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Where is Russia's Foreign Policy Headed?

Angelique van Engelen - 3/30/2005

Russia's official foreign policy is rather obscure and not unlike many of Russia's policies, most of which are largely carried out on what appears an ad-hoc basis by President Putin himself. Moscow's frequent rows with international organisations of are more or less an indicator of where it is at in its otherwise non-coherent strategy to enter into the international community. In anger over the role played by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Ukrainian and Georgian elections, Moscow recently threatened to withhold its $180 million membership fee from the organization. Vienna-based diplomats close to OSCE say that Moscow is upset that most of the organisation's budget is spent on monitoring of elections. It is particularly upset about elections that were won by anti-Moscow candidates in Georgia and the Ukraine in which the OSCE had been actively monitoring the situation and which resulted in pro-West candidates winning the elections.

Russia's top politicians often appear to be in two minds when dealing with their interests abroad. On the one hand, they want to be in charge of the ex Soviet Republics, on the other hand they want to reap the benefits from international alliances that won't cede power they have gained in these territories. Recent Russian dealings in Georgia very much highlights this. Russia chased away the OSCE observers in this ex-Soviet republic last year and now Georgia is getting back at mother Russia by saying it is requesting NATO to send troops instead to monitor its border with Russia.

Russia itself is pursuing full-fledged membership of the North Atlantic alliance. All dynamics of the relationships that the Russians are developing with the West clearly point toward greater cooperation on both the economic and the military front. Yet full-fledged membership of NATO, an institution created to secure the West from any communist threats, is not without difficulties, even post 9/11. Yet any objections to Russian membership likely reveal more of the foreign policies of the alliance's incumbent members than on any evil ambition the Russians might cherish.

Putin's pragmatism is very much seen as the driving force behind Russia's moving closer to NATO membership. From the Russian President's message to reporters at the time Russia joined the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council he deal was concluded in 2001, it was clear he had clearly thought about the impact Russia might have on the pact. He dealt the alliance a tough card; "If NATO turns away Russia while expanding to include other countries all the way up to its borders, we shall continue to mistrust each other, although I think that everybody understands now that Russia is not threatening anyone," he said after signing the deal, a kind of Half-way house between full NATO membership and full exclusion from NATO.

"The simplest [solution] is to dissolve NATO, but this is not on the agenda", Putin said. "The second possible option is to include Russia in NATO. This also creates a single defense and security space. The third option is the creation of a different, new organization which would set itself these tasks and which would incorporate the Russian Federation. Putin added that "we do not see NATO as a hostile organization, but given the demise of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, we don't see why it is needed anymore."

Putin likely alluded to Eastern European resistance to Russian membership of NATO. Hungary and the Czech Republic, and to some extent Poland, have been most fiercely opposed to Russia as a NATO member. More recently, the Baltic States and Ukraine have voiced concerns. Just after the Soviet collapse in 1991, this was one of the main issues in European international politics. Then 9/11 happened and American talk of Russian membership of the alliance started to dominate the debate. Russia's cooperation and intelligence sharing with the United States on the Taliban in Afghanistan was seen as a major step in the right direction. Furthermore, Russia endeared itself to the West by not objecting to American use of former Soviet bases in Central Asian countries. Concurrently, Russia stepped up its efforts to become included in NATO "There is no longer a reason for the West not to conduct such talks," Putin demanded.

These words did not have all that much effect. As important as Putin's NATO initiative may prove to have been, it was not entirely new. Gorbachev raised the possibility of Soviet membership in NATO as many as three times in 1990. Diplomats and high ranking officials slagged his suggestion off as too premature. In the early 1990s, the then President Bush teased a general on a Soviet negotiating team that visited the US, asking how he would like to have a U.S. commander if Russia were to become part of NATO.

But even though in today's international community the lines haven't been laid out clearly, it's a given that Russia won't play any role of significance on the world stage unless it reforms. First its economy and then its army. US defense departmental staff and military experts however have been caught drawing up elaborate plans on how they personally would go about reorganising the Russian military.

Even though the imbalances in the army and the defense industry's structure are more than obvious, the Russians themselves have shied away from any ambitious overhaul. This is likely an important impediment barring Russia's entry into NATO.

Any full-fledged Russian entry into NATO -even if it took place 10 years from now- would bear modern day significance because it would be the result of long negotiations that would have effected (agreement to) tangible changes of its military. It would also be a reason for smugfaced bureaucrats to congratulate themselves on a mission-overly- accomplished.

For the time being, however, Russian participation in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council and any future for Russia in the North Atlantic alliance provides great insight into how the lines of power are laid out globally and into who's thinking what. As such, the Western attitude toward Russia being not at all driven by considerations of Russia's armed forces as a noticeable threat, is quite interesting if outdated. Reactions to Russia as a previous superpower indicate how any given country views itself in a modern day role on a global basis.

US officials have always been quite openly assessing the situation in Russia and momentarily are strongly positing the view that they favor a healthy Russia over an ailing Russia in the context of global security that the US of course is lead-securing. In recent weeks, high ranking US officials have stated time and again that even though the 21st century started under conditions of U.S. unrivalled primacy and new American globalism, America is not 'going it alone' out of principle. No, it is looking for partners around the globe to join it.

The few general assumptions about the Russian armed forces that still feature in the debate on a Russian role in the new world order include the idea that the Russian army is on a decidedly downward path. It is expected that the Russian military will continue to decline in numbers over the next decade. Some partial improvements are believed to be made, but the army will continue to decline in the overall quality of both the personnel and the equipment. The morale problems will remain serious, and will probably get worse.

Some believe that the US drive to primacy is undoubtedly a goal of US foreign policy and that any potential partners will only serve it in securing this role. Many Russians are inclined to believe this and the US is aware that its actions in former Soviet Republics are largely seen in this light.

However strong and mighty the U.S. and its military forces can be, however prepared Washington may be to "go it alone", allies, partners and friends in different parts of the world are as precious as ever, exactly in view of the U.S. primacy and its new role, one Washington based analyst deducted recently.

"America has a number of would-be useful, though occasionally unusual, partners in many parts of the world, whom it would pay (in more sense than one) to engage. It would suffice to look at the map of Eurasia to realize the signal importance of Russia to the U.S. as a security partner", he said.

They would not be eying up a hugely powerful army however. Russia's armed forces consist of some 1.5 million people in uniform, 750,000 civilian MOD personnel and around 2 million defense industry workers. It has increasing problems mobilising the army and this is seen as a major impediment to industry reform. Spend on the armed forces amounts to around 30% of the Russian budget or $12 billion, which boils down to pay per soldier of less than what the military is paid in China even.

Putin promised Russian army reform as early as 2000, but it is simply not happening. Despite the dire state of the army and Russia's economy, Russians are not taking eagerly to any Western influence in their country's affairs and anti American sentiment is at all time highs. Russians loath the West even more now than during the Cold War. Unsolicited advice on how to reform the Russian army will likely fall by the wayside, to put it euphemistically. Yet it is quite obvious to anyone that, given the size of the Russian army and the low rate of pay of its servicemen, the sector is dangerous enough only for its potential to weigh the Russian economy down. The irrational patterns of spending in the army administration itself open the way to widespread and structural corruption. Commanders are actually encouraged to spend their government budget as they see fit. It would be quite difficult to rationalise here without creating tensions at the higher levels.

Putin has a number of choices to turn the army around. He might go about it the Peter the Great way, which will be a shock treatment. He has direct control over the army from the Kremlin so it is a real possibility. Putin can also throw in the towel and give the military back its selfgoverning rights. Or, and this is the most likely option, he might continue on the path of reform, but any results will be seen years down the line only.

In an international context, whatever Putin or his successor opts to do with the Russian army, it's unlikely to have a great deal of influence on a global level, unless a situation is created in which the army poses a significant risk other than by dragging down the domestic Russian economy. Putin is not believed to be willing to get involved with the Russian army by taking matters in his own hands. He's a slow reformist that won't risk upsetting political stability at any cost.

Russia's involvement with NATO for the time being comprises of consultations, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action. A number of committees are in the process of developing cooperation on terrorism, proliferation, peacekeeping, theatre missile defence, airspace management, civil emergencies, defence reform, logistics, scientific cooperation and on challenges of modern society.

Aside from semi- NATO membership, Russia has indicated during recent years that it is open to other international alliances. But the international community has by and large shunned the country over the past decade. The US's Nunn-Lugar legislation which went accompanied by a $5 billion grant under its Defense Enterprise Fund ("DEF") was adopted just after the fall of the Soviet Union. The legislation provides for so called rogue states to turn on their ways and have their companies enter into joint ventures to dismantle nuclear devices. Yet hardly any progress had been booked with Russian companies by 2002.

Last February, during the US - Russia summit in Bratislava, the US signed a deal with the Russians to disallow the sale of any portable nuclear umbrella shields to third countries. These apparently are only made in either the US or Russia, so if they are found anywhere else, the two powers can blame each other.