Home >> South Asia >> India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal Email Print Gen. Pervez Musharraf, and the Demise of One More of America’s Client Dictators Timothy Brown - 9/9/2007 Previous foreign policy has seen the United States cooperate with, support, and engender dictatorial leaders at the expense of democratic development and reform for geo-strategic interest. Ferdinand Marcos, the Shah of Iran, Papa and Baby Doc Duvalier, Manuel Noriega, Saddam Hussein, Augusto Pinochet, and President-General Pervez Musharraf are a sampling of the client dictators that the United States has used in order to stave off regional communist expansion, contain Islamic revolution, and combat global trans-national terrorism. The United States has accommodated the above although they ruled by force, repression, and absolute power at the expense of good governance in exchange for geo-strategic positioning and influence in differing parts of the world. Doing the bidding of Washington at the expense of good governance and democratic reform has ultimately caused some former heads of state to become ultimately expatriated and die in exile never again to set foot upon the soil of their native lands. Gen. Musharraf is feeling the awkward pressure of being an American ally in the Global War on terror and managing the internal dynamics that are foundering the divestment of his power as the chief of the armed forces as well as the office of president. Gen. Musharraf’s current political situation, not to mention his lack of options, may be the basis of a possible power sharing deal with former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. If Gen. Musharraf accepts Bhutto’s offer he has to take off his uniform and relinquish control of the military, one of Pakistan’s most powerful institutions, become a civilian president, and another casualty of American geo-political strategic interest and policy. It is in Musharraf’s best interest to accept Bhutto’s offer for the following reasons: it will more than likely prevent a cataclysmic shift of power, for example the Iranian revolution, and will allow Musharraf to set a precedent as a client dictator not to be forcibly removed and exiled from power after he has outlived his usefulness to Washington.
Conditions for a Cataclysmic Shift of Governance
In 1979 the Shah of Iran departed his country on a permanent vacation never to return again. The Ayatollah Khomeini became the leader of the first Islamic Republic in the Middle East. Khomeini’s ascent to power was the result of a popular revolution that transferred power to the clerical elite in a Bolshevik like manner. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi’s (the Shah of Iran) close association with the West, and its policies, and the failure to implement economic and democratic reforms became the impetus for the internal dynamics that would provide kinetic energy to the Islamic revolution. Pakistan today in many ways resembles pre-revolutionary Iran. A cosmopolitan middle class is prospering, yet for the great majority of poorer Pakistanis life remains intolerably hard and access to justice or education is a distant hope.1 Additionally, the regime has not allowed the freedom of association, the freedom of movement, the freedom of speech for moderate political forces, and so by default, the mosques and the madrassas have become the only outlet of permitted political expression in the country.2 The above activities of political repression combined with the gravitation towards the mosques and madrassas have created the conditions for political religious extremism and popular opposition to the military regime.
The outside drivers for political opposition are the West's close association with a military dictatorship… [which has] alienated Pakistan's people and is playing into the hands of those hardliners who blame the West for the ills of the region.3 Musharraf’s sacking of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry in March of 2007 and the Lal Masjid (Red mosque) debacle have put Musharraf’s presidency and the country in crisis. Musharraf’s only viable option in preventing a drastic regime change from the present political crisis would be to cooperate with former PM Bhutto.
The Bhutto and Musharraf Pairing, the divesting of Dictatorial Power
Mussharaf has very limited options in resolving the current political crisis and fortifying his own position; the worst case scenario for him would be meeting the same fates as the Shah of Iran or Ferdinand Marcos. However, a Bhutto-Musharraf power sharing deal seems to be Musharraf’s most viable option at the moment. As unlikely as it might have seemed a few months back, this is now Musharraf's best shot. There are dangers in this strategy, not least the role of the Supreme Court, which could still stop Musharraf from running again or hinder Bhutto's return from self-imposed exile, or both. There's also the fact that Bhutto's popularity has taken a hit since talk of a tie-up with Musharraf broke, while last week, the Supreme Court ruled that the exiled Nawaz Sharif could return to Pakistan to oppose Musharraf's bid for another term. A Pakistani official [had] stated that Musharraf has sent representatives to London ... to discuss a power-sharing pact with Bhutto....Washington is encouraging such a deal in the hope that together Musharraf and Bhutto can capture Pakistan's moderate middle and help save the country from extremists. This reasoning overlooks the fact that Musharraf has helped fuel many of the problems that his country now faces but the sense of urgency is almost palpable.4 The problems that Gen. Musharraf has engendered with his hard-line approach have eroded his authority and have caused political defections among his own supporting party. Despite his... appearances on a...weekly television show, the general’s power is oozing away. Even strong-arm tactics have been denied him. Last month American pressure forced him to back down from imposing a state of emergency. Members of his own Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q)...have already resigned or fled.5
Future Possibilities of Pakistani Governance
Bhutto and Musharraf have denied talking to each other recently about a possible power sharing arrangement. The future governance of Pakistan will be decided by the masses; they will also ultimately determine if Musharraf needs to make post military-presidential living arrangements outside of Pakistan. President Musharraf's tussle with the chief justice spawned an unlikely opposition coalition of secular [middle class] and religious parties as well as most of the legal community who are determined that he should leave office; also, Pakistan is being wracked by daily suicide bombings by Islamic extremists outraged at the military's operation against the radical Red Mosque.6 The strengthening of Musharraf’s political opposition resulting from the Chief justice affair and his mishandling of the Red mosque affair has incited the worse political violence since Musharraf’s eight year rule. What began as small-scale demonstrations against the president's effort "to tame" the judiciary soon became huge protests, attended by most opposition parties, against military rule.7 Uncontrollable nation wide political protest, such as the late 1978 violent nation wide strikes and protest in Iran prior to the Shah’s departure and the 1986 “people power” movement in the Philippines that led to Marco’s ouster, are exemplary of political oppositions gaining a momentum that only left one option: exile.
Former PM’s Bhutto and Sharif are planning to return to Pakistan; this definitely presents challenges to Musharraf in terms of holding on to power. Given the current political situation in Pakistan, Musharraf has two viable options for not meeting the same fates as the Shah of Iran and Ferdinand Marcos: first, take off his uniform and run as a civilian in the upcoming elections. Second, allow a fair and transparent contest of power between him and the political opposition at the ballot box. Anything other than the two viable options above will continue to exacerbate the current political crisis, further alienate the middle class, continue to engender the political violence by extremist elements, and ultimately find Musharraf with the same living arrangements as the man he ousted in 1999.
REFERENCES
1 . William Dalrymple, “Days of Rage, Challenges for the nations future” The New Yorker (23 July 2007), 6, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/07/23/070723fa_fact_dalrymple?currentPage=6.
2 . Benazir Bhutto and Richard Haas, “A Conversation with Benazir Bhutto,” Council on Foreign Relations (15 August 2007) New York, NY, Audio Transcript, http://www.cfr.org/publication/14041.
3 . Ibid.
4 . Simon Robinson, “Musharraf Fights for his Job,” Time (28 August 2007), www.time.com, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1656901,00.html?iid=sphere-inline-sidebar.
5. “The race back home,” The Economist, Vol. 384, No. 8544 (September 1st-7th 2007), 35.
6 . “Q & A: Pakistan’s Political Crisis,” BBC News, (1 Sept 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6653475.stm.
7 . Ibid.Timothy Brown is a 20 year vetern of the United States Army, which included participation in the Gulf War. He's currently pursuing a degree at the American Military University in Middle Eastern studies with a concentration in Persian Gulf Security issues.
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