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Home >> United States & Canada >> Foreign Policy & Military Baghdad Ablaze: Interview with Prof Ray Tanter On Winning In Iraq and Iran Ryan Mauro - 8/20/2007 Professor Raymond Tanter is the president of the Iran Policy Committee. The IPC has just published their new book, “Baghdad Ablaze: How to Extinguish the Fires in Iraq and Allow for a Triumphant Return Home of US Military Forces.” Raymond Tanter served at the White House as a Senior Member on the National Security Council staff, from 1981 to 1982. In 1983-1984, he was personal representative of the Secretary of Defense to arms control talks in Madrid, Helsinki, Stockholm, and Vienna. In 1967, Tanter was deputy director of behavioral sciences at the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense and a member of the Civilian Executive Panel, Chief of Naval Operations, 1980-1981. RM: The basic idea of "Baghdad Ablaze" is how to secure a stable Iraq. Can you summarize what the action plan is of the authors? RT: The authors of Baghdad Ablaze present a six point plan to stabilize Iraq: 1. Prevent Tehran from infiltrating its paramilitary and intelligence forces into Iraq by stopping them at the border and/or capturing or killing them in Iraq. 2. Isolate the Iranian regime diplomatically and economically to constrain its influence in Iraq; if reaching out to Tehran were the policy, however, it would be wise to reach out to the opposition as well in order to provide the U.S. with leverage in any negotiations. 3. Enlist the Mujahedeen-e Khalq to wean Sunnis from the insurgency and break the cycle of sectarian violence. 4. Empower the Iranian people by de-listing the Mujahedeen-e Khalq from the Foreign Terrorist Organizations lists of the United States and European Union. 5. Win Iraqi public support to take direct action against Iranian proxies in Iraq, including disarming the militias. 6. Support Iraqi economic growth, while decreasing Iran's subversive role in the Iraqi economy. RM: Did the authors unanimously support or oppose the "surge," or was there disagreement? RT: The authors all supported the surge, but of far more concern is the need to shift to a counterinsurgency strategy and to tie the surge to political benchmarks. Under previous commanders in Iraq, Coalition forces remained isolated from the population and only ventured into urban areas in heavy formations that made easy targets for roadside bombs. This conventional strategy also left the Iraqi people vulnerable to insurgents and militias, deepening the resentment of an ineffective occupation General Petraeus has shifted to a counterinsurgency strategy that embeds U.S. forces in vulnerable communities, allowing the troops to build trust among the Iraqi people and win them away from sectarian extremists. RM: What specifically do you propose doing with the MEK to stop Iran? Would you use other Iranian opposition groups? And I get lots of emails from Iranians who despise MEK. Do you worry about turning such Iranians against us? RT: Baghdad Ablaze does not favor supporting the MEK, the book reports on research, which suggests that removal of the MEK from the foreign terrorist organizations lists of the United States and European Union would achieve international security objectives and make Europe and the United States neutral in Iranian politics. RM: Do you believe arming former insurgents and Sunni tribes is a wise strategy? Some people fear we are arming our future enemies. RT: In the short term, such arming may be necessary, but a more effective long term strategy would involve disarming many of the Shiite militias that are supplied by Tehran. Denying these militias materiel would obviate the need to arm Sunnis. Ideally, the Iraqi army would balance against both extremes, but will not do so as long as the United States continues to do the dangerous and dirty job of counterinsurgency. Another solution that would avoid having to arm the Sunnis as a balance is to use the main Iranian opposition group--the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK)--which is based in Iraq as an interlocutor between Sunnis and moderate Shiites who are not affiliated with Iran. The MEK is already playing this role to some degree, but could be more effective if the United States actively reached out. RM: Why do you think the MEK can convince Sunni insurgents to stop fighting? RT: The MEK has excellent relations with Sunni politicians who are in touch with the insurgency. See Appendix H of the book Baghdad Ablaze for a statement of support signed by tribal Sheiks in Diyala Province and a declaration of support from the "National and Islamic Parties in Diyala Province." The MEK also is in a unique position to play a mediator role between Sunnis and the U.S. military, because the Iranian opposition has a keen understanding of the Iranian regime's infiltration of Iraq, which is the common threat shared by Sunnis and the U.S. military. Awareness of such a common threat would be the basis for weaning Sunnis away from the insurgency. RM: What were some of the major mistakes made in Iraq that caused the current situation? RT: The two major mistakes, which are now widely discussed, are de-Baathification and disbanding of the military after the fall of Baghdad. These decisions had the effect of creating a massive gap in security and provision of government services. While the system—including most of the military and government bureaucracies—was in large part broken before the United States invaded, the fear that held the old system together evaporated following the invasion. In the absence of a national army and effective police force to provide security, sectarian militias and insurgents became the most attractive protectors for local populations. Without the most loyal, competent, and feared members of the ancien regime—the Fedeayeen and Baathists—the glue that held the country together was gone: basic services faltered and communities came to rely on support from extremists, many supported by Iran. This mirrors the strategy Iran has used in southern Lebanon to win popular support there. RM: It seems every time we try to hand power over to the Iraqi forces, they fail. What is being done differently (or should be done differently) that will make this time any different? RT: Until there is a political deal cut, a handover cannot be successful. Thus far, the Iraqi government has been divided and characterized by sectarian parties withdrawing support for the Maliki government, elements of which are close to Iran. Without a unified government of national reconciliation to which the Iraqi military can devote its loyalty, one cannot expect Iraqi forces to be effective. RM: Ahmed Chalabi, once the Pentagon's favorite to run Iraq, has made statements arguing that Iran is not a big contributor to the insurgency, and he opposes US policy towards Iran. Do you believe Chalabi can be trusted? RT: There is a wealth of evidence that Iran is supplying Explosively Formed Penetrator IEDs that are killing U.S. Forces. RM: To what level are Iraq's neighbors responsible for the survival of the insurgency? How much of an impact would cutting off Iranian support have? Do you believe Iran is supporting Sunni, as well as, Shiite insurgents? RT: While the invasion and occupation of Iraq provided a spark and the ongoing heat for violence, and sectarian differences provided fuel for the fires, Iran's infiltration has been like oxygen fanning the flames of violence. There is no doubt that Iran is supporting both Sunni and Shiite militia, as evidenced by the widespread use of Iranian made explosives (including explosively formed projectiles (EFP) made in Tehran for export to Iraq), the capture of IRGC officers in Iraq, training facilities, and support networks. Iran has an interest in perpetuating violence in Iraq, because the continuation of conflict would expedite the departure of U.S. troops and allow Iran maximum influence over Iraq. While cutting off Iranian support would not solve all of Iraq's problems, no plan can be successful unless Iranian infiltration is countered. There will be no victory in Iraq or stability in the Middle East until the United States confronts Iran over its blatant support for terrorism and insurgency in Iraq and the greater Middle East. RM: What specific evidence is there that Iran is arming Sunni insurgents? If "there is no doubt" this is occurring, why does there seem to be so much debate about it? RT: During a December 2006 raid in Baghdad and a January 2007 raid in Irbil, the U.S. military arrested several Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Qods Force members who possessed documentation that demonstrated they were providing assistance to Sunni groups, including al Qaeda. There is debate on this point because it seems at first counterintuitive that Iran, an ideologically motivated Shiite Islamist state, would support Sunnis, who are ideologically incompatible. It is also at first glance strange that Iran would support the enemies of its Shiite Iraqi proxies. Contrary to the conclusions of the Iraq Study Group, though, Baghdad Ablaze concludes that Iran has an interest in an unstable Iraq. Indeed, Iran has an interest in a chaotic Iraq that will hasten U.S. withdrawal and allow Tehran to exert maximum influence in Iraq. Arming both Sunnis and Shiites accomplishes these goals. RM: How do the authors propose we stop Syrian, Saudi, Chinese, and (according to some) Jordanian support for the insurgency? RT: To stop support for the insurgency, the United States need to show Sunni Arab states that the U.S. military is not cutting and running from Iraq, that the United States is trying to develop a national compact for Iraq, and is taking steps to contain the Iranian threat to the Arab states. Iraq's Sunni Arab neighbors are supporting the insurgency because they recognize that Iran is winning the unconventional war by infiltrating Iraq militarily, politically, and economically. Compelling Iran to cease subverting Iraq would reassure Sunni Arab states so that they would refrain from supporting their proxies in Iraq. RM: How should Moqtada al-Sadr be handled (do we launch a Fallujah-like offensive on Sadr City)? And do you believe the reports that Iran has hijacked rogue elements of the Mehdi Army, or is Al-Sadr still controlling all of the Mehdi Army's actions? RT: The first step must but to cut off the arms flow from Iran. In this respect, the MEK could help the U.S. military by providing intelligence on the Iranian regime's activities in Iraq. The MEK has provided useful intelligence to the U.S. military in the past. Taking direct action against the Mehdi Army would require the U.S. military to win Iraqi public support. A fractured Iraqi government translates into greater support for sectarian militias aligned with Tehran. By helping to establish a true government of national reconciliation, the United States could diminish popular support for radicals like Moqtada al Sadr. RM: Have you talked about backing the Iranian opposition to any presidential (or potential presidential) candidates? It is surprising that the idea has not been brought up in any debates. RT: Yes, and I am hopeful that the idea of being neutral in Iranian politics by removing the main Iranian opposition groups from terrorist lists and using them as mediators in Iraq will enter into presidential election dialogue.
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