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Foreign Mercenaries in Chechnya

Aliheydar Rzayev, Ph.D. - 3/30/2005

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Closely related to the geopolitical aspects of the Chechen crisis is the issue of foreign interference in the region. It is a well-known fact that from the very onset of his political career Johar Dudaev has been counseled by several representatives of the radical, anti-Russian nationalistic circles from the former Soviet republics in the Trans-Caucasus, the Ukraine and the Baltic regions, who in practice formulated his first program for the building of an independent Chechen state. At the same time, immediately after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Afghanistan in 1989 and the final fall down of bans against religious activity during "Perestroika", Chechnya saw an in-flow of the first Islamic preachers from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan and other countries. Additionally, several dozen Chechen veterans, who fought in Afghanistan on the side of the mujahideen, returned to the republic accompanied by "colleagues" - citizens of various Muslims, mostly Arab countries.

The Chechen separatists had established close contacts with Islamists organizations, mostly related to and funded by Saudi Arabia and acting in Russia, the Trans-Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia), the Ukraine, Central Asia, Turkey and a number of European countries, among which are Great Britain, Germany, Sweden and France.

Serious financial support to Dudaev's regime was provided by the large and influential Chechen communities in Turkey and Jordan. Apart from financial support, the established contacts were used for the recruiting of mercenaries as well as for the provision of additional arms deliveries from abroad. Western sources point that among the mercenaries, who fought on the side of the separatists in the two Chechen wars there were citizens of Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Yemen, Qatar, Kuwait, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Algeria and Morocco, as well as fighters from Bosnia, Albanians from Kosovo Liberation Army and even Afro-Americans with US passports. [1]

In Chechnya the mercenaries developed and reached new highs in professionalism. So who are the modern mercenaries and how did the transformation to the mercenary occurred? What is the point of view of Russian media to this?

Becoming a mercenary is a deliberate choice. Usually they are people who are not afraid of risk and are basically ready to die, but only for good money. This kind of job is especially widespread in the Middle East, where the standard of living is not high, families are large and few people have the opportunity to provide for their families and ensure them a worthy future.

It all starts with a recruiter who gathers a small group of recruits, who get a specified sum of money and leave it to their families. It is usually about $1,000-2,000. "When you become a real mujaheed, you'll get a lot of money, enough to last you for your entire life," promises the recruiter. Then the group of future mujaheedin transported to the base, where they will be molded into fighters. In a number of countries there are underground mercenary training centers. Training lasts a couple of months, and by the end of this period the inexperienced recruits become "dogs of war". They learn to make use of all kinds of weapons, can make a landmine from a spent shell, as well as make and read maps. They have the skills for close fighting, sniper and subversive war. They know how to fight in cities and in the mountains, how to ensnare and smash an army convoy and how to survive in a winter forest.

Mercenaries get weapons, kits and medicines right on the spot. A small first-aid kit must consist of necessary medications, which are at times they are used to relieve pain of wounds; at other times they are taken to get up the courage for a battle. This ruse is taught in the camp: "If you want to kill fear, make an injection." Later, many fighters can no longer do without them.

In his first battle, the fighter is still being tested to see whether his hand will falter, whether he will have pity on a wounded enemy, or whether he will run away from the site of the battle or not. Though for those who are scared, awkward and hesitant, the first battle becomes the last: they lose their presence of mind and get in the bullets' way. Those who survive are organized into elements and charged with intricate tasks.
After each successful operation, the commander of a unit gets the money and distributes it among his people, leaving the lion's share to himself as a rule. The unit can get $40,000 for an attack on a convoy, out of which the commander takes $20,000, divides another $10,000 among his assistants, while the other fighters get what is left. An ordinary fighter who takes part in a convoy rout gets about $1,000 for his work, and the one who mines the road gets only $100.

After a couple of months, most mercenaries come to realize they will never see the promised money, but by then they have nowhere to go, and if they try to escape they will either be shot as traitors or trapped by the federals (in case of those fighting in Chechnya, that would be the Russian army and law-enforcement ministries units). However, many fighters in their peaceful life would never earn even a third of all the money they get, which is why the idea of going back home is not particularly enticing either. [2]

The Russian media describes these mercenaries as "wild geese" hunting for the money. Meanwhile, this simplified idea about the motives of mercenaries prevent us from seeing the complete picture.

It is understandable, that money plays their role, but accent nevertheless is placed on the idea. How, for example, did al-Hattab (the first and the most prominent leader of mercenaries in Chechnya) recruited his soldiers? In the interview for its information organ "Jihad in Chechnya", he had declared: "We want so that the brothers would be joined to us... However, situation is difficult, especially for the injured. Recently seven injured brothers, who were attempting to leave, were killed in the cave and three of others on the Ingush boundary ". This is more of an invitation to death, than to the promise of quick enrichment. This is an indirect, but explicit call to the vengeance. It is also addressing religious emotions.

The basic activity in this sphere was achieved at the level of personal contacts. The instruction for the future fighters stated: "Any desiring to wage a jihad in other countries (if he passed the appropriate preparation) or being going to pass training course must be connected with those members of its community, about whom is known that they participated in the jihad. You recognize these people, and they learn you ". The authors of this document also advise the beginner mujaheedin to contact with the local imams. Frequently the contacts, including the questions of participation in the jihad, occur with the mediation of the clergy. Many mosques collect funds for these fighters..

Contact with the veterans of jihad is the only first step for the mercenary, who were guided into Chechnya. They were then connected with the representatives of Chechen Islamists to prepare the route of trip. Mercenaries were instructed that "no one may make the trip to Chechnya until he did not establish contacts with the Chechen groups, organizations, centers or the Islamic charitable institutions, which 100% confirm existence of safe route into Chechnya. All visas must be obtained before the trip. After proving to be in Chechnya, it is necessary to be joined to one of the numerous groups, which help to the suffering Moslems of this region ".

Addressing the people willing to die for their faith in Chechnya, Hattab invariably emphasized that he required only such fighters who already passed special preparation, since they have no possibility to train them inside Chechnya. Many fighters who arrived to Chechnya had no concept about the extent of the severe and uncompromising war there. Many quickly perished, suffered injuries or went insane.

As a result, the management of IAU (Illegal Armed Unit) of the Chechen Republic of Ickeria and the leaders of mercenaries in the summer of 1999 rigidly placed the following condition to all foreign fighters - before the sending to the Caucasus, they must get basic habits of military skill and guerrilla warfare.

The Jihadists' web site instructed new fighters to undergo training where special training camps were available: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Sudan and Republic of North Cyprus. Additionally, Tajikistan joined the list after its government lost control over the eastern regions of the country. [3]

And so a question arises as to who recruits the fighters, where they pass preparation and who is financing them? The analysis of different information sources shows availability of large numbers of public organizations, which is recruiting the mercenaries. Among them such organizations as Hezbollah, Jamaa al-Islamiyya, Tawhid, Maktab al Shuad, Committee of Caucasian-Chechen Solidarity (located in Berlin), the Parisian Committee of Support of Chechnya, Krakow-based "Chechen Information Center" and so on.

Mercenaries passed preparation in special camps. Fundamentalist bases for the instruction of terrorists were found in Afghanistan under Taliban, as well as Pakistan. Most widely known camps were al Farukh, Maktab al Khidmat and Baar-2 in Afghanistan, as well as bin al-Ansaradion in Pakistan. Among the organizations financing these fighters, most frequently mentioned are al-Haramain and Maktab al Khikmat. [4]




SOURCES


[1] Islam, oil and blood/the Chechen issue - between myths and reality (in Russian) Alexander Todorov. Publishing House: "Kama", Sofia 2003

[2] "Commersant" newspaper. 15 November 2004, Terrorist Act Contract

[3] www.grani.ru/chechnya_mil/articles/mercenaries/ Ivan Sventsitskiy. Mercenaries in Chechnya: Warriors and missionaries (in Russian)

[4] "Krasnaya Zvezda" newspaper, 27 April 2000. Nikolai Astashkin, Alexander Veklich. Two tickets for one-way trip, or with which paths international terrorists scold into Chechnya (in Russian)

Dr. Aliheydar Rzayev has a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Azerbaijan State University. He currently resides in Dubai, UAE.

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