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Iran: Minefield or Milestone for Next US Administration?

Robert Carpenter - 8/4/2008

If it wasn’t near the top of the agenda already, Iran’s recent ballistic missile tests firmly fixed Iranian-US policy as a key issue in the 2008 presidential election. The tests gave Tehran what it seeks most: worldwide attention and an acknowledgement that the clerical regime is a force to be reckoned with and not bullied.

While provocative in their own right, the two missile tests were just another step in Tehran’s “dance” with the US, which has recently witnessed other significant points of contention between the two adversaries. Iran’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, its continued advancement of its nuclear program, and direct support to terrorist and extremist groups in the Middle East constitute other sore points between the countries. Iran’s leadership continues to use bellicose rhetoric that isdesigned to play to both an internal and external audience, and the risk of confrontation remains high. Ironically, the risk probably comes mainly from the potential for rash reactions by either side to misinterpreted intentions rather than a preconceived plan on the part of Iran to threaten the US. Recent threats by an aide to the Iranian Supreme leader that Iran would target Tel Aviv, US shipping in the Gulf, and US interests around the world if the US or Israel attacked Iran are a perfect example of Iran’s strategy to wage both a war of words as well as rattle its saber through the missile tests.

Whichever candidate wins America’s November election must understand that Iranian actions are driven by Tehran’s desire for influence, and insecurity about its strategic position in the Middle East. Iran is concerned about preserving its position as a regional power, protecting its resources, maintaining alliances, and, above all, ensuring the survival of the clerical regime. By engaging in provocative acts, Tehran hopes to gain respect for its military prowess, and to ensure that all economic, military, and political issues in its sphere of influence take into consideration Iranian positions.

Because the Bush administration has followed a failed policy of shunning any attempts to engage Tehran, an Obama or McCain presidency will face a steep uphill battle in establishing its own “Tehran Agenda,” a foreign policy challenge that could singlehandedly cement or sink the next president’s legacy. While some in Washington will decry engagement with Iran as a sign of weakness, one needs only to look to the Reagan Administration’s relations with the Soviet Union for a clear example that despite radically different agendas, adversaries and allies can engage in dialogue and open lines of communication. This is not a policy of capitulation; it makes practical and realistic sense when countries are engaged in dangerous military and political decision making.

Realistically, few believe that dialogue between Washington and Tehran will result in a Camp David-style meeting between Iranian President Ahmadinejad and the new US President given Iran’s antipathy toward Israel, support for extremist groups, and push for nuclear enrichment. However, as with past talks between the US and North Korea, and Israel and Syria, communication between adversaries can work when it’s part of a comprehensive defense, intelligence and diplomatic policy. An Obama or McCain White House would do well to take a page from the Reagan approach of engaging adversaries and not squander potential opportunities just because of policy dogma or partisan pandering.