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Iran-EU Negotiations on Nuclear Weapons Fit Wider Context

Angelique van Engelen - 3/12/2005

Well into its 18th year, Iran's nuclear weapons program is beginning to pose considerable tension internationally. Current US-endorsed talks between Iran and the European Union are almost certainly doomed.

The Iranians have said time and again over the past decade they are willing to negotiate ending their program so long as their demands for trade, technology transfer and, more recently, greater security guarantees are met. The standard response has been evasive.

So far, Iranian demands have not effected much else then cynicism from the international community and only when the country was almost sent to the UN Security Council for possession of illicit weapons of mass destruction, did a concerted diplomatic effort get underway.

Ministers from France, Germany and the UK boarded a plane to Tehran cowboy-style last November and secured a deal whereby they ensured the UN procedure would be delayed in return for a temporary freeze of the nuclear program in Iran.

It was a major breakthrough. But news reports showing Iran as evading and manipulating inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) overshadowed any feeling of euphoria. Iranians were said to be hiding major production facilities from the agents, most notably a nuclear enrichment facility in Natans that was found only after dissidents tipped off the experts.

It is unlikely that the three European countries that managed to get Iran to temporarily halt its program last November are going to instigate another breakthrough this time. Iranians went into the negotiations saying the EU is not the party they want to deal with anyway and it remains to be seen if the United States' endorsement of the negotiations will have any impact at this stage.

What's on the table now are more stringent rules that Iran has to prove it is playing by, in return for a mixture of trade incentives, technology transfer and security guarantees from Europe and the US.

In reality, it's only the US that can make a difference in Iran's security situation, observers say. Yet despite the highly topical nature of the security issue, the US will likely be guided by broader historical events in formulating its stance. The fact that Iran's nuclear program has been going on for some 18 long years already, being a case in point. Iran's threat that it will restart uranium enrichment and suspend negotiations if its demands are not met are likely going to be explained as highlighting Iran's commitment to its plans despite its earlier promises.

Hassan Rowhani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, said last week that if Iran does not diversify its sources of energy, it will soon be forced to use a significant amount of its oil production for domestic energy needs. Nonsense, say observers. They point out that the way Iran has been running its nuclear program are not consistent with energy worries at all.

In this light, the international shouting matches between Israel, which itself boasts a nuke arsenal, and Iran are significant too. Iran just about stops short of saying they actually also have a bomb, which is what many US observers claim in what is perhaps only echoing the rhetoric they likely voiced toward the Russians a few years hence, but nevertheless. Iranian Defense Minister Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani can't have come across as reassuring three days after the country gave weapons inspectors the green light saying that if Israel attacks the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Israel "will receive a response, which no politician in Israel can even imagine." Denying he alluded to a nuclear response, Shamkhani threatened "actions will speak". In the same breath he denied Russia is supplying Iran with parts to enrich uranium. Russians have stated the opposite repeatedly since.

The IAEA lacks any conclusive evidence that claims are true that Iran is trying to build its own nuclear bomb. However, Iran's repeated lies have not put it in any good stead with anybody. Trust levels went to all time lows when the nuclear enrichment facility in Natans was found. This led to international furore that will overshadow any negotiations and instigated more stringent rules that Iran was forced to comply with. These include allowing the IAEA weapons experts to perform more comprehensive inspections at short notice. It remains to be seen whether Iran will honor this supplementary protocol.

'Now we have a rather clear picture of what is happening there', IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei told the German magazine Der Spiegel recently. His inspectors started out in February 2003, shortly after Iran publicly announced it was building a power plant using only home spun materials. More recent assessments are that if Iran decided to operate a secret nuclear weapons program, they can have a bomb in two to three years. To date no real, conclusive evidence has been found showing Iran is really enamored with such plans, but the know-how and the industrial infrastructure is very much there, according to ElBaradei. Oil on the fire for those reiterating that Iran is likely a nuclear power already. ElBaradei says that in the case of nuclear weapons, inspectors' role is to verify what they see being produced, not what's intended for production.

Which leaves ample room for those suspicions that create those eery international tensions. These are bound to overshadow the negotiations taking place in Geneva. The weapons program that was started in the late 1970s after Dutch-trained Pakistani nuclear specialist Abdul Khan sold his know how to this country. After a brief . A program that's become as precariously topical any nuclear weapons program can become, given the lay out of the Middle East and the division of power there right now.

Iran's referral to the US presence in the region underscores this even more. Iran is nervous because of the deployment of US troops, which it says, creates the need for Iran to be properly equipped to defend itself. This happens to be true at this moment in time. Iran over the last few years has become literally surrounded, not to mention the strong US naval presence.

The Iranian excuse is met with much scepticism because the situation was completely different when the country embarked on its program some 18 years ago. Today's precarious situation has long been built up. 'Never before has a nuclear situation been so serious', says ElBaradei, who calling for a new international control system that mitigates risks the black market is causing.

Europe-Iranian negotiations are setting the scene for more direct talks between the US and Iran no doubt. And if past treatment is anything to go by, the US is likely pushing for the stick rather than the carrot approach. In 1994, during the Clinton era, Iran found itself cold shouldered when it offered good behavior in return for economic incentives. While the US had gone out of its way to get North Korea to abandon its program earlier, it snubbed Iran. Some see this as one in a series of missed opportunities.

There is a lot of uncertainty around the official US approach to Iran, so far, but perhaps this is a good thing. If the European effort fails, as it is almost certainly doomed to, what will have been gained is a lot more clearity and transparency. International law is predictable, the way a country goes about its nuclear arsenal is less so. Intelligence might be the name of the game that's being played out.

If a deal with Europeans fails, Iran is likely going to be referred to the Security Council in about six months' time. What has been gained from the European negotiations that are seen as Europe's upstaging of the US and that have been dubbed 'preemptive action' by soft European diplomacy, is a lot more transparency as a result of the access of weapons inspectors into this country. Iran might be seen to buy time, but it is common knowledge that weapons inspectors need a few months too to actually get to grips with what is going on in a country.

It remains doubtful that the US will offer Iran much in terms of security guarantees. The political will might be there, but all that is needed to show how wrong such guarantees would be is some recent evidence of the country's support for terrorism, more evidence that Iran is not cooperating with international weapons inspectors, its interference in Iraq, human rights abuses, the list goes on. Any deal would soon seem unethical. Although the diplomatic effort might be orchestrated behind in ways that will never become really visible, the outcome is uncertain to say the least. Iran is a rogue state and there's not a lot of scope for any dealings with rogue states in the US' rulebook. The Iraq situation has shown this and any incumbent response to Iran might prove symbolic of lessons learnt.

Military action has verbally been dismissed by President Bush and officials in Europe. If the stance would change here we'd be months further on. One good thing that has come out of all the wrangling is that finally weapons inspectors are on the ground in Iran. US and EU defense strategists over recent months have repeatedly said that intelligence is the main way of conducting any future warfare. Perhaps the War Against Iran has already gone underway.