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Wither Maliki? What’s Working, What’s Not, and Why

Nicholas M. Guariglia - 10/9/2007

Are you of the lot that feels security can only come to Iraq if there is a political accommodation amongst internal factions? Or do you believe the establishment of security is a prerequisite step that must be taken prior to a political resolution? Or are the two interwoven and yet distant all at once?

Is it reconciliation that brings peace, or peace that brings reconciliation?

For the first three years of this conflict, the expectation was that a transfer of sovereignty, transitional elections, the development of a transitional government, the writing of an interim constitution, the passing of that constitution in a national referendum, parliamentary elections, and the formation of a democratic parliament –– unprecedented political milestones all, each with greater participation by diverse Iraqi sects –– would lead to conditions congruent with stability. Add this hope, which I admittedly shared, to the correct assertion that counterinsurgencies are won indigenously, and put the rapid training of Iraqi security forces into this context.

In short, even with the inadequate post-Saddam preparations, the war effort was supposed to be winding down by now. The reconciliation that was establishing a cross-sectioned elected government, with the involvement of the disenfranchised minority Sunnis, was thought to be the recipe that would bring peace and an end to the insurgency. But what lessons have we learned?

We have learned that all the immeasurable political progress that has been made in Baghdad is necessary, but not sufficient, if we are to ascertain our objective of a democratic and independent Iraq. There is no choice between stability –– true stability, not the “stability” of a dictatorship –– and democracy, for the two concepts are inseparable.

Whether one proceeds the other is up for deliberation. For instance, if we had transferred authority over to the Iraqis the moment Hussein’s ouster was accomplished, perhaps a lot of these intricacies could have been avoided. But with a dearth of security, and a lack of representation, Iranian proxies and foreign Wahhabis seized the moment, creating considerable havoc and thereby forcing Iraqis to differentiate between a stabilized society and a liberalized polity.

The irony is twofold. Our assessment of what would come first –– security or political self-sufficiency –– was wrong, and has since been changed. (That is, after all, what the surge is all about.) But in addition, the obstructionist point of view has alternately changed for the dramatic. During the historic democratic attainments in 2005, opponents of this effort downplayed Iraqi self-determination, lambasting that all the purple fingers in the world couldn’t change the “conditions on the ground.”

What is the mantra now? It is visible that the reinforcement and change in strategy –– which only just recently hit full force levels –– is working. Even leftists and Democrats are in accord. Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack of the left-leaning Brookings Institute, previous critics of the war strategy, wrote an influential op-ed piece on their return from Iraq, declaring the mission is working and quitting would be catastrophic. Senator Obama and Senator Durbin now admit that additional U.S. troops have substantially quelled the violence. Senator Levin speaks of positive results from the course-change. Rep. McNerney, D-Cal., Rep. Mahoney, D-Fl., Rep. Baird, D-Wash., Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., and Sen. Casey, D-Penn. all now concur that the surge is, in fact, effective. Hillary Clinton also has said the surge is working (to a VFW audience, of course; let’s see her make that statement at the next Daily Kos convention).

So what will be the fall-back line? Either the infancy of success has occurred “too late” (Mrs. Clinton) and thus we ought to end our deployment anyway, or candidates and opportunists can blame it on the Iraqis. This seems to be the more popular approach, and Sen. John Warner, R-Vir. is beginning to take this mantle, and he’s pondering if he should run with it.

The Iranian-stoked sectarianism and Wahhabi-driven insurrection has continued regardless of Iraqi political progress. This much is undeniable. Top-down efforts to tame the violence did not pay off, and opponents reminded this to the rest of us on a weekly basis. But now as abject military success against al Qaida in Anbar, and against the insurgents across the field, is beginning to pay off, the fons et origo talking point is to claim everything poor is the fault of Prime Minister Maliki and his sectarian nature.

While Maliki has been dealt a difficult hand of cards, and he has admittedly not lived up to his responsibilities, the source of warfare and sectarianism and violence in Iraq is not his personality, or the defunct nature of a democratically elected government. If all of the democratization of Iraq’s yesteryear has not led to conditions of stability, what makes Senator Biden feel a passed oil law, or an agreement between provincial leaders, will end the conflict? We are militarily thriving against the jihadists, and we should not stop this simply because the Mahdis, Hakims, and Talabanis of Baghdad cannot agree on Iraqi tax code reform. That is an egregiously short-sighted and limited frame for which our elected representatives should view this unfortunate combat.

Maliki will, in all likelihood, resign or be voted out of office. Although this would be a political setback, it would also be manifestation of democratic mechanisms the Iraqis have exercised several times, now. The top two candidates for his replacement seem to be the husky Adel Abdul Mahdi –– considered for the premiership twice before, and lost; an American favorite, although also part of an Islamist party close to Tehran –– and former interim premier Iyad Allawi. There may be a compromise personality behind the scenes, but it seems as if Mahdi and Allawi are the big names in the ring.

Mahdi’s premiership would reignite the intra-Shi’ite Hakim-Sadr clash, something the United States should tentatively welcome. Yet Allawi’s ascendancy would single a greater shift in Iraqi politics and a return to ironfisted secularism. Iran recently protested (and forced to postpone) a reconciliation meeting, amongst all Iraqi blocs and factions, because Allawi’s party was set to participate. This is an inexcusable Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs.

Mr. Allawi would force the Iraqi Shi’a community to question whether they were Iraqi-Arab or Shi’a first, and this question of identity, in and of itself, would be a wonderfully calculated psy-op against Khamenei. Countering Iranian influence –– tackling the militia problem, naming the IRGC to the terrorist list, arresting Hezbollah members in Iraq, etc. –– is just half of what the surge was about. Whipping al Qaida out of the country was the other half, and that seems to be working. But the political motivation for militarily raising the stakes was a sustainable, and hopefully less Iranian-dependant, Iraqi society. Allawi could do that.

Reconciliation did not bring peace. Peace can bring reconciliation. That’s what we’ve learned. And that means viewing Iraq as a proxy war against its devious neighbors.