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Future of Japan-US Relations

Rajaram Panda, Ph.D. - 11/1/2009

The Japan-US security alliance that has remained as the lynchpin of the East Asian security architecture since the World War II is likely to undergo some change under the DPJ-led government of Yukio Hatoyama. Even before Hatoyama won the elections held on 30 August, his views expressed in an op-ed article published in the New York Times in which he spoke of reviewing Japan’s alliance relationships with the US with a more independent foreign policy created a sensation amongst policy analysts both in Japan and in the US as also in other Asian capitals. Hatoyama pledged to build “an alliance on an equal footing” with the US attracted considerable scrutiny, given the fundamental nature of the Japan-US security arrangements as well as the rare instance of a cross-party transfer of power in Tokyo – only the fourth since the Meiji era.

With this kind policy pronouncement, comparison with DPJ’s brief honeymoon with power with Hosokawa at the helm in the early 1990s is inevitable. Yet, in fact a stronger parallel exist with an earlier change of government. In an landmark election to the Imperial Diet in 1924, three opposition parties got together under the banner of anti-bureaucratism and proclaimed to protect the Constitution and effected Japan’s transfer of power by winning under two-third of the seats. The argument that was made then as was now that Japan as a country had ‘grown, but not grown up’ and that Japan ought to cultivate a mature sense of self-definition, somewhat akin to the Western model.

In pursuance of his pronounced foreign policy somewhat independent of the US, Prime Minister Hatoyama wants to chart his own “autonomous diplomatic strategy”. Far from resolving the contentious issues that continue to remain irritants in the bilateral ties, such a policy stance is bound to cause more concern in Washington. Issues such as the Status of Forces Agreement, the planned Futenma relocation, the ‘sympathy budget’, the non-nuclear principles, the Indian Ocean refueling mission and the anti-piracy maritime dispatch that beg solution may continue to remain irritants for longer period of time. The inclusion of the Social and Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) within the governing coalition might further complicate the matter. It might be remembered that the SDPJ reversed its prior recognition of the Japan Self Defense Forces’ constitutionality in February 2006, which it had agreed during its unwieldy cohabitation in power with the LDP during the mid-1990s.

What is likely to emerge in the coming months is that even while Hatoyama and Obama will rethink the relationships between Japan and the US, they will expand their ties from the narrow alliance to a partnership that can deal with a broad range of global challenges. Analysts might interpret this approach as undermining the bilateral relationship but on the contrary, the relationship will show greater maturity with vision of share responsibility beyond bilateral to global sphere. Obama forthcoming visit to Japan on 12-13 November will provide a good opportunity for the Hatoyama government to set a new direction in Tokyo-Washington ties. In other words, he needs to clarify what he means when he advocates an “equal” relationship with the US.

Security analysts in the US and the Asian region would be eager to know from the autonomist leanings of Hatoyama’s policy pronouncements as to what would be the basic principles of Japan’s security policy. As a start, the National defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) is likely to be delayed and Hatoyama is in no great hurry to rush through this job. The NDPG has been issued previously in 1976, 1995 and 2004. It serves as a framework document outlining defense principles and proposed capabilities that subsequently inform medium-term procurement priorities. The NDPG is due to be revised later this year but with a new government in office, Hatoyama will study the recommendations on national security and defense policy presented by the outgoing LDP government-appointed advisory panel. Under the circumstance, the guidelines are expected to be delayed into the next year.

Hatoyama needs to make its own assessment of Japan’s own defense needs and security priorities and Hatoyama ought to make it clear when Obama visits Japan on 12 November, especially when Hatoyama has a different view on the issue of realignment of US forces in Japan. Tensions have risen between Tokyo and Washington over the planned reorganization of US forces, especially Hatoyama government’s efforts to review the 2006 bilateral agreement on the relocation of US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. US security analysts are of the opinion that though the alliance is necessary to continue, it is no longer sufficient as the nature and scope of challenges that confront the two countries have widened.

According to Washington-based think-tank, Council on Foreign Relation President Richard Haass, most of the global challenges today ranging from the financial crisis to climate change and fighting international terrorism go beyond the scope of traditional alliances that “tend to be formal relationships in which countries agree on what they are against and what they are going to do in certain situations”. As such, it is argued that consultations in the most creative sense of the word are necessary as “effective partners” to deal with the global challenges. Obama administration is under tremendous pressure to resuscitate the domestic economy and put the country’s finances in order to cut its huge deficits and therefore would expect Japan to be involved in building up “relevant capabilities for involvement around the world”. The US also expects Japan to “condition its political system” so as to enable both Japan and the US to be partners at dealing with the broad range of global challenges. It is in this context both the countries are advised to develop new alliance management practices to match the new priorities. Washington seems to be confused in identifying the new government’s strategic assessment of Japan’s own defense needs and its security priorities.

Relocation of the Futenma airfield out of the Okinawa city of Ginowan remains the centerpiece of discussions for the realignment of US forces. The US Secretary of State Robert Gates during his recent visit to Japan urged Japan to abide by the 2006 accord to move it to a new facility to be built in Nago, northern Okinawa Island, in response to the new administration’s moves to review the accord. The DPJ’s coalition partners, SDPJ and Kokumin Shinto (People’s New party) have also advocated a review of the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Revision of the SOFA would make the US agree to hand over to Japan, if requested by Tokyo, any military personnel suspected of committing a crime prior to indictment. Hatoyama government needs to help Washington understand what Japan’s strategic needs are and place the alliance in that strategic concept.
In advocating a “close and equal Japan-US alliance”, Hatoyama gives the impression to Washington that the relationship has not been equal and that there is a legacy issue that the new government may feel needs to be corrected. In theory, both Japan and the US are equal in the sense that both are sovereign states and either has the choice in their bilateral relationship to do something or not. But the truism is that both countries are unequal because their histories and capabilities differ. The alliance is becoming increasingly a “discretionary” relationship, which means that either can exercise some degree of discretion or choice in some situation and that would be the reality of the relationship in the future.

If, however, the bilateral relationship assumes an anti-American tinge in Japan’s quest for an “equal relationship”, that would not serve either party’s interest. Washington’s apprehension arise from the fact that Hatoyama government has announced to terminate the Maritime Self-Defense Forces’ refueling mission in the Indian Ocean in support of US-led anti-terrorism operations in and near Afghanistan. According to Yukio Okamoto, who served as special advisor to the prime minister in the administrations of Ryutaro Hashimoto and Junichiro Koizumi, when the new administration talks about an equal partnership with the US, it means that Japan should no longer follow what the US says as it used to do. But the people in the US interpret differently and say they would welcome an “equal partnership” with Japan if Japan is willing to become more involved in dealing with global challenges.

As it transpires, Washington is not clear what Hatoyama means by saying “more equal” Japan-US relationship. How the Japan-US security alliance relationship will be redefined under Hatoyama administration is a matter of speculation at the moment. Whether a clear understanding emerges during Obama’s visit to Tokyo on 12-13 November is not clear now. If indeed Japan is serious about redefining its alliance relationship, the Asian security order is likely to be reshaped in the coming years.