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Regional Powerplays and Shifting Sectarian Dynamics in Iraq

Timothy Brown - 7/2/2007

The March 2003 United States invasion of Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, reversed 300 years of Turkish Ottoman, Sunni based monarchial and military rule in the country. The toppling of Saddam Hussein, the Baa’th Socialist Party of Iraq, and moreover, the total evisceration of the governmental structure, set in motion the decentralizing centrifugal forces of sectarianism. The ending of the Saddam regime moved away from the axis of order and central rule the following: the Sunni dominated leadership, the Shi’a majority, and the Kurds. The long oppressed and marginalized Shi’a majority, and Kurds, now found themselves the new political majority in governance, but without any centralizing factors because of an occupation by a foreign power and a violent sectarian based insurgency. The ascent of the Shiites in Iraq, and the internecine strife that ensued, will pervade not only the politics of Iraq but the broader region in the future. By liberating and empowering Iraq’s Shiite majority, the Bush administration helped launch a broad Shiite revival that will upset the sectarian balance in Iraq and the Middle East for years to come.1 The historically driven sectarian power plays between Iran and Saudi Arabia, pertaining to Iraq and its future, will determine whether the Sunni Wall is reinforced or Persia is enlarged while the emerging anti al-Qaeda sectarian dynamic presents a potential stabilizer for security, but not without inherent risk.


History of Sectarianism in the Region and Iraq

The country of Iraq has historically been a point of convergence, and also, a partition between Arab and Persian empires and the Shi’a and Sunni sects of Islam. The Sasanian Empire, which contained parts of Iraq and Iran, would be defeated by Arab incursions and give rise to the Caliphate of Bagdad that would founder the Abbasid dynasty.

The Caliphate, or leadership, of the Muslim community shifted from the Umayyads in Damascus to the Abbasids in Bagdad around 749 BCE. The Abbasid dynasty lasted about 500 years until Mongol invasions brought about its demise. The following, cited from the work Jihad in the West: Muslim conquest from the 7th to the 12th Centuries by Paul Fregosi, describes how the Abbasid dynasty ended at the hands of the Mongol invaders:

In 1258, Hulagu, the grandson of Gengis Khan, captured Bagdad, the capital of the Muslim Empire. He then assembled the population in a field outside the city and massacred them all, then butchered al-Mustassim, the last of the Abbasid caliphs and his family (1998, 210).

The demise of the Abbasid Caliph would give way to the Safavid dynasty in Iran and Eastern Iraq. The Safavid dynasty would be in contention with the Ottoman Empire. The country of Iraq would become the fault line between two empires and both sects of Islam. The Sunni Ottoman Empire and the Shi’a Safavid Empire both converged in Iraq. Iraq was divided into three semi-autonomous provinces under Ottoman rule; the Turks Ottoman Empire supported Sunni governance in order to counter influence from Shi’a Safavid Iran. Persia sponsored Shi’a missionaries during the 1800’s and the majority of Iraq’s population converted to Shi’a Islam.2 Like the country of Poland after WWI, the formal creation of the nation state of Iraq under the British Mandate served as a formal barrier between Persia and the former Ottoman Empire states. The two main historical spheres of influence in Iraq have been the Sunni Arabs through Ottoman Imperia and the Persians via the large Shiite population with whom Iran shares a common religious heritage. Turkish/Ottoman influence pervaded a nascent and emerging Iraq although the British victory ended Ottoman imperial rule. The British administration of Iraq under a League of Nations mandate, and the monarchy that was installed after WWI, followed the typical pattern of artificial colonial design that ignored existing tribal and ethnic boundaries. Iraq would become the following: a frontier between the Arab world and the Persian/Caucasus region, the template for Arab Sunni dominance in the Middle East, and the fulcrum upon which the lever of geopolitics in the region would be balanced upon.


Iranian Power Plays and Strategic Aims in the Region

The ascent of the Ayatollah Khomeini, and the subsequent fall of the Shah in 1979, would become the input force upon the geopolitical effort arm in the region creating an offset to the preponderance of Sunni led Arab governments in the region. What are Iran’s designs for Iraq and the region? The creation of a security buffer zone, improved Iran-Iraq relations, and limited United States influence in the region are Iran’s three strategic aims. The creation of a security buffer zone by Iran would deny primary ground invasion routes from its Western neighbor that were used in the Iran-Iraq war when the Saddam regime attacked and gassed Iranian forces and areas inside the western border of Iran. The strengthening of Iraq-Iran relations is important since Iran has longstanding ethnic, religious, and political ties to Iraq. Iraq’s leading religious authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, is a native of Iran. Tehran also enjoys close ties to the Iraqi Shiite leadership, many of whom were exiled to Iran during the Saddam era. Lastly, Iran seeks to curtail U.S. influence in the region. Iran’s mullahs do not want to see democratization spread across the region or a U.S.-backed client state to emerge on their western border. Also, Tehran does not seek a failed state. Some have called Iran’s policy one of “managed chaos,” which is enough instability to eject U.S. forces from Iraq but not enough to engulf Iraq’s neighbors in a wider sectarian war. To a degree, this keeps [U.S. forces] tied down and not available for use in Iran.3 Additionally, Iran has created spheres of influence and access in the (Sunni) Arab world through the country of Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah.


Making Sunni Inroads

Iran's aspiration to become the leading regional power in the Middle East is dependent on its relations with Sunni Muslims, especially Arabs. Tehran is faced with the choice of courting Sunni Muslims with the aim of modeling a broad pan-Islamic agenda acceptable even to moderate (and often pro-US) Sunni leaderships, or attempt to strengthen its geo-strategic position by overcoming the existing pre-dominance of Sunni Muslims in the Middle East.4 Iran’s three fold access and influence in the Arab world are through Hezbollah, the Iranian-Syrian defense pact, and the support of Hamas in the Palestinian authority. Iran has gained a lot of “street credibility” in the Arab world because of the success of Hezbollah’s armed wing, the Islamic Resistance, against the Israeli Defense Force’s ground invasion into southern Lebanon in the summer of 2006; the standing up to and repulsion of Israel, generated political momentum in which Iran was able to leverage its advantage. The Iranian-Syrian defense pact, formed in June 2006, is an agreement to expand military cooperation against what they called the “common threats” posed by Israel and the United States. Iran’s Defense Ministry said in a statement that the two countries “stressed strengthening mutual ties and the necessity to preserve peace and stability in the region.”5 Providing support to Hamas in the Palestinian Authority is another way in which Iran has attempted to influence Sunni Muslims but not without sectarian concerns being preponderant. For example, Iran has attempted to court Sunni Muslims and often militant Salafis on issues most dear to them, particularly by providing financial support to Palestinian resistance groups and militant insurgent groups confronting their rivals internally, such as the case with Saudi Arabia. However, the problem of discord and sectarian strife still overshadows the inroads Iran has made with Sunni Muslims and Arabs in the region. The Islamic Republic faces serious difficulties in achieving the much sought-after alliances with its Sunni Arab Muslim neighbors despite the pan-Islamist rhetoric of Iran's leadership.6 However, despite the limitations of fully connecting to the Sunni Arab world, Iran has managed to maximize the current regional state of affairs to its advantage.


Exploiting the New Geopolitical Balance in Its Favor

Hezbollah’s success in southern Lebanon and the ongoing Iraqi imbroglio entangling the United States military has allowed Iran’s nascent nuclear program to go uncontested and decoupled from other issues concerning regional stability, for example, the future and stabilization of Iraq. The May 2007 U.S.-Iranian talks held in Baghdad are the thawing of relations that were frozen for nearly thirty years after the fall of the Shah; however, the bilateral talks were only limited to the security situation in Iraq. The sessions, according to both sides, did not veer into other issues that encumber the U.S.-Iranian relationship which is Iran’s nuclear program and the prolonged diplomatic estrangement.7 Iran’s new tilt of the balance of power and influence provided by the disposition of Saddam Hussein has been a main point of concern for its Arab neighbors who fear Persian hegemony and encroachment in the region due to the fissures in the Sunni wall caused by the instability in Iraq.


Saudi Arabian power plays and strategic aims to contain Iran

The predominately Sunni states in the region have long relied on Washington to keep Iran contained for regional stability purposes. Saudi Arabia has been the United States main ally in the region since the 1940’s. The United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia share strong and close economic and security ties. Saudi Arabia is the United States top purchaser of military hardware and armament while conversely the United States is a leading purchaser of Saudi oil. The strong backing of the United States has allowed the Saudis to be very influential in the region. Saudi Arabia has always had tenuous and complex relations with it neighbors Iran and Iraq as well as dealing with its own internal and external threats to its monarchy. Saudi Arabia, as an influencer in the region, has brokered the Taif accords that called for reconciliation between warring factions and an end to the Lebanese civil war and the Mecca agreement that calls for Hamas and Fatah to end the internecine violence and form a unity government. In light of the recent Iraq war conflict, which has tilted the regional balance to favor Iran, Saudi Arabia has sought to counter Iranian influence with the Saudi peace initiative, engagement with Syria, asserting itself apart from U.S. foreign policy, and rallying the Sunni cause in Iraq.


Saudi Peace Initiative

The Saudi Peace initiative, which was proposed at the 2002 Arab summit, calls for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace deal. Under the plan, Israel would withdraw from all occupied Arab lands including the Syrian Golan Heights, back to the borders of June 4, 1967. Israel would, also, reach a just solution to the Palestinian problem agreed upon in accordance with (U.N.) General Assembly Resolution 194 and accept establishment of an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty of Palestinian land occupied since June 1967, including the West Bank, Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital. The Arab states will do the following: consider the Arab-Israeli conflict over, enter into peace agreements with Israel including providing security to all states in the region, and establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace. Spurred by fear of growing Iran influence, Saudi Arabia is emerging as a key diplomatic player whose moves in the region could breathe new life into the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. For the Saudis, regional stability is the name of the game. The two main sources of perpetual unrest in the region are the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iranian radicalism. 8 The Ahmadinejad regime would lose a major raison d’etre for the export of Islamic revolution in the region if the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflicts were ultimately resolved. A comprehensive regional Arab peace agreement, and a solid resolution between the Israelis and Palestinians, would not only potentially isolate Iran, but inevitably force a paradigm shift of Iranian foreign policy. However, a comprehensive regional peace plan has to include all Arab brethren in order to be effective in isolating Iran. Pulling Syria back into the Sunni-Arab orbit is instrumental in the Saudi stratagem of isolating Persia.


Engagement with Syria

The United States ambassador to Syria was pulled out after the assassination of Rafik Hariri in 2005; later, a United Nations tribunal was set up to investigate the assassination with full United States support to press Syria to cooperate with the tribunal. Joshua Landis, a leading expert on Syrian affairs, says “Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s recent meeting with Syrian foreign minister, Walid Moualem, at the conference on Iraq held at Sharm-el Sheik has…complicated Saudi Arabia’s efforts to draw Syria away from Iranian influence.”9 Saudi Arabia…is looking to bring Syria back into an Arab consensus, and to contain Iranian influence in the Arab world by breaking Syria’s isolation and trying to woo it away from Iran. The Harari court stands in the way of that process.10 Severing the Iran-Syria nexus has vast strategic implications for the region because as Joshua Landis further states that “In order to contain Iran, Saudi Arabia understands that it needs Arab unity, and most important in that Arab unity is Syria, because Iran’s reach into the Arab world is through Syria. Hezbollah is armed through Syria. The arms come largely from Iran, but arms cannot be sent through airports, or by ships, because Israeli intelligence will stop them. Therefore the only way to get arms into Lebanon is over the mountains and through the valleys of the border of Syria.” The Saudi assertion is that continuing to isolate Syria only allows them to side with Iran; however, any Saudi-Syrian talks would be divergent of the policy of its main ally, the United States.


The king parts company

King Abdullah’s call for Arab Unity at the 2007 Arab League summit illustrates the emerging different views between Bush and King Abdullah concerning the regional situation of due to the Iraq War. Hassan M. Fattah, New York Times (28 Mar 2007), reported the following in the article “Saudi King Condemns U.S. Occupation of Iraq” pertaining to the growing gulf between Riyadh and Washington concerning U.S. actions in the region and Iraq:

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia told Arab leaders…that the American occupation of Iraq is “illegal,” and he warned that unless Arab governments settle their differences, foreign powers like the United States would continue to dictate the region’s politics….The Saudis seem to be emphasizing that they will not be beholden to the policies of their longtime ally….The king called for an end to the international boycott of the new Palestinian government; however, the United States and Israel want the boycott continued.

Mustapha Hamarneh, director of the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, said the Saudis are sending Washington a message. “They are telling the U.S. they need to listen to their allies rather than imposing decisions on them and always taking Israel’s side.” King Abdullah has not publicly spoken so harshly about the American-led Iraq war before and his remarks suggested that his alliance with Washington may be less strong that Bush officials have been hoping.

True to form, Washington, after the remarks were made, put on the visage that everything was “OK,” like a battered wife in an abusive marriage protecting her husband, so as not to cause any trouble for him. But in this case, to minimize the obvious signs of discontent, Washington glossed it over with a Department of State sound bite and sent Vice President Dick Cheney to the region. Cheney’s May 2007 visit to the Arab peninsula was to “smooth things” over with the Kingdom, sell the American military strategy to secure Baghdad, and reassure the house of Saud about the al-Maliki government. King Abdullah…has sent signals that he doubts the effectiveness of President Bush’s buildup in Iraq. The Kingdom has taken an aggressive leadership role in efforts to quiet Mideast troubles.11 Abdullah, not necessarily aspiring to be like Nasser of Egypt, but to gain credibility, and not to be perceived as an American puppet, has challenged the U.S. military presence in the region.

Rallying the Sunni cause. Financial support for some Sunni insurgents in Iraq has “originated” in Saudi Arabia with private citizens of the Kingdom and charity/religious organizations serving as conduits for the Byzantine remittance process know as “hawala.” Saudi Arabian madrassas have also provided personnel and ideological support for the Sunni cause in Iraq in a similitude of their support to the Afghan Mujahedeen during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Although Saudi Arabia denies actively aiding insurgents, King Abdullah has already expressed that Saudi Arabia will aid the Sunni’s in the event of a security vacuum due to a pulling out of coalition forces or an implosion of the central [Iraqi] government. Abdullah …has signaled that he sees al-Maliki as a weak leader with too many ties to pro- Iranian-Shiite parties to be effective in reaching out to Iraq’s Sunni minority.12 Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution said Saudi Arabia has a reason to take sides: “They’re terrified that Iraq is going to fall to into a civil war. They’re terrified that civil war will spill over into Saudi Arabia. But, they’re also terrified that the Iranians, backing the various Shiite militias in Iraq, will come out the big winner in a new civil war.” Pollack further cites that “The Saudis are nervous about giving Iran any more legitimacy or any more influence in Iraq.”13 The U.S. propping up of the predominately Shiite Maliki regime has been perceived as legitimizing the Shiite position, but moreover, the marginalization of Sunni Arab concerns.


Complex and Shifting Sectarian Dynamics and Their Potentialities

The stability, security, the future of Iraq, and the region, rests with reversing the centrifugal and decentralizing forces within the country and creating centripetal forces that will centralize the various groups back around the axis of order and stability; the angular momentum for this may be found in the sectarian dynamic of both the Sunnis and Shiites opposing the extremist Al-Qaeda of Iraq group but not without potential problems.


Moqtada Al-Sadr Changes Tactics

Although internecine strife permeates the interactions between the Sunni and Shi’a sects, turning their guns on Al-Qaeda would indicate a positive convergence that could drastically affect the security situation. For example, the movement of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has embarked upon one of its most dramatic shifts since the beginning of the war. The 33 year old cleric is reaching out to a broad array of Sunni leaders, from politicians to insurgents, and purging extremist members of his Mahdi Army militia who target Sunnis….“We want to aim the guns against the occupation and Al-Qeada, not between Iraqis,” stated Ahmed Shaibani, 37, a cleric who leads Sadr’s newly formed reconciliation committee.14 The pan-Islamic approach being advocated here by al-Sadr has both positives and negatives. The positive is a decrease in Sunni-Shia inter-sectarian violence which caused so many deaths. The debit side is that coalition forces could now become targets of the “occupation” by a common Sunni-Shiite backed insurgency.


Baghdad Sunnis, al-Qaeda Clash

The extreme reactionary ways of Al-Qeada have added another layer of complexity to the internecine strife, Sunni on Sunni intra-sectarian violence. The following excerpt from The Washington Post article, “Baghdad Sunnis, al-Qaida clash,” by John Ward Anderson, illustrates this point:

Sunni residents of a west Baghdad neighborhood used assault rifles and roadside bomb to battle the Sunni insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq…leaving 28 people dead and six injured. The mayor of the Amiriyah neighborhood, Mohammed Abdul Khaliq, said…that residents were rising up to try to expel al-Qeada in Iraq, which has alienated other Sunnis with its indiscriminate violence and attacks on members of its own sect. “I think this is going to be the end of the al-Qaeda presence here,” Abdul Khaliq said of the fighting…which began over the accusations that al-Qeada in Iraq had executed Sunnis without reason….The Baghdad battle is evidence of a deepening split between some Sunni insurgent groups and al-Qeada in Iraq, which claims allegiance to Osama bin Laden. Although similar rebellions occurred in the Diyala province earlier this year, the fighting…appears to be the first time the conflict has reached the streets of Baghdad (2007).

The new quasi-nationalist, anti al-Qaeda shift in sectarian dynamics has the potential to create the centripetal forces needed to stabilize Iraq and to mitigate the internecine violence that has been a by product of a weak central government to secure its population; however, the shift in dynamics has allowed a convergence between the anti-al-Qaeda Sunni insurgents and U.S. coalition forces. With the four month-old “surge” in American troops showing only a modest success in curbing insurgent attacks, American commanders are turning to another strategy: arming Sunni Arabs groups that have promised to fight militants linked to Al Qeada that they have been previously allied with in the past.15 The new convergence between coalition forces and the Sunnis, while very pragmatic, and beneficial security-wise, has the potential to reverse itself against the coalition and become the principia of other problems.


The Inherent Risk of Arming Sunnis:“The Enemy of the Enemy Is My Friend”

The new partnership strategy between the coalition forces and Al-Qaeda has produced very favorable results in the Anbar province which as long been a hotbed of the pro-Saddam, Sunni based insurgency. Although the marriage of Sunni and coalition forces represents a significant and exploitable counter-insurgency approach, the dissolution of this union has the potential to turn nationalist, anti-coalition, and become the precursor of a civil war. But while the marriage of convenience may be successful for now, the Sunnis seem to have no intention of making a lasting commitment to the Americans. In Buhruz Iraq, Abu Ali, a former Saddam regime intelligence officer, states that “After we are done with al-Qaeda, we will ask the Americans to withdraw from Iraq…if they do not withdraw, there will be violations and the American Army will be harmed.” He adds, “Especially after the help the U.S. Army has provided us, we would like them to go home as our friend, not enemy.”16

The support of Sunni groups for short term security gains has the potential to founder a civil war since it is essentially amounts to arming both Sunnis and Shiites whom have yet to reach a political solution or critical accommodations with one another to foster unity within the central government seated in Baghdad. For example, the United States has spent more than $15 billion in building up the Iraqi Army and police force, whose manpower of 350,000 is heavily Shiite. With an American troop drawdown increasingly likely in the next year, and little sign of a political accommodation between Shiite and Sunni politicians in Baghdad…, there is a risk that any weapons given to Sunni groups will eventually be used against Shiites.17 The shotgun marriage between the coalition forces and the Sunni anti-al Qaeda groups has been the most pragmatic development for the coalition, in light of the “troop surge,” after almost five years of occupation which has produced more casualties than stability. However, the offspring of this union, which is a noticeable decline in Sunni attacks on coalition forces and a rejection of al Qaeda, has the potential to further exacerbate the extant instability due to militarizing groups whose government representatives have failed to produce stability and security for their constituents.


Towards the Future of Iraq and the Region

The March 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein was one more tumultuous event in the history and politics of Iraq. The United States lead military endeavor codenamed ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom,’ brought an end to a portion of Arab Baa’th Socialist rule and influence in the region the same way that the 1958 coup severed a branch of the Hashemite kingdom family tree with the demise of King Faisal II. The modern nation state of Iraq has always been shaped by power struggles, internecine strife between various clans, tribes, ethnic groups, and religious sects. However, the United States desire to implement a Jeffersonian democracy in Iraq had triggered a centuries old sectarian dynamic endemic to Iraq, but one that has reverberated epidemically in the region. The favorable tilt towards Iran produced by Saddam’s disposal, and the ascent of a predominantly Shiite government in Iraq represents a reshaping of the Middle East along sectarian lines. In the coming years Shias and Sunnis will compete over power, first in Iraq but ultimately across the entire region. Beyond Iraq, other countries will (even as they embrace reform) have to cope with intensifying rivalries between Shias and Sunnis. The overall Sunni-Shia conflict will play a large role in defining the Middle East as a whole and shaping its relations with the outside world.18 The historically driven sectarian power plays between Iran and Saudi Arabia, concerning Iraq and its future, will determine whether the Sunni Wall is reinforced or Persia is enlarged while the emerging anti al-Qaeda sectarian dynamic presents a potential stabilizer for security, but not without inherent risk to the security environment of Iraq and the Middle East.