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AKP’s Victory: Politics of Identity and Economic Effectiveness and Empowerment

Timothy Brown - 7/29/2007

The recent July 22, 2007 elections in Turkey heralded a victory for the Islamist (AKP) Justice and Development party over the other contenders. Six years after the tragic event that occurred in New York City and nearly five years after the United States invaded Iraq, the Middle East and Arab world has been viewed in terms of oversimplified categorizations, for example, Islamist/Moderate, Religious/Secular, and Sunni/Shia. The Turkish elections were viewed in a similar context: Islamist vs. Secularist. Looking deeper than the Islamist vs. Secular paradigm that framed the election from a western media perspective, one would see that oversimplified Islamist-Secular paradigm, in relation to the elections, was more about Turkey’s identity and the strong correlation between economic progress and political empowerment.


Islam, Democracy, and Secularism: Turkish Identity Markers

Democracy is not a characteristic of most Middle Eastern governments while democracy and secularism describe most western style societies. Additionally, Islam and secularism have created social and cultural antitheses in the Arab world and through out the Middle East. The uniqueness of the Turkish republic is that all three coexist together making Turkey the only Arab country, and also a NATO member, with a functioning democracy. Turkey is exemplary of the fact the Islam, democracy, and secularism can coexist in the Arab world, however, this has been the root of conflict identity with the Turkish republic since its inception. In order to clarify this point, a short historical overview of Turkish republic is in order. The Turkish republic has its origins as the seat of the Ottoman Empire that stretched from Eastern Europe to Mesopotamia until the end of World War I. Out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, a brilliant young Army officer, Mustafa Kemal, would founder a nationalist movement and lead Turkey’s 1919-1922 war for independence that would keep the country from being divided up between European powers. In 1923 Mustafa Kemal would become the Turk republic’s first President and founding father; it would be his sweeping reforms of modernization for the new Republic that would founder Turkey’s identity issues.


Ataturk’s revolution, modernization at the expense of cultural identity

Kemal Ataturk’s reforms were both revolutionary and uncomfortable. His reforms were revolutionary because they reshaped Turkish society along the lines of a modern, democratic, and secular state out of the vestiges of the Ottoman Empire; his reforms, or much better stated revolution, led to a nation state with an unusual dichotomy for a country in which Islam is the predominate religion. That dichotomy was the separation of religion from the state along the lines of most western style democracies. This was revolutionary because it was more than just about Western style reforms; it was revolutionary because Kemal Ataturk’s reforms redefined and recreated Turkish culture apart from the religion of Islam which asserts a particular cultural and social identity upon the people and places where it is the predominate religion. The revolution, however popular, had caused the nation to be divided as to what is the role of religion and to what extent should it be influential in the day to day affairs of Turks. This has been uncomfortable for those concerned over Islam’s revival. The most formidable threat today to the Ataturk legacy, and particularly to the Turkish republic, is radical Islam. For eighty-four years since the birth of the republic, the Military has been the vanguard of the secular democracy, or moreover, the Kemalist ideology, intervening at various times in order to maintain the dichotomy religion (Islam) and the state. The challenge to the Turkish government is how to preserve the Ataturk legacy while not simultaneously disaffecting, distancing, and marginalizing Turks from the entity of Islam, which links them to the Arab world and provides a moral and spiritual force for them, while at the same time preserving the Kemalist revolution which connects them to Europe and the western world.


Turkish Islam: politicized but not radicalized

The main characteristic of the influence of Islam in Turkey is that although religion was marginalized in the political sphere, devout Muslims were not totally disenfranchised from the political process. The early years of the Republic were shaken by violent uprisings of religious leaders and stern repression by the secular state. After World War II, the authoritarian regime relaxed and gave way to a more democratic, multiparty system. The new breed of politicians remained true to Ataturk’s project of Westernization but was more tolerant of Islamic practices and actually courted the Islamic vote.1 Radicalization was prevented by the fact Muslims had access to the political process within an established republic as opposed to being politicized within a post-colonial Arab monarchy such as post World War I Iraq and Egypt. In those countries Islam became a vehicle of political opposition and divergence to oppressive western-backed colonial monarchies. However, in Turkey, Islam connected the rural dwellers in the cities with urban conservative values. The Islamic movement [in Turkey] not only resolved problems of identity and conservative angst. It became a channel to political power, social status, intellectual prestige, and economic wealth, for people who in one way or another had been marginalized by the republican ethos. From within these circles…, ascended a new generation of businessmen who differed from the established business community in their conservative values. From within this movement, counter-elite had arisen. Paradoxically, as Islamists entered into elite circles, with different values and lifestyles than those of the more established elites of the Turkish republic, prospects for radical Islam become dimmed.2 The important point to be recognized here is that about 99 percent of Turkey’s 72 million inhabitants are Muslim, and whether secular or religious, headscarf or not, identify themselves as such; this is why Turkey has been spared of the religious factionalism that has racked other countries in the region.3


Economics and Political Empowerment

The victorious AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) or Justice and development party is…a product of the religious, merchant class in rural Turkey. During the economic boom in the 1980’s, large numbers of rural Turks moved to the cities, forming a new Islamic middle class with its own wealthy elite. That religious class, in the form of Mr. Erdogan’s party, pushed to the upper reaches of the state’s power apparatus.4 A strong and stable economy contributes immensely to political stability and to democracy. The AKP’s broad victory was due to its record on the economy. For many who voted for Mr. Erdogan’s party, the election was a referendum on the party’s economic performance.5 During the party’s tenure, rampant inflation has been tamed, annual growth has run to 7%, unemployment has leveled off and the national currency has strengthened. The boom has bought a middle class life style within reach of millions of Turks, including many in the party’s religiously conservative core constituency.6 However, the AKP’s economic track record and overall government performance still has others unconvinced of its true intentions.


Assuaging secularist fears and concerns

Although the party has turned the economy around and made reforms in order to bring Turkey into the European Union, the secularists are not totally convinced and continually suspect a hidden Islamist agenda from Mr. Erdogan and his party, as cited by the Burak Akinci, from the Turkish Daily News article, “AFP: AKP strives to shrug off Islamist image:”

Erdoğan's government has carried out democracy reforms that ensured the start of Turkey's EU membership talks and pursued pro-market policies that stabilized the fragile economy and boosted growth. Rural, pious Turks still form the backbone of the AKP electorate, but analysts expect the party to also muster support in Sunday's election from traditionally centrist voters. The government is widely credited for easing access to medical care, providing free textbooks to schoolchildren and supporting the poorest with food and fuel aid. AKP officials fiercely reject accusations that the party uses the democratic system to advance a "secret agenda" to transform Turkey into an Iran-style Islamic republic."We are at the centre of the political spectrum. The AKP receives votes both from the left and the right," said Egemen Bağış, a senior AKP deputy. The young politician, who left his business in the United States to join the AKP in 2002, represents the party's modern, urban face. Accompanied by his wife, the manager of a luxury fashion retailer in Istanbul, Bagis launched his election campaign with a cocktail reception at the city's museum of modern art, where the guests were entertained with drinks and classical Western music. But hard line secularists remain unimpressed. "This is deception. A few leftist candidates (on the AKP list) is only window-dressing," commented journalist Yalçın Doğan. "The AKP is still essentially run by Islamists." The AKP's detractors include the military, the judiciary and the academic elite, which see themselves as the guardians of the secular legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey.7

Although the AKP won big and savored in its victory, the real political work begins with smoothing over differences with secular Turks and others opposed to the Islamist party’s win. Accepting victory before a crowd of…supporters at his party’s headquarters in Ankara, the capital, Mr. Erdogan immediately…addressed fears among millions of urban and middle class Turks that his party is bent on unraveling decades of determinant secular rule launched under the founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Ataturk. “No matter who you voted for, I respect your choice,” Mr. Erdogan said.8


Conclusions

The Turkish elections drew world-wide attention because of media hyped Islamist “take over” slant that is overly present in post 9/11 news reporting from the Middle East. To the media’s dismay and the West, the AKP’s victory did not bring out AK-47 wielding, green Islam head band wearing Turkish jihadis chanting “death to America, death to Israel.” The majority post election celebration images from the media show both headscarf wearing and non-headscarf women waving banners and national flags. The AKP’s victory occurred in a distinctly Turkish context, and has little relevance to pack journalism which sees a “wave of Islamist victories” in Pakistan, in Morocco, and in Bahrain.9 Although the Turkish elections were viewed in a similar context: Islamist vs. Secularist. Looking deeper than the Islamist vs. Secular paradigm that framed the election from a western media perspective, one would see that oversimplified Islamist-Secular paradigm, in relation to 22 July 2007 elections, was more about Turkey’s identity and the strong correlation between economic progress and political empowerment.


REFERENCES

1 . Marvine Howe, Turkey Today: A Nation Divided Over Islam’s Revival (Colorado: Westview Press, 2000), 2.

2 . Binnaz Toprak, “Religion and State in Turkey (2001),” http://www.dayan.org/mel/toprak.htm, (26 July 2007).

3. Howe, 1.

4 . Sabrina Tavernise, “Ruling Party in Turkey Wins Broad Victory,” The New York Times, nytimes.com, (23 July 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/23/world/europe/23turkey.html?ei=5070&en=97b201c3 (25 July 2007).

5 . Ibid.

6 . Laura King, “Turkey’s ruling party wins big in parliamentary elections,” Los Angeles Times, latimes.com, (23 July 2007), http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/middleeast/la-fg-turkelect23jul23,1,1635 (25 July 2007).

7 . Burak Akinci, “AFP: AKP strives to shrug off Islamist image,” Turkish Daily News, (28 July 2007), http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/vote2007/article.php?enewsid=7 (28 July 2007).

8 . “Turkey’s big result,” Economist.com (23 July 2007), http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9535158 (28 July 2007).

9 . “The AKP: Turkey and Islamic Politics,” The Estimate, political & Security Intelligence Analysis of the Islamic World and its neighbors, Vol XIV, No. 20 (November 4, 2002), http://www.theestimate.com/public/110402.html (27 July 2007).