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Russian weapons in the Middle East

Natalya Hmelik - 9/1/2007

The last three days of July the leader of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas spent in Moscow . Actually, Mr. Abbas is the leader of the West Bank, with the Gaza Strip under control of Hamas radical movement, a rival of his Fatah party. But many in the world, including in the United States, Europe and even Israel, have recognized him as the only legitimate Palestinian leader and a great peace-lover and rushed to help him. Russian President Vladimir Putin also offered Mr. Abbas support in a form of 50 armored personnel vehicles for his security forces and an announcement that Russia had downgraded the level of relations with Hamas. According to Russian Foreign Ministry those contacts would be "pragmatic". Anyway Hamas has received an invitation to Moscow while Mr. Abbas was still there.

Mr. Putin's regime is the only member of the Mideast "quartet" of international mediators - the United States, European Union, United Nations and Russia - that recognizes Hamas and invites its leaders to Moscow. Thus, Khaled Mashal, the political leader of Hamas, sometimes described as the leader of the movement's Syrian branch as he resides in Damascus, visited Moscow in March. There he called for lifting the sanctions against Palestinian Administration introduced after Hamas' victory at Palestinian parliamentary election in early 2006, and for support of the "unity" government Hamas and its rival Fatah party were arranging under Saudi sponsorship. He also sought to increase Russian arms export to the Arab world and promised to attract Arab investments in Russian economy.

In June, after Hamas took the Gaza Strip under control and the idea of Palestinian unity was buried, Russia seemed to avoid dealing with the movement at large. However, Russia said it wanted contacts with Hamas' "political wing" as opposed to the military one. Now it hopes to make use of its exclusive relations with the movement to come out as a mediator reconciling Fatah with Hamas.

The said is an obvious example of Russia's interest in the Middle East and its ambition to restore its one-time clout in the region. Since he came to office in 2000, Mr. Putin has wished to restore his country's great power status. As long as the economy was weak, the first years of his rule were the time of anti-terrorist alliance with America after September 11, 2001 , terrorist attacks on the United States , and cooperation with Europe . But with the rise of oil prices Russia, rolling in petrodollars, promptly forgot its friendship with the West and came to pursue what its officials call independent foreign policy. The political goal of its return to the former Soviet zone of influence in the Middle East is to demonstrate its power in a region where American influence is on decline.

The economic goal is the increase of trade with the states interested in Russian non-energy exports, mainly weapons. Russia’s oil wealth allows it to waive the Arab countries' debts, which have been made in the Soviet times of "political export", when "progressive" regimes and organizations all over the world, particularly in the Middle East, got arms for a song or even as a gift. Now Russia sells missiles to Damascus and Tehran, upgrades Syrian Air Forces' fighters MiG-21 (Fishbed), MiG-23 (Flogger) and MiG-29 (Fulcrum) bought in the Soviet Union. Russian-made advanced anti-tank guided missiles Kornet and RPG-29 (Vampire) grenade launchers sold to Syria were used by Hezbollah terrorist organisation against Israel during the last summer conflict in the South Lebanon. Earlier this year Moscow started supplying to Damascus a batch of the Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly) air defense systems worth at least $200m. Contracts of Russian arms dealer Rosoboronexport with Syria are totally worth near $10bn.

Russia's arms trade with Iran started in the Soviet times and continued after independence despite American pressure. Before 2001, Moscow supplied Tehran with two air regiments of MiG-29 fighters and Su-24 (fencer) bombers, three diesel subs 877 EKM (Kilo), several divisions of S-200 (SA-5) surface-to-air missile systems; established license production of T-72 main battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers BMP-2 and Kornet missiles. After a short break, in November 2005, Russia signed $1bn contract to supply the Tehran regime with 29 surface-to-air missile systems Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) and a consignment of military boats, and upgrade Iran's Soviet-made bombers and fighter jets.

The scale of trade with other Mideast countries is not so impressive but Russia makes its best to get further ground in the region. Two years ago Russia sold two Ilyushin Il-76MF military transport aircraft capable of carrying 60 tons of cargo or up to 305 people. The United Arab Emirates have in service about 1,000 Russian-made armored personnel carriers and are in negotiations with Russian arms-dealer Rosoboronexport Company and the maker of the vehicles, Kurganmashzavod Company, on establishment of a joint venture to maintain and upgrade them in Abu Dhabi . The Emirates also have a contract for supply of air defense vehicles Pantsyr S1, some of which are already delivered.

Russia has also supplied Libya with short range shells and Yemen with T-80 main battle tanks and MiG-29 fighter jets.

But does Russia really exert an influence on Arab states it supplies with military hard ware? This still seems unlikely. Just look at Iran . Despite Western pundits' talking of democracies' inability to do without Russia in the standoff with Iran , Moscow has not been able to draw any rebate from Tehran that continues its nuclear program and threatens to wipe Israel off the map. Now Russia itself says it will terminate the supply of fuel for a nuclear power station in Iranian port of Bushehr if the regime of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad doesn't allow UN inspectors to all its nuclear sites. Iran replies by threatening to file a suit against Russia in the Court of Arbitration in The Hague.

"Moderate" Arab regimes buying Russian military hard ware are not so much interested in Moscow 's ideas on creation of an OPEC-like gas cartel. They politely listen to Russian offers but its efforts have so far come to smoke. They are also in no hurry with investments in Russia.

Russian policy in the Palestinian Authority is also far from success. It cannot bring any profit as the very ideas of “Palestinian economy” in general, and “economy of the Gaza ” in particular, involve contradiction in terms. Those 50 armored personnel vehicles were given to Mr. Abbas as "humanitarian aid" rather than sold. Even the West Bank, though being wealthier than Gaza, cannot afford such expenditure at present and will hardly be able to do so in the foreseeable future. So, Russia can expect neither substantial profit from its deals with Palestinians nor significant increase of its influence in the region.
The basic reason for Russia ’s continued failures in its Middle East policy is its irrational desire both to eat a cake and to have it. It wants to earn a lot of money from international arms trade, but also to be as influential in the region as the Soviet Union in the times when it gave out free weapons to every pro-communist terrorist asking for them. However, these two approaches require very different clients. To earn money, you need prosperous and reliable partners. To stir up trouble, you need gangs of aggressive fanatics. Mr. Putin has to understand that one simply cannot be both.