. The days of British-based extremists talking of the “Magnificent 19” (in reference to 911), as Omar Bakri did before the glorification laws came in, are hopefully long gone.

One wonders how long it will be before the glorification laws are used to stop non-Islamist individuals who rely for self-promotion – sometimes earnings – by displaying extremist videos on their websites, without really thinking through the messages emanating from their sites. These individuals – who the police regard at best as anoraks and at worst as dangerous cranks – often use copycat domains, built around extremists’ names or extreme groups’ names, to archive some of the worst videos out there. There is evidence that Islamist extremists use their sites as watering holes – where they can lap up the videos when their extremist thirst needs quenching. What would happen, say, if the police arrested certain individuals using evidence from videos, which were then posted on the crank’s website and potentially caused ruptures in the evidential chain? What if an extremist played a film from such a crank’s site while addressing a bunch of likely recruits or, worse, psyching up some suicide bombers?

While the glorification laws are welcome, they need adjustment so that the police’s ability to use them is not inhibited by society’s oddballs and nuts who, in spite of their anoraks, are as deluded as to think that their name is James Bond.