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Bolivian Waves Of Resentment At Chile

Thomas Muirhead - 1/19/2005

A century's old friction between two South American neighbours has recently been awakened from dormancy by the repeated and prominent outbursts of an extraneous leader, Hugo Chavez, Venezuela's controversial president. Most recently he reiterated, loudly, his fanciful desire to swim in Bolivian seas. To most this will seem a rather surprising desire, being aware that Bolivia is quite clearly a landlocked country. There is no Bolivian shoreline for Chavez to bathe off. Herein lies the friction. Over a hundred years ago, Chile invaded Bolivia and began the bloody War of the Pacific. This ended after 4 years of hostilities, with Chile adding what is now a third of its territory from what was the coastlines of Bolivia and Peru. Peru seems to have come to terms with the loss after over a century of brooding, but Bolivia holds the resentment bitterly to this day.

They may have a good reason. Bolivia lost its only access to the Pacific Ocean to Chile and feels this to be a cause of many of the country's economic problems, as well as deeply wounding the people's pride. Diplomatic attempts have continued to this day to little affect as Chile sits tight on a prevailing state of affairs. There have recently been positive movements that suggest Bolivia could be conceded something from Chile but the clumsy, inarticulate, tactless noises made by Chavez, amongst others, most probably to serve his own needs, are raising the hopes of the Bolivians far beyond what seems remotely possible. Chavez is supporting the Bolivian cause but the question remains as to whether his kind of support creates more problems than it solves and whether there really can be some sort of suitable compromise.

War of the pacific

In August 1825 Bolivia declared independence from Spain and a new country was formed. The entire South American revolution had drawn upon the skills of one man, Simon Bolivar who had begun the revolutions that forced Spain from its colonies in Venezuela. He had released the population of the continent from colonial rule, and the pragmatic decisions as to how and where to divide the lands seemed of little importance at the time. For over 50 years of independence the border between Bolivia and Chile had lain around about the Rio Salgado, as above that was the Atacamas desert. This border gave Bolivia about 158,000 kilometres squared of land running 400kms up the coast to the border with Peru.

In the years running up to 1879 Bolivia and Peru were aware of their weaker status as compared to neighbouring countries such as Chile or Argentina. In a show of solidarity they signed an alliance wherein one would come to the aid of the other in the face of invasion by another nation. This accord was tested when on the 14th of February 1879 the Chilean army, referred to by the author Gabriel Garcia Marquez as the "bloodiest of all America", assaulted the Bolivian port of Antofagasta, swiftly followed by the ports of Caracoles and Mejillones and all three fell without resistance. Immediately Peru responded to Bolivia's plea for help and declared war on the Chileans. What ensued was a 5-year war of aggression as a country clearly far better equipped basically plundered as it pleased. The divergence in military power can be easily seen through the 13,000 troops available to the Chilean authorities in comparison to the accumulated 6,000 available to the allied pair, not to mention the vast technological advantages held by the aggressor.

In 1904 a treaty, ratified by all three countries involved, awarded the taken lands perpetually to Chile. Whether there was much option for Peru and Bolivia is unlikely. The treaty gave Chile 73,760 square miles, a third of its present area, made up of coastline within the original borders of both adversaries. This meant that Chile and Peru now shared a border and Bolivia was left landlocked, with no access to the ocean.

Reasons

The rationalizations for this war were many and varied, with very different stories available on any side of all three borders. What is clear, however, is that Chile resented the vast stores of natural resources recently discovered and exploited by the Bolivian and Peruvian governments in the Atacamas and Tarapacan respectively.

Up until the war, the resources of guano, saltpetre and nitrates found in the disputed area had been under the control of the two Andean countries. Many Chilean companies, mostly backed by British interests, had located themselves over the borders to take advantage of these founts of wealth. The official spark, according to Chile, was the decision by the Bolivian authorities to place a tax upon the export of these resources, after having agreed an exemption. Many Peruvians believe it was their lands that attracted Chilean interest, rather than Bolivian areas, and that Chile took the opportunity knowing Peru was bound to come to Bolivia's aid, due to the alliance, to spread up as far as the Peruvian province of Tarapaca.

I think whichever area was most coveted by the Chileans, it is clear that the war was one of impassionate greed, a despised reason to send a country to war, and in most eyes certainly an unjustified one. Had the dispute been coloured by some long lost claim to the lands, or even some wounding insult then in these days of relative morality, we might be able to understand if not condone an invasion. The fact that Chile invaded and seized lands from two countries makes the cold-hearted economic reasons hard to stomach. It is this recognition of maltreatment that allows the Bolivians some hope; there cause is a sympathetic one. It seems right that Chile should recognise its wrongdoing and concede something to the Bolivians. In fact it fits right in with the worldwide idea of almost confessional statements governments have made in acknowledgment of shameful past actions.

Progress

Since the war many different attempts to achieve a lasting solution have been undertaken, without progress. In fact the last hundred years has seen deterioration of relations between the countries. From the 1929 agreement Chile made with Peru whereby neither country could cede any of the decreed lands to a third party without the consent of the other, to the official dissolution of diplomatic ties between the countries since 1962, Bolivia's chances of reaching an accord satisfying to both parties disintegrated increasingly.

The standoff has flirted with military incursion a number of times, and to the leaders even today this seems a conceivable threat. For example, as recently as 2001, Chile, who already command a military domination of the area, applied to purchase new F-16 fighter planes, which raised immediate fears in the neighbouring Andean countries. Bolivia's Defence Minister General Oscar Vargas, has responded with an effort to find the funds to "improve our military means", and Foreign Minister Murillo expressed grave concern that this purchase would inspire a regional arms race.

Chile's position

Chile are in the holding position, and it would seem unwise from a pragmatic point of view to give up when one is winning. Chile holds all the cards. They have the land; their people populate the land; the land has been theirs for over 120 years; they are a more powerful country; politically, economically and militarily (and none of these look likely to change in the foreseeable future)

Chileans are aware of the situation and quite clearly view it to be a case of 'bad luck' on the part of the Bolivians; that those days were days of invasion and conquest the loss should just be accepted as history. The government must represent the people and seem no more willing to consider relinquishing sovereignty. In an interview with Radio Cooperativa, a government spokesman Francisco Vidal stated quite clearly Chile's position: "Discussion about access: absolute willingness; discussion about cooperation: absolute willingness; discussion about sovereignty: it's not up for discussion." A strong reason why sovereignty could not be given over, and one that in my opinion really spells death to the Bolivian claims for the return of their old lands, is that to cede these lands would mean splitting the country in two, a measure unlikely to attract much support from any section of Chilean society.

The possibility then turns to Chile giving some of the land they took from Peru, but with any such proposal needing ratification by Peru according to the 1929 treaty, that seems an unlikely solution. President Lagos of Chile has indicated numerous times his enthusiasm for allowing Bolivian access to the coast by means of a corridor along the border with Peru. Talk of a corridor has grown as Chile sees the possible gains to be made through aiding the export of Bolivia's natural gas resources. The Bolivian authorities need to take advantage of this bargaining tool to persuade the Chileans to give a little, because without a carrot they really need not budge.

Bolivia's impossible war

Bolivia is a country that holds grudges, especially this one. From an early age, for example at the Colegio San Francisco in La Paz, school children chant in time, in answer to a teachers query, "Cual es nuestro deber?" (What is our duty?), the anthem, "estudiar y trabajar para volver al mar, al mar" (to study and work to return to the sea, the sea). The military are made to repeat often the phrase, "el mar nos pertenece por derecho, recuperarlo es un deber" (the sea pertains to us by right, to regain it…a duty). The capital city is flooded with references to 'Bolivia's shoreline', and the country retains a navy, which trains on Lake Titicaca, at 13,000 feet above sea level, for the day when the Pacific Ocean is theirs to roam once more.

The country expects so much that any sort of compromise that does not involve the complete yielding of all Bolivia's former lands is unacceptable to the populace. An example of this can be seen in the recent riots that led to the removal of the last Bolivian president, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada. He was forced to leave for considering exporting the countries vast natural gas resources through Chile rather than the more expensive Peru. The people couldn't understand how Sanchez de Losada could consider awarding contracts, of benefit to Chile, when Chile had not yet given back the land. Soon after his 'resignation', ministers restated the governments view on the matter as: "Any future negotiation over the gas must not be separated from the just and legitimate claim to a free port and sovereign territory on the Pacific Ocean."

These are the problems any Bolivian politicians face when trying to come to some sort of reconciliation with Chile, and such impassioned beliefs are hard to soften. This all or nothing stance by some active elements of Bolivian society plays into Chile's hands as 'all' is just not going to happen, and 'nothing' leaves Chile holding everything.

The Unhelpful

One of the influences that keeps the Bolivian people from realising the situation to be what it is, is the influential, and misguiding stance of impassioned popular individuals who use the situation for their own ends. Figures like the headline, attention grabbing antics of Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, who views this problem as a clear example of the richer more developed state backed by 'gringo' money exploiting the weaker neighbour. He views it as a rallying card for his supposed 'Bolivarian' revolution and a means of hiding his failures at home. This type of simple support brings little but problems…it exacerbates the situation, making any kind of compromise unacceptable to the fired up people.

It leads back to a stalemate from which only Chile gains. Chavez stated, "I'm very sorry for Chile, but I keep dreaming about bathing in a Bolivian beach," at the recent meeting alongside President Bush and 33 other international leaders. He made similar comments at the Ibero-American summit last November and even offered to finance the construction of a road to the 'Bolivian' coast. He is not the only leader who has placed his support behind Bolivia's total claim; the left wing leaders Castro of Cuba and Marcos of Mexico have both shown themselves to be behind Bolivia in this extreme manner. These leaders are inspiring to many of Bolivia's poor and idealistic, of which there are many willing to dream of a continent wide people's revolution, however what they are asking for is nigh on impossible to achieve.

The Helpful

Some recognise the problem as it now stands. To remove the generations of Chileans whom have now occupied the area for well over a hundred years, force them to find a new home and those that remain to adopt a new nationality would seem to commit the crime all over again. Yes, the Bolivians probably have a traditional claim to the land, but unfortunately Chileans have been living there for a long time and now view it as home. The case can be roughly paralleled to the better-known problem concerning Palestinian claims to Israeli lands. A long time ago, Palestinians were ousted unlawfully from their land, by a well meaning international community, and now legitimately claim those lands back, but again here the problem remains that, do the innocent generations now occupying these lands deserve the same fate. The answer is no in both cases. The age-old adage that two wrongs don't make a right is correct, and some sort of compromise must be found. To practically commit the crime again, only with different reasons seems to defeat the purpose of resolving the issue, rather it creates a new group of people with a similar resentment. This sector of the international community recognises this, and feels that some other form of reconciliation can be found.

The Organization of American States (OAS) has supported Bolivia's cause since 1979 with the goal as some sort of agreement between the disputing countries. The recent Mexican summit was another spotlight moment for Chavez but it also saw the United States and Mexico working with 17 nations from three continents and six international organizations, including the United Nations and the World Bank, to form the Bolivia Support Group. This group has been formed to attempt to bolster the Bolivian economy, which will obviously include a consideration of this particular problem. Other vocal supporters of some sort of recompense include U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter.

Conclusion

It is the hopes of these more restrained supporters of Bolivia's cause that seem the most likely to reach any real sort of progress. The expectations of some, for Bolivia to regain its lost lands, are just unrealistic, and will not happen in the near, nor not so near, future. There are possibilities, such as the plan for a corridor of access, or recognition of the area as a trading region outwith the particular sovereign of any of the three countries involved. These possibilities, amongst other compromises, are the only real hope, but they can only happen if the politicians in Bolivia can find a way of painting such compromises as a victory to the Bolivian people. Nothing else will be accepted. Maybe, if Chavez and others would restrain their ardent cries, the Bolivian people might come to realise the futility of their fight and accept a compromise, but the chance of that last prerequisite occurring is slim to none.