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Indian Ceasefire Sine Die?

Chiranjib Haldar - 8/19/2007

The ceasefire between the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN -I/M) and the government of India has been extended sine die on July 31, 2007. If we turn the clock back, the truce in Nagaland has been extended every 12 months since 1997, except in 2005, when it was renewed for just six months at the insistence of the rebels and further prolonged by another six months in February 2006. It was endorsed for another year on July 31, 2006 in Bangkok giving a fillip to the peace process. As of now, it is a war of rhetoric, bravado and threats of resorting to the extreme, aimed at making the opponent cower before the battle and ease up on their respective adamant stances. Ending speculation on both sides, at the end of the day on July 31 it was another leash of life to the ceasefire that both parties agreed upon in 1997. This is a natural corollary, for in the decade gone by, the peace ushered in by the ceasefire, though flawed, has become a powerful vested interest for all and sundry. Be it, mandarins in the North Block, the NSCN (I/M), the Nagas and other northeastern communities.

One should read the fine print in the joint statement issued by the center's key interlocutor, K. Padmanavaiah and NSCN (I/M) general secretary, T.Muivah ‘…it was decided to extend the truce indefinitely from August 1, subject to the progress of talks’. Reinforcing the ceasefire monitoring mechanism and adopting the Spanish government model of talking to the Basque separatists, whatever that means, may be the NSCN (I/M) leadership’s ploy to simply play to the Naga gallery. According to a status paper issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs recently, there has been no significant fall in civilian and military casualties in Nagaland in the year gone by. However, inter-factional clashes, read the NSCN (Khaplang) offensive against NSCN (I/M) has led to militant fatalities from both groups. The Nagaland government has been asked by the Ministry of Home Affairs to prepare an action plan to tackle this growing inter-factional rivalry.

There have been major glitches in the decade gone by. A lot of bad blood has been created between the Nagas and the Meities in the Imphal valley, an offshoot of the centre’s ambivalence. Former Prime Minister I.K.Gujral who brokered the armistice, initially refused to reveal its terms and conditions in parliament. Gujral did admit that he had discussed the ceasefire’s jurisdiction with Naga leaders Muivah and Isak Swu and yet within months of the truce, Naga-inhabited areas of Manipur bore the brunt of violence. For New Delhi it has been a carrot and stick policy – both the NSCN factions have been asked to go back to their camps. The bottom line is, it may be better to stagnate in peace than in hostility. The NSCN (I/M) has softened their rigid stance and have realised to some extent that the centre has to abide by the Indian constitution at any cost. Talks in Dimapur unlike in Amsterdam or Bangkok earlier are a pointer in that direction.

NSCN (I/M) hardliners have understood that if a decade of negotiation did not bring in any tangible result for them, armed rebellion could not do it either in the past 50 years since 1947. Semantically it was a ceasefire between two equal parties, but never in reality. For there was another unwritten script that emerged concurrently. In the peace breakthrough, the Indian interlocutors, first Swaraj Kaushal and then K. Padmanavaihah have always kept the upper hand by gerrymandering, overlooked by Muivah and IsacSwu in the euphoria of expectation. In this script, the Government of India was the benefactor, giving the insurgent organization another chance to reform, or else a honorable exit. If this was not so, the preconditions of the ceasefire would not have been about setting up designated camps for the insurgents.

The NSCN (I/M) has been accusing New Delhi of tacitly helping the Khaplang faction to weaken their strength. They blamed the Indian army for the supplies of automatic weapons to the Khaplang faction that has led to their recent revival. The Indian army has stoutly denied all such allegations. India has termed this a systematic violation of the ground rules of the ceasefire agreement by both the factions. It had also appealed them to end the battle peacefully and amicably failing which it said it reserves the rights to use force to flush out all such militants.

The Nagas were the first ethnic group in the northeast to revolt against New Delhi’s rule. On August 14, 1947, Naga leader Angami Zapu Phizo and his Naga National Council (NNC) asserted that the Nagas were never a part of India and demanded a sovereign status. However, New Delhi summarily rejected their demand that marked the beginning of the long haul of the armed struggle in Nagaland. India made efforts to broker peace and Nagaland became a state in 1964. Though a ceasefire was signed between the Indian government and the NNC, the Naga rebels continued their offensive that made the government abrogate the truce in 1969. However by then chinks had appeared in the Naga struggle. Then came the Shillong Accord that was signed in 1975. The trio of Muivah, Swu and Khaplang decided to sever ties with their parent body and formed the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980. But soon the NSCN was mired in internal problems, with leaders differing on major policy issues on clan and tribal lines. The NSCN split in 1988 with Khaplang forming a parallel NSCN (Khaplang). By 1992, the two NSCN factions, Isac Swu-Muivah and Khaplang were engaged in a fratricidal war over territorial supremacy.

Unlike the Mizo National Front in Mizoram, whose rebel leader Laldenga formed a government in 1986, politically the ceasefire has been unproductive for the NSCN (I/M). Despite the braggadocio, they have not been able to topple any democratically elected government in Kohima. The implicit basis always was, and still is, the settlement reached, has to be ultimately within the Indian Constitution, or within acceptable limits of amendment to the constitution. If the NSCN (I/M) or any bellicose group chooses to negotiate peace and thinks anything beyond this is achievable, they should be prepared for a hundred years of futile negotiations. It puts the ordinary citizens in total misery. They are berated by opposing laws, different extortion regimes and are expected to be loyal to two powers on the threat of being castigated either for being party to sedition to the nation, or being a turncoat.

There are, however, a few critical questions. During earlier talks, the NSCN (I/M) had proposed ‘a special federal arrangement’ and a separate constitution under the arrangement, both seemingly impossible propositions. The government of India has serious objections to both the demands. It’s not in favour of redrawing the boundaries of its northeastern states for the territorial unification of Nagaland. Ultimately the legendary Naga rebel leader Phizo had also accepted the Indian constitution. New Delhi expects an aging Isac Swu-Muivah and Khaplang to fall in line in may be another 10 years of extending the cessation of hostilities. But history repeats itself. Who knows another group owing allegiance to the NSCN (I/M) will break away and carry on their struggle as Isac Swu-Muivah had done when the Naga National Council signed the Shillong accord with then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1975.