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Shia Revival, Shia Triumphalism

Jason Guberman-Pfeffer - 8/20/2007

Vali Nasr (2006) The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 304, $17.13

It is certainly true that a Shia revival is manifest in post-Saddam Iraq—the first and arguably the last Arab Shia nation—and that this reality’s reverberations across the Middle East cut deeply against the grain of the historic Sunni-Shia and Arab-Persian divides which make up the regional dynamic. To admit as much is, however, to grasp the pinnacle of Shia ascendancy. Iraq, Lebanon and the Islamic Republic in Iran are collectively likely to remain the greatest possible extensions of Shia power. 1 In Iran’s case, while its outward influence continues to grow, paradoxically, it is a diminishing power internally.2 Shia enclaves in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf states and (most notably) the oil-rich Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia cannot be overlooked, but by author Vali Nasr’s own admission, these minority communities have each in various ways been oppressed, subdued, and continue to be closely monitored by majority Sunnis, thus limiting just how much they can rise and insuring their predictable falls whenever desired. Nasr is therefore at once true in the descriptive and mistaken in the predictive in stating that:

The Shia revival rests on three pillars: the newly-empowered Shia majority in Iraq, the current rise of Iran as a regional leader, and the empowerment of Shias across Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and Pakistan. The three are interconnected, and each reinforces the others. Together they ensure a greater Shia voice in Middle East politics and are pressing events toward a new power distribution in the region. All this will also mean a more even Shia-Sunni balance of power in the Middle East than has been seen in nearly fourteen centuries.3

After meticulously documenting the mainstream Sunni antipathy toward the Shia—from the pejorative names4 Sunnis call them, to the fatwas they issue labeling Shi'ism heresy5 and condoning their massacre6 to the government policies that translate these sentiments into action—it is disconcerting to then talk of “a new power distribution” in the region that will be more evenly balanced.7 Just how is this realignment to come about if previously and without exception, Shia attempts at empowerment have all ended in failure? This fact has been reinforced again and again whether by the election of a few Shia prime ministers in Pakistan,8 Shia protests against inequality in Saudi Arabia,9 and Shia attempts to throw off the yoke of minority Sunni rule in Iraq (by uprising)10 and in Bahrain (by coup d'état).11 Therefore, wouldn’t it seem altogether more plausible to suggest that Sunnis (or at least the extremists among them) will stop at nothing to reverse Shia gains? Wouldn’t this history also prove that, faced with enough carnage, the characteristically less temporally-minded Shia (with the exception of politically-savvy Persians) will be intimidated once again since they have “always back[ed] down” in the past?12 This is precisely the assumption that the Ba’thist and Sunni Islamist insurgencies13 are operating under in Iraq proving that the Shias’:

chosen government and their venerated religious leaders were feeble and incapable of protecting them. Nor was the United States able to provide the security the Shia yearned for. Shia were not safe in their markets, homes, mosques, police stations or, symbolically, at the large religious gatherings that were banned under Saddam.14

Considering the Iraq situation alone, it may be prematurely triumphalist to cast the Shia as heir presumptive to the region when even in that country they are still as-yet incapable of stemming Sunni violence with the aid of the most powerful military in the world. Moreover, this reality cannot merely be wished away by Nasr’s use of the past-tense “were,” when events on the ground very much “are.” Shia may have lived low and resigned to their fate these fourteen centuries, but Sunnis “associate their faith’s validity with worldly success,” and will never abdicate what is in their view their “rightful” supremacy without a fight.15

This is not to say that Sunni victory is a “given” and that Shia revival can be taken lightly, or at least “need not be a source of concern for the United States.”16 To ignore the revival is to become its victim—as the Shah learned in thinking so little of Ayatollah Khomeini that he rejected out-of-hand Saddam Hussein’s prophetic counsel to take him seriously or (at least) to let the Butcher of Baghdad pay a visit to the exiled cleric.17

The revival is very potent, aggressive, and threatening because it is ultimately not about “Shia empowerment,” but Iran’s hegemony. The revival (if it ever was independent of the most populous Shia state)18 has been co-opted to the point where it is synonymous with Tehran’s machinations for regional power as represented by the global reach of Hizballah, the removal of Sunni regimes in Baghdad and Kabul, the rise of Hamas (a Sunni Islamist organization which now is primarily funded by Iran),19 the resurgence of the Taliban (a Sunni Islamist erstwhile enemy that reportedly has turned into a pragmatic ally),20 as well as Iran’s nuclear program. A representative view of the Iranian government which underscores this reality was expressed in a recent interview by Hossein Shariatmadari, an adviser to the Supreme Guide of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and a self-proclaimed “journalist” of sorts. According to Shariatmadari:

God has helped us a lot because our enemy [George W] Bush is stupid. His stupidity has helped us a great deal. By attacking Iraq, Bush ended the rule of Saddam Hussein and this worked in our favor. The exceptional capacities of Iraqi people, which were hidden under the strict rule of Saddam Hussein, were launched and this is another point in our favor because Iraq and any other Muslim nation that is liberated from dictatorial oppression is a friend to us. Now people who were in exile in Iran for decades are in power in Iraq. This is an important advantage and is the third point in our favor. Through his attack on Iraq, Bush struck a blow to all liberal democracies around the world. I think this caused embarrassment to Francis Fukayama. Those who support the United States and the groups that were trained by the United States do not dare to voice their support for the United States now. There have been many advantages to Bush's actions; therefore we are not afraid of external factors. Americans threaten that they will target Iran militarily. We know that this is a mere psychological threat; Americans are amidst a major crisis in Iraq. Even in Afghanistan, there are roughly six provinces in the south that are now controlled by the Taliban and other Afghan groups. An attack on Iran would be very costly to the United States… We are militarily ready and prepared for anything. I believe that if anything happened, Americans and Israelis would regret it. Hezbollah is just a sample of what could happen; we can compare it with what we can do.21

This, in short, is the true Shia revival. There will be a “greater Shia voice,” but Iran is going to be doing all the talking. “Liberation” from “dictatorial oppression” (read: Sunni governments) either by “stupid” Americans who are advancing Iran’s interests at their own expense, or by Iran itself will only benefit Shia populations peripherally and arguably will be to their detriment when they are caught in the crossfire. While not wanting to give credence to the discriminatory “fifth column” canards against the Shia that are prevalent in the Sunni-Arab world, it is no exaggeration to state that Iran has used these Shia as such, and will do so in the future to advance its own interests without regard to their co-religionists’ well being. A prime example is last summer’s Hizballah-Israel War which while opportune for Iran, was less than fortuitous for Lebanon.22

Iran’s efforts in Iraq surpass its involvement in any other country, including its substantial support of Hezbollah’s state-within-a-state in Lebanon. Nasr elsewhere has characterized this in two ways: a public “constructive” role, and a greater “unofficial influence”—which is what it is, Tehran acting to secure its advantage to Washington’s amateurish dismay.23 But, was soft Iranian imperialism really that predictable?24 In retrospect, with the fall of Saddam, Iranian Shia pilgrims and increased trade between the countries was pretty much understood to be in the offering; the infiltration of Iranian intelligence officers, support for Shia militias with training and weapons, and interference in the political process should also have been understood to be a likely outcome. However, the construction of institutions and concerted efforts to monopolize entire sectors of the Iraqi economy could hardly have been expected to take place in the open as they are today (neither, for that matter, the continued U.S. and Coalition ambivalence to this clear and present danger). 25 Iyad Jamal al-Din, a member of the Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List has stated that Iran has established “centers and libraries… for strategic purposes and to fulfill specific political objectives.” More troubling are the comments of Iraq MP and Secretary-General of the Iraqi al-Ummah Party, Mithal al-Alusi, who believes that Iraq is: “entering a new stage of the Iranian presence [there]. Formerly [it] was the presence of their intelligence and their provision of weapons and money to the militias only, however today they have penetrated deep into our lives through their control of energy, the economy and communications.”26 Iran’s interest is not in Iraq per se, but in how to use Iraq to further its regional objectives. In Nasr’s own words: “Iraq’s significance lies not in detailed questions of governance but in the lesson that Shias can demand more and get it.”27 Replace “Shias” with “Iran” and the situation becomes magnitudes clearer.

Despite all these apparent successes of late, it must be noted that, in typical Middle Eastern fashion, the revival is susceptible to experiencing the same defeats and reversals as past movements whose rhetoric outmatched reality. Even Iraq may just be a “cemetery of dreams… Iranian dreams, no less than American.”28 Shariatmadari’s boisterousness about Iran’s military preparedness is especially telling (although, the Hizballah threat is no hyperbole). Déjà vu best describes the experience of comparing the underlying assumptions of the current alliance of Iran, Syria, Hizballah and Hamas with those of Arab Nationalism from:

a half-century ago… that Israel, America, and the West are really weak. If Arabs and Muslims are willing to sacrifice themselves and their societies as martyrs, they can achieve victory. In this respect, Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah, Palestinian leader Khaled Mashal [of Hamas], Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sound eerily like Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Syria's rulers and others in the 1960s. It was this kind of thinking, for example, that led to the Arab defeat in the 1967 war.29

Almost inevitably such arrogance leads to blunders. After the rather brilliant manipulation of the media with the taking of British hostages and their release (on Easter, 2007, with flower-print goody bags no less),30 Iran has almost certainly miscalculated in imprisoning Haleh Esfandiari on trumped-up charges.31 If the Iranian government intends to keep up the appearance of being amenable to negotiation, it defies logic to arrest “Esfandiari, an Iranian-born U.S. citizen, [who] is director of the Middle East program at the Woodrow Wilson Center.” Ironically, Lee Hamilton, the overall director of the Center has “urged increased U.S. engagement with Iran.”32

The Esfandiari case pales in comparison to the catastrophic failures of Ayatollah Khomeini which Nasr documents in great detail. While Khomeini had a penchant for appropriating exalted titles for himself (such as “Imam”) and went even further by shrewdly leaving the question unanswered as to whether or not he was the long-awaited Twelfth Imam,33 there is no doubt that his governance did not meet the criteria for the Shia messianic age or that of a Platonic philosopher-king (an ideal he also fancied).34 Far from the perfect rule incumbent to the Twelfth Imam’s return, Khomeini brought incompetence, cynicism and death.35 Hundreds of thousands of Iranians (many of them children and adolescents) needlessly died in human wave tactics in the Iran-Iraq War as a result of Khomeini’s purge of the once-powerful Iranian military. Perhaps worse than throwing away the lives of an entire generation was the way in which Iran manipulated and exploited its “troops.” They were given plastic keys to “paradise,” and made to believe that that the “Twelfth Imam” had actually returned with the appearance of white-clad actors atop white horses during battlefield nights. Victory, these countless innocents were told, was just on the other side of Iraqi mine fields. 36

The Islamic Republic’s handling of the economy was and, to the present day, continues to be an abysmal failure. Khomeini is quoted to have fantastically said that “economics is for donkeys,” and “we did not make a revolution to slash the price of watermelons.”37 (With such a mentality, it is no wonder the “per-capita income of Iranians today is 30% less than 1978…. Unemployment is high and inflation rampant.”). 38 The decreasing standard of living is just one reason why many if not the majority of Iranians are, as one youth expressed it: “fed up with being forcibly taken to heaven”39 while they find life in the Islamic Republic an earthly hell. Khomeini’s heirs are increasingly being haunted by the Iranian “baby boomerang” or the children born to “replace” those lost on the battlefield at the government’s behest, who are now in the majority and largely pro-Western.40

Aside from the weakness of Nasr’s projections, it is worth noting an important omission, as well as the shortcomings of his recourse to comparison. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, the Shia were only second to the Christians in supporting Jerusalem’s stated objective of dislodging the PLO (and they hoped all Palestinians). Shia greeted Israeli soldiers “as liberators, with flowers and open arms.”41 The relationship was much deeper than mere greetings, and did not end with the rise of Hizbollah as Nasr implies. There was an entire Shia brigade (Number 70) which served in the SLA (South Lebanon Army) until the year 2000 when Israel ignominiously retreated from the “buffer zone,” and left their SLA allies without provisions to continue the fight against Hizballah. Many followed the retreating Israelis across the border, rather than surrender to and thereafter have to live under Hizballah.42 To be sure, money was an incentive which compelled many to serve in the SLA, but the facts remain that even the now notorious Hizballah stronghold of Bint Jbail, a “town of 30,000 that serves as the capital of south Lebanon” was, prior to the collapse of the “buffer zone,” very much opposed to “their” (Shia) militia, Hizballah.43 The town was pro-Israeli according to Labour Member of Knesset, Ephraim Sneh, who was the commander of south Lebanon. He recalls that Israel “established a big civilian clinic there [and] many residents worked in Israel under the Good Fence program.”44

Nasr consistently relies on familiar references to Westerners to try to make Shia history, practices, and the Shia/Sunni divide more accessible. This is highly effective in parts, e.g., Catholic Lenten rituals as a parallel to Ashoura.45 However, other examples are misleading, if not wrong. In one such case, he compares Shia messianism with “Orthodox Jews… who at first condemned Zionism for taking on the messianic task of returning Jews to Palestine.”46 Despite cautioning that neither Shia nor Sunni believers are monolithic,47 he seems to think that Orthodox Jews are. This comparison only gets a little better when, in repeating it, Nasr inadvertently changes “Orthodox” to “ultraorthodox.”48 It is true that some but not all Orthodox Jews (primarily of the ultra-Orthodox persuasion) were opposed to Political Zionism and still oppose Israel, the Zionist State, but by no means are even the latter unanimous in their position.49

Nasr is remarkably helpful in shedding light on a subject which has previously received scant attention. 50 While no single work can ameliorate such longstanding negligence, this insightful treatment will undoubtedly spurn greater scholarly interest as well as that of policymakers. For this reason alone Nasr is to be congratulated, but to do so only for that reason would be an injustice; The Shia Revival is an important contribution in and of itself. Its scope, vivid detail and historical depth—remarkable for such a thin volume—are indispensable to fostering a better understanding of the Shia and the implications of the greater role they are now playing in the region. However, it must be said that the analysis in regard to the future does fall short of the rather ironic promise of Parmenides “test of reason” with which it began. 51 The sentimentality of the “blind eye” or “echoing ear” was not entirely dispensed with, thus betraying the understandable, but still overly-optimistic hope of its author that the region will eventually be Shia-dominated. 52 Nevertheless, it is an opinion well worth hearing and the very real need for more of it, is an expression of the genuine gratitude owed for what Nasr has already given.