Home >> Former USSR >> Russia  Email  Print Russia's Foreign and Security Goals Christian Wipperfuerth - 5/25/2009 1. Stability: Protection of the Territorial Integrity
For the elites and the population the unexpected dissolution of the USSR is a permanent reminder of their country's potential vulnerability. Russians also even tend to draw comparisons between the 1990s and the Smuta in the 17th century, when the state broke down and millions died. The fear of a break down is not wholly unfounded, because a traditionally centralized multi-ethnic power with a weak society like Russia is not as flexible as others to cope with shocks.
Besides that, in the 1990s the boundaries between Russia and its neighbors were generally not acknowledged. 25 million Russians were separated in 1991 by new borders from their homeland, which were in some cases considered as unjust in Russia. But the Kremlin never tried to redraw the map of Russia. The Kremlins policy is concerned with Russia (and to a comparably very large extent with the well-being of its elites), not with the ethnic Russians. Russian politicians, even the highest, often condemn the (alleged) hardship of their compatriots in certain states of the post-soviet area. But Russia does nearly nothing for them besides some noisy utterances. The country is interested in stability. The Russian leadership knows that an ethnocentric-nationalistic policy potentially does not just endanger the own multi-ethnic state but would also result in an immediate application for NATO-membership by friendly states like Kazakhstan. But the noise which is made to mitigate nationalists within Russia could be misinterpreted as expansionism: Some observers took sometimes harsh words at its face value. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former US-Security adviser and still influential, for example warned in 1997: the Russian leadership has a comprehensive plan, to subjugate the other former soviet republics. This interpretation of Russian policy was and is wrong. But it is heard ever since.
Russia needs and wants stability inside and outside its borders. It demands respect and tends to play hardball with its CIS-neighbors. The other way round is also true, sometimes even more. But Russia was and is generally busy with itself and the elites are realists to the core (they had and they have to), or you might call them cynics to try the adventure of an imperial policy. It is typical for an important power which once was an Empire to meddle in affairs of a foreign country. Russia to an astonishingly extent does not want to, and its ability for that would be limited. The situation in the Russian part of the Caucasus is more or less under control nowadays, Russia's boundaries are no longer disputed. China for example signed a treaty with included minor concessions made by the Kremlin. The Russian economy and state became stronger in the last 10 years, despite all persistent shortcomings, but the feeling prevails, that
a. the countries territorial integrity might be in danger
b. the state capacity to act and protect is to a large extent insufficient.
Democrats, nationalists as well as representatives of a middle course express this concern every now and then, and since the beginning of the crisis in autumn 2008 with mounting frequency. In September 2008 President Dmitri Medvedev said, that Russia will lose the country's Far East, if efforts were not sped up. Even seemingly unshakable things sometimes end in a very dramatic manner, Medvedev warned. Russians understood what he meant.
2. Development within Russia
The cause of the countrys vulnerable position is widely seen as a product of the underdevelopment in the economic sphere and infrastructure. It is nearly undisputed, that one of the most important reasons for the states brake down 20 years ago was the strangulation of the economy and society by the horrendous concentration on the armed forces. Therefore the military budget was and is limited, its GDP-share is lower than in Great Britain or the United States. Necessary measures for modernization are occasionally labelled military build up in order to mitigate the nationalistic opposition with just some words, not deeds.
Russians have the impression, that their country contributed a lot to the development of the majority of its neighbours which were long united in the common state USSR and that they got back too little. This view is contestable but shared by the vast majority. Russians do not want to pay the bills for others any longer, to put it bluntly. It was Russia, which put an end to the common currency and the customs union of the post soviet countries in the 1990s. But the process of disentanglement is long, longer than Russia wants. CIS-countries and also the Baltic States pay much less for Russian Gas even nowadays than for example Poland or Germany. Russia knows what is an imperial overstretch. Two thirds of the Russian population want the other CIS-Republics to be treated like any other foreign state, just a shrinking minority prefers a policy which strives for domination, just a very small minority, especially elderly, want the restoration of one state within the borders of the former USSR.
Russia wants to spend its resources on the well-being of its inhabitants and the development of the country, not for imperial adventures. It strives and
wants to become and to be a full grown Great Power by means of strengthening the economy. The leadership knows that Russia's ability to act is too limited to be considered a Great Power nowadays. Therefore in the Foreign Policy Concept of June 2008 these words were not mentioned anymore. At least one factor should be mentioned which hampers the development of Russia to a considerable extent: In comparison to other important powers, Russian politics are extraordinarily driven by personal and group interests. You can call it corruption and nepotism. Firstly institutions are weak. Russians therefore have to rely, more than others, on personal relationships and networks. Secondly, the willingness to put ones own interests - in peacetime - last for the sake of the state or society is obviously underdeveloped. Because everything can change very quickly. This was not only the lesson from the last decades, but also from before. So why bother about the state and society if your own fate could change for the very worse tomorrow. You can not rely on predictability. Enrich yourself.
This tendency hampers the development of Russia to a considerable extent. It holds not only true for the development within Russia but, to a smaller but nonetheless discernible extent, also to its external relations. The circumstances and sometimes the destination of weapons export seem to be an example. This seems also to be the case in other post-soviet republics, e.g. the Ukraine.
3. Sovereignty
Russia has several times tried to join the west, for example by President Jelzins letter written to the NATO states at the end of 1991 that Russia might apply for membership in the immediate future. But the letter was not answered. At the beginning of President Putins term as President, at the beginning of this decade, numerous signs indicate that Russia wanted to be acknowledged as a power on the western side. But neither in the 90s nor afterwards Russia wholeheartedly tried to join the west, nor were western powers ready to open their arms. Russians are not sure if they could and should be a part of the western civilization, and the west does not know what Russia is - and is split: is Russia an alienated relative, who should be welcomed or a potentially dangerous stranger? During the first terms of President Jelzin and respectively of President Putin Russia tried to appear like a relative for the West, during the second terms the approach was erratic. Since 2005 Russia left the western orbit to conduct an independent, sovereign policy. But: Russia needs a cooperative relationship with the west for modernization, to counteract the perceived danger of disintegration. Besides that the elites are interested in keeping their penthouses in Kensington and their lodges on the Cote dAzur. It would be a terrible blow for them to be regarded and treated like Byelorussians.
But mistrust prevails. Neither the elites nor the vast majority of the population trusts the good will of the outside world. This corresponds to the climate of distrust within Russia, as already mentioned. The turning point in the Russian-western relationship was perhaps the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine which was not seen as an impressive public movement, but as orchestrated by western Neocons. From this moment on the west was perceived above all not as a remedy for Russias ills but a danger for its sovereignty, which must be defended against western interference.
Russian complains were not wholly unjustified, but hardened to prejudices which sometimes became absurd. It is for example widely believed in Russia, also among Democrats, that Madelaine Albright, the former US-Secretary of State, said that the treasures of Siberia are too precious to be owned by just one country. They should be a common heritage for all of mankind. She never mentioned this. It was an invention by just one blogger of unknown origin. But Russians nowadays tend to believe stories that are not favourable of the west and the other way round. The prevailing western reaction to the Georgian attack on South Ossetia was hardly more reasonable.
During the last years the adversaries of cooperation in Russia as well as in western countries had a strong impact on the relations and strengthened each other. Change changed something since winter, but also the fundamentals? Freedom is better than non-freedom, this was Dmitri Medvedev's slogan during the campaign for the Presidents election one year ago. If he intents to substantiate his words with deeds I think he wants to could it be done if the West is perceived as an ill-wisher in Russia? This question was especially asked in late summer last year, during and after the war in South Ossetia / Georgia. Most observers expected a strengthening of the nationalistic and authoritarian trends within Russia. But Medvedev declared in September that Russia needs reforms not to please foreign powers but for its own sake. In my opinion authoritarian trends will lessen, substantial reforms will be initiated. But the President will demonstrate his independence from the West with harsh words, perhaps harsher than Putin expressed it during the last years. This will be popular and Medvedev needs to prove that he is no softie in order to conduct his liberal agenda."
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