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Why Is Israel Fighting Hamas?

Ryan Mauro - 12/31/2008

The eruption of the conflict in Gaza, which most observers could have forecasted months ago, should be seen as a lever in the power plays of the various regional actors. This conflict has potential positive and negative impacts for each player involved, and a proper analysis of these dynamics may allow us to peak into what will occur over the next few weeks.

For Israel, the most obvious incentive for launching the campaign in Gaza is to stop Hamas' rocket attacks into Gaza and do serious damage to the terrorist infrastructure there. From a geopolitical point-of-view, Israel is hoping its aerial attacks provide an opening for the Fatah forces to fill the vacuum created by a weakening of Hamas, and are hoping for a political split among Palestinians over whether a ceasefire should be pursued or whether all-out war should commence.

The Israelis can also hope that Hamas' political position is undermined, as even some Arab newspapers are simultaneously railing against the Gaza offensive while commentating that Hamas is responsible for provoking the conflict, albeit criticizing them far less ferociously as they are the Israelis. In my opinion, while a large portion of Palestinians, perhaps a majority, that thought the rocket attacks were a bad idea, and Palestinians want stability above all else at the moment. This, of course, does not amount to an approval of the Israeli action, as Palestinians almost universally view Israel as being overly aggressive and using the Hamas rockets as a pretext to kick them down.

While I believe that Hamas is hurting politically from this conflict, I do not believe this will cause a sudden melting of their political support, especially because they are viewed as the party best equipped to fight the Israelis--a perception that will be reinforced if Hamas, like Hezbollah in 2006, comes out looking like the victor, simply by surviving if for no other reason. Therefore, politically, there could be a backlash among Palestinians against Hamas for this conflict, and a new Fatah-Hamas conflict.

And of course, we must mention the Israeli political scene. We must recognize that Israel's legitimate security concerns and understandable imperative to stop the rocket attacks are carried out by politicians, and elections are soon. For Kadima, this could make the party seem tough in the eyes of the electorate. On the other hand, it is more likely this will cause security issues to come to the forefront, which the more hawkish Likud Party and Benjamin Netanyahu benefits from.

In addition, if this conflict is viewed as being waged incompetently by any means, Kadima loses big time politically. Some commentators feel Israel will launch a major ground invasion, and others feel Israel will use a relatively light force to quickly capture strategic points and launch quick raids against terrorist targets, rather than systematicaly dismantling the network throughout Gaza as a whole. If the latter is indeed how this conflict is waged, we'll soon have a triple case-study in the misunderstanding of modern war-fighting, which will be known as Iraq-Lebanon-Gaza. These three case studies will become textbook examples of how technologically and militarily superior powers failed to fight non-state actors due to an apprehension to use strategies that have their roots in so-called outdated war doctrine--specifically the hesitance to move quickly with larger forces that overwhelm the enemy and no broad strategy.

Basically, the conflicts in Iraq and Lebanon in 2006 and possibly Gaza, represent a flawed thinking that aerial and light ground forces can subdue an enemy embedded inside a population that does not rely upon traditional, fixed targets for operation. The truth is that counter-insurgency warfare has become modern warfare, and all conflicts of this kind must face the harsh realities of that type of fight: Significant ground forces are needed over a prolonged period of time. The failure of the Israelis to move in quickly and decisively will prolong this conflict and could result in a victory for Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria and Iran.

However, this represents a major problem for Israel. For one, a prolonged conflict could allow for a two-front war to begin if Hezbollah attacks from Lebanon. There is also a lack of support in Israel for a costly re-occupation of Gaza, and several of the successful tactics the U.S. used in Iraq will not work for Israel. The Palestinians hate Israelis so much (and vice versa) that it's doubtful that Israel could be looked at as a protector, or that increased interaction could debunk extremist propaganda, or that Palestinians would provide them with the intelligence they need to win--all three circumstances of which have allowed the U.S. to nearly win in Iraq.

Israel will likely use some form of ground forces in the coming days. The question is whether Israel will choose to act like Rumsfeld, utilizing light forces capturing key locations, or Petraeus, recognizing that they are in a counter-insurgency campaign and applying the appropriate doctrine.