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India and Pakistan: The Unsolvable Conflict

S K Modi - 2/18/2005

India and Pakistan, or at least their respective leaderships, are trying hard to improve relations with each other. Diplomats and ministers are shuttling between the two capitals and joint statements are being issued, as well as a recent announcement of new road and rail service. George Bush and Tony Blair are throwing appreciative glances and hopes are running high once again, but the real issues continue to be ignored by the policy makers. Similar attempts have been made in the past, but failed to produce any tangible results.

The primary problem between the two countries is Kashmir. At the time of independence, this state had acceded to India, but about a third of it was taken over by Pakistan in the war of 1947-48. The attack was rather sudden and audacious, taking India by surprise. India could have easily retrieved the territory, but instead of fighting, India's leadership decided to approach the United Nations. A ceasefire was ordered and the status-quo was expected to be maintained by both the sides. Wars broke out again in 1965 and 1971. After the 1971 war, an accord stipulating status-quo (as prevailing after the 1948 war) was signed between the then prime ministers Indira Gandhi of India and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan.

After that things were quiet until the late eighties. At that time the Indian government was headed by the young and relatively inexperienced Rajiv Gandhi. Insurgency and terrorism started growing. Since then, the atmosphere on the borders has remained explosive and relations between the two countries have been far from cordial. India has consistently accused Pakistan of supporting terrorists and disruptive forces operating on the Indian side of what both the sides like to call "the line-of-control," rather than the border. Credible evidence of cross-border sponsorship of terrorism on Indian territory has been presented to the US administration on several occasions by India. However, the US has had its own political compulsions and, therefore, has chosen to ignore the evidence, though it goes to the credit of the US administration that it has acknowledged the authenticity of information provided by Indian authorities.

The key problem between the two countries is that both want to own the Kashmir part of the state of Jammu & Kashmir. The ground reality is that neither side is in a position to accept the line-of-control as the permanent border. Any Pakistani ruler who accepts the line-of-control as the permanent border is quite likely to lose his position within days. Whichever Indian government accepts the line-of-control as the permanent border may not face an instant popular uprising, but is likely to lose the next round of elections. Therefore, the line-of-control continues to be the line-of-control and not the border between the two nations.

Talks between countries inevitably stumble over Pakistani demands on Kashmir, which India considers to be its integral, non-negotiable part. In July 2001, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf visited India for three days, but returned without signing any accord - the two sides simply agreed to continue talks.

There isn't much that either side can do, except to forget that a dispute exists and try and live in peace with each other. Let things be as they are. However, there is a difference between the Indian and the Pakistani approach in this context. The people of India are willing to ignore the continued occupation by Pakistan of a part of Kashmir that they believe should belong to them. If there is peace on the (effective) border and a government makes no attempts to retrieve the lost land, Indians are ready to accept it.

But in Pakistan, it is a different story. If a government, whether elected or military, stops making efforts to gain control of the Indian part of Kashmir, it can lose power quickly. Every government in Pakistan has to make the people, particularly the cadres of its armed forces, believe that it is striving to gain control over the entire Kashmir. That is the first pre-requisite for maintaining public acceptance of a ruling government. Leave aside economic development, quality of life, peace, even food, clothing and shelter are secondary priorities. This is a somewhat complex phenomenon that is intertwined with a certain degree of religious fanaticism, as well as the general animosity that a large nation invites from smaller neighbors. Besides, the military establishment in Pakistan, like elsewhere in the world, has its own axes to grind, the most important being to justify its disproportionately (in relation to the nation's resources) high size and expenses.

Therefore, Pakistan continues to create trouble, the ostensible claim being that it wants the people of Kashmir to have the right to determine their own destiny. In February of 1999, the then-Prime Minister of India Atal Behari Vajpayee undertook his legendary bus trip from the border town of Amritsar to Lahore in Pakistan. At that time, Pakistan had a democratically elected government, headed by Nawaz Sharief. The top brass of the armed forces objected and refused to greet the Indian prime minister. As subsequent events have proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the Pakistani military was encroaching upon the Indian side of the line-of-control.

In May 1999 the limited war of Kargil took place. The general impression in the developed world is that Pakistan withdrew from the Indian side under pressure from Washington. That isn't correct. Indian forces successfully forced Pakistani forces to retreat. The pressure from Washington was on India - Pakistani forces were allowed an extra day or two to retreat, in order to minimize casualties and avoid a situation where India held a large number of POWs.

That the people of India aren't overly obsessed with the idea of retrieving the Pakistan-controlled part of Kashmir became clear soon after the Kargil war -Atal Behari Vajpayee won the general elections in the later part of 1999, in spite of accusations of intelligence failure and having wilted under the US pressure. Nevertheless, this should not be construed to imply that Indians do not care about the Pakistan-controlled part of Kashmir at all. If any government is able to retrieve that land, diplomatically or by force, at some point of time in future, longevity of that government would be assured for at least a decade or may be even more.

The reality on the ground is that the problem of Kashmir is basically unsolvable. It simply has to be lived with. Then the question that arises is, if the problem is so unsolvable, why do India and Pakistan keep initiating talks every now and then?

Talks help politicians on both the sides, though the reasons are different.

Pakistani leaders welcome dialogues because the talks, the negotiations and the summits are seen by the masses as an attempt to gain control over Kashmir. The people of Pakistan are generally secure in their belief that their leaders dare not concede anything concrete to India in any round of talks. Whenever peace efforts are on, the need for stealth declines, providing a much needed breather to the government for paying attention to mundane issues like economic development. For periodic recesses and reliefs, and for the sake of its global image, Pakistan doesn't mind going through mindless mirth.

India too has its own reasons for continuing, and even initiating, dialogue every now and then. Perhaps the most important is the minority vote. When Pakistan is not talking, it has to keep the levels of violence in Kashmir at high levels. The option of crushing that violence with physical force is considered undesirable by Indian governments because India has a sizable Muslim population. A no-nonsense approach towards terrorists and militants operating in Kashmir implies some losses of innocent lives also and that means alienating the Indian Muslims. Therefore, most Indian prime ministers consider it expedient to keep some sort of dialogue going.

While global image is as important for India as it is for Pakistan, there is an added complication in case of India. Somehow, every Indian prime minister has had the dream of achieving immortality in history by crafting a lasting solution for peace on its northern borders. And the dream has never been limited to solving the problem of (violence in) Kashmir - every single prime minister of India has tried to achieve the status of a global statesman, a phenomenon which can perhaps now be called the Bush Syndrome, though it would be only fair to state that had 9/11 not happened, perhaps President Bush wouldn't have been as concerned about freedom and liberty in every part of the world as he has been.

The personal ambitions of Indian prime ministers have, more often than not, blurred the view, resulting in India generally offering and conceding more than what is needed. The process started from the first prime minister Mr Jawaharlal Nehru and has continued uninterrupted since then.

What the people of India want is plain and simple peace. They are not bothered about retrieving the Pakistan occupied part of Kashmir, though they surely do not want to lose one square inch of the Indian part of Kashmir. All they want is that there should be no violence in Kashmir and they should be able to travel to the heavenly valley that Kashmir is, for their holidays. Kashmir should earn economic growth through tourism, rather than frequent injections of fiscal help from the central government, a large part of which invariably gets embezzled by the local politicians.

In addition, there is a growing sense of unease about the militants spreading their wings to other parts of India. The general belief, whether rightly or wrongly, is that arms, drugs, militancy and terrorism coming in from the northern borders have started affecting lives in other parts of India.

The general feeling, therefore, is that the government should not allow Pakistan to smuggle arms, drugs and terrorism into Indian territory in the name of building cordial relations and the so-called CBMs (Confidence Building Measures). Whenever "peace talks" between India and Pakistan start making progress, an average Indian becomes more apprehensive than expectant, fearing that the 778 km long LoC (Line-of-Control) would become more porous, paving way for influx of more arms and more militants. Not surprisingly, steps for making travel between the two countries easier are generally viewed with a great deal of skepticism by an average Indian.

When the Agra Summit failed in July 2001, a large part of the global media, including most of the Indian English language media, had blamed the Indian side for being too rigid. The general impression was that the people of India were disappointed by the failure of their leadership to make progress towards peace. The reality is that after General Musharraf left on the night of July 16, 2001, Indians heaved a collected sigh of relief. Most Indians were apprehensive of their leaders conceding too much, for nothing.

The current peace efforts have resulted in agreements providing for travel between India and Pakistan through the new road and rail links without passports. Most Indians expect this to result in rising levels of arms and drugs trafficking.

The key point that is apparently being missed is that Indians are not interested in being friends with Pakistan. They are interested in only peace. Let the Pakistanis live peacefully in their country and let the Indians live peacefully in their country. There is no need for building trade or improving social and cultural relations. Indians do not comprehend why fencing of the borders should create tensions between the two countries?

Nevertheless, political compulsions of rulers of Pakistan is also a stark reality that cannot be wished away, at least by the global community. India and Pakistan, both have nuclear weapons now and the concern of the developed world about relations between the two "nuclear powers" is understandable. In fact, a certain degree of nervousness in the developed world diplomatic circles is quite palpable. But the options of the world (or should one say, the US?) are limited. Nobody doubts India's ability to handle its nuclear weapons with the requisite sense of responsibility. So far, the Pakistani ruler General Musharraf too has not made any irresponsible statements about use of nuclear weapons, though few diplomats in the developed world are willing to exonerate Pakistan of allegations of having passed on nuclear technology to irresponsible quarters.

So what should the world community do about the India-Pakistan scenario?

The answer is nothing. Absolutely nothing can be done. It is for India to take steps to make it physically, economically and logistically difficult for the miscreants, whether independently or with support from Pakistan, to spread terror in its state of Jammu & Kashmir. Violence would subside sometimes. It would escalate at times. It can only be contained. It cannot be eliminated. In a way, it is like the drug problem of the US - as long as there is some consumer demand, imports of drugs (from LatAm, Afghanistan and elsewhere) can only be contained. The drug trade cannot be eliminated.

But of course leaders have to keep their illusions of greatness alive and the diplomats have to justify their existence and expenses. Without high profile summits, life can be quite boring!