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Dealing with Iran: The Key to Bush’s Middle East Legacy

Namjoo Hashemi - 9/15/2007

The recent resignation of Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, and long-time friend of President Bush, follows the path of Carl Rove and Donald Rumsfield. While things have not been going well for the Bush administration on the domestic front, his foreign policy has taken even greater hits. There’s been no progress to report in Afghanistan; rather, the Taliban gain ground there daily and though the recent surge in troops in Iraq, while it may have offered temporary relief in limited areas, any sign of a long term positive affect are fading fast. With criticism mounting from all sides, the White House has begun the process of allocating blame for the U.S. failure in Iraq on Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki and his government. Sadly, as President Bush shows no sign of altering his foreign policy strategy the next president of the United States will inherit the neo-con debacle this Administration has created in Iraq and Afghanistan.

When U.S. troops rolled into Baghdad on the afternoon of April 9, 2003 and shortly thereafter dismantled the ever-so-famous statue of Saddam Hussein in Ferdows square, White House and Pentagon analysts were busy congratulating each other on the ease with which they had toppled Saddam’s regime. Nearly one month later came President Bush’ famous speech on the U.S.S. Lincoln signalling that the major battle for Baghdad was over. Given the lack of resistance in Iraq, the world actually thought maybe George Bush will go down in history as someone who brought liberty to the Iraqi people after decades of dictatorial rule.

Yet Pentagon analysts were soon to realize Sun Tzu’s famous maxim of war “know thy enemy.” The past fours years have shown the world that our foreign policy-makers neither fully understood nor were prepared for the vacuum of power created by Hussein’s downfall. To attempt to fill this vacuum with democracy-lite, without first understanding the power struggles between Iraq’s constituent groups has been a disastrous exercise.

Given the various religious groups and factions that exist in Iraq, sadly, it took a brutal tyrant to keep these various groups under control. Democracy is not something that can be exported via a Pax Americana—only its indigenous form has legitimacy in the eyes of its constitutions, and indigenous forms take generations to adapt.

The future of Iraq is bleak, with the infiltration of Al-Qaeda, and various militias all vying for control. Recent reports that the U.S. has begun to supply weapons to various insurgent groups in hopes of curtailing violence, is a clear sign of confusion reminiscent of U.S. support of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan during the 1980’s; which later resulted in the birth of the worlds most wanted terrorist, Osama Bin Laden, who was once indirectly trained and supported by the U.S.

George Bush is eager to end his second term as President on a positive note. While victory in the Middle East may never be achieved, he hopes to at least be a catalyst for progressive change in the region. With this in mind, George Bush realizes any change in the Middle East will only come once Iran is dealt with.

Iran’s influence in Iraq and Afghanistan has only grown since the U.S. invasion. It is no secret that numerous members of the current Iraqi government and parliament sought refuge in Iran during Saddam’s rule. Plus Iraq’s majority Shia population has always held close religious ties with Iran. Tehran should be thanking Washington for removing two of its worst enemies, the Taliban and Saddam Hussein and strengthening its position in the region. While the U.S. was slowing acclimatizing itself with the region after invading Iraq, Iran was quickly making in-roads and increasing its influence in Iraq.

As long as Tehran feels a threat of increased sanctions or a possible attack from the U.S, it will continue to favor chaos in Iraq and Afghanistan. The longer the U.S. is preoccupied on those fronts, the less likely an attack on Iran becomes. Iran has been taking full advantage of this scenario by talking tough on the international scene. Frequent speeches by President Ahmadinejad warn that any attack by the U.S. will be a move the U.S. comes to regret. Iran continually stalls IAEA inspectors and negotiators in an effort to buy more time to advance its nuclear program.

The end game for Iran is clear: – Iran wants to develop a nuclear weapon and automatically become an unwelcome member of the exclusive nuclear club. Ahmadinejad claims that Iran is now running 3,000 centrifuges aimed at obtaining enriched uranium. Whether or not his assertion is factually accurate at this time, each month Iran comes closer to achieving its goal of a nuclear powered arsenal.

The UN’s modus operandi remains consistent: gradual pressure on Iran, but the U.S. appears ready for confrontation. The U.S. plans to officially declare Iran’s revolutionary guards (who receive direct command from the Iran’s Supreme leader, Ali Khamenei) a terrorist group, this will be “a shot across the Iranian bow” aimed at linking and setting the scenario to tie Iran’s rulers to terrorist activities. Such a move will almost certainly close off any diplomatic solution for the coming Iran-U.S. crisis.

Iran’s recent appointment of a new leader of the revolutionary guard forces (Sepah-e Pasdaran) comes as a surprise and indicates a potential change in its strategy.; whether positive or negative this is yet to be seen. There is significant evidence that the revolutionary guards support Hamas and have also been know to support militia groups in Iraq. Labeling the revolutionary guards a terrorist organization, given its influence in the Iranian government, will give the U.S. the ammunition it needs to support a much harder stance against Iran. Connecting Iranian support for insurgents in Iraq directly to the ruling elite in Iran is the first step to direct confrontation between Washington and Tehran.

A military attack on Iran is likely to be as great a debacle as the invasion of Iraq and will escalate the destabilization of the entire region, but to compromise with Iran and give Tehran the international attention and clout it is seeking is a pill no one in Washington wants to swallow.

Although the goal of a fully transparent and truly democratic Iran is laudable, such an outcome can only be achieved through diplomatic negotiations and the continued nurturing of the seeds of reform. Iran has the pillars to build a democratic foundation and like any regime, also has a tipping point for negotiations. As we’ve seen with Libya and now the recent announcement by North Korea considering its nuclear program, Iran must be enticed in a manner that diffuses nuclear ambitions while setting the stage for reform and democracy internally.

The recent announcement that the former Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani (a pragmatic-conservative) has been elected to head of Iran’s Council of (Religious) Experts is significant. It suggests a weakening of the forces of ultra-conservatism and a triumph of more pragmatist forces. As Rafsanjani indicated in his opening speech the council intends to have more say running the country’s affairs, with a strong likelihood of influencing Iran’s international policies. It is in the world’s interest to see this internal Iranian trend continue. Rafsanjani is someone who the West can deal with and it is our own short and long term strategic interest to adjust U.S. foreign policy to ensure this outcome.