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Ukraine: What will happen after the first blood?

Dr. Andreas Umland - 1/27/2010

On December 26, 2009, the famous Crimean city of Sevastopol saw yet another confrontation between Ukrainian and Russian nationalists. A group of activists of the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda,” Ukraine’s largest explicitly nationalist party, tried to conduct a – what they called – March Against Illegal Immigration through the town that hosts Russia’s Black Sea fleet. As could be expected, they soon encountered a pro-Russian counter-demonstration. Although some violence occurred, Sevastopol’s police was able to hold the two groups separate, and to prevent an escalation.

A straightforward political interpretation of that incident is not an easy task. The Russian nationalists labeled their Ukrainian counterparts “fascists.” That is a not entirely inappropriate label for the members of “Svoboda” – an organization that has grown out of the manifestly ultra-nationalist Social-National Party of Ukraine. Some of the “Svoboda” demonstrators, at their Sevastopol march, showed the Roman Salute, as used once by the NSDAP and today by neo-Nazis worldwide. However, the pro-Russia counter-demonstrators, according to a report by “Sevastopol Life”, also included activists from the Vitrenko Bloc. This grouping’s leader Natalia Vitrenko has, for several years, been in an open alliance with Russia’s so-called International Eurasian Movement. The Eurasian Movement’s leader, Alexander Dugin, in turn, has repeatedly eulogized fascism in general, and the Waffen-SS, in particular. For instance, the neo-Eurasianist leader praised, at one point, SS-Obegruppenfuehrer Reinhard Heydrich, the Holocaust’s initial organizer, as a “convinced Eurasian.” Dugin has made many similar statements that make it difficult to believe that Vitrenko and her entourage did not notice Dugin’s fascist inclinations. This circumstance makes the usage of “fascism” as a swear-word by the Vitrenko people for their Ukrainian opponents sound odd.

Whatever the exact meaning of the incident, similar future events are probable, especially on the Crimean peninsula. In the worst case, they could get out of control and turn into bloodshed. In both, Ukraine and Russia, there are certain politicians and political groups who, for purely domestic reasons, would clearly benefit from such an escalation. To be sure, most Ukrainian and Russian citizens would be horrified by the idea of a violent confrontation between their co-nationals. Yet, a small circle of determined extremists, whether within Russia or Ukraine, may be able to succeeded in provoking such an escalation – especially if the confrontation, such as the one last Saturday, contains on both sides pro-fascist activists.

What could the repercussions of a possible bloodshed be? In Russia and to a lesser degree in Ukraine, many may feel it necessary to react decisively. One can easily imagine the President, Prime-Minister or/and Pseudo-Parliament of Russia issuing yet more offensive statements concerning the Ukrainian nation state and political class. Worse, in both Russia and Ukraine, state and party officials might start engaging in a public contestation on how to respond appropriately to violence in Sevastopol or elsewhere. This could trigger a kind of “patriotic outbidding” between politicians trying to demonstrate superior allegiance to the supposed national interests of their countries. It would sooner or later include discussions of a military “solution.” Both Russian and Ukrainian politicians may, in principle, understand that employment of troops cannot result in a quick victory for one or the other side. Yet, emotional public debates in Russia on how to properly “protect” ethnic Russians on Crimea, or an outburst of patriotism by Ukrainians worried about the sovereignty of their young state would put pressure on both states’ commanders-in-chief. It might create a dynamic that could supersede rational calculations of the actual pros and cons of a military intervention. At least, Russia has, in Georgia, aptly shown that it has no qualms to use swiftly regular troops beyond her borders in order “to protect” people whom she regards as being “her own” and perceives as physically threatened.

In such a situation, Kyiv would have to remember that a military confrontation with Russia should be avoided at almost all costs. As the case of South Ossetia has shown, NATO is not prepared to step in for a non-affiliated state. True, the Ukrainian army would be a much more formidable opponent for the Russian one than Georgia’s armed forces. Yet, a military confrontation even at only one circumscribed location, like Sevastopol, would have repercussions within other Ukrainian regions with large ethnic Russian communities. Even an unlikely Ukrainian victory in a relatively short war on Crimea would put the integrity of the Ukrainian state, as a whole, under strain.

Russia too should not lend herself to illusions. True, it has a large conventional army, is a nuclear superpower, and would be the more likely “winner” of such a war (though “victory” would surely not come as easily as in Georgia). Russia may even be able to “re-unite” with Crimea. Yet, such a military “success” would be costly, on the international scene. While Russia has partly succeeded in portraying one unfriendly post-Soviet leader, Mikhail Saakashvili, as being a “mad-man,” it will be more difficult to convince the world that yet another democratically elected post-Soviet government is “mad,” as well. Whatever spin Russia’s “political technologists” may come up with, most people around the world would start thinking that the real “mad-men” sit in Moscow, rather than Tbilisi or Kyiv.

A Russian-Ukrainian war would also trigger a full-scale second Cold War with the West, with effects on economic relations, cultural exchange, travel freedom, etc. The EU-Russia summits, the Olympics in Sochi, Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe, Russian participation in the Eurovision contest – these and many more joint events, common projects and Russian-Western links would be put under question. The International Criminal Court may, like in the case of Serbia’s former leadership, issue warrants of arrest against Russian leaders.

Moreover, after the de facto annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a second territorial expansion of Russia would make the leaders of such countries as Belarus, Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan having second thoughts about their alliance with Moscow. These and other Russian allies in Europe and Asia were already conspicuously silent during and after the Russian-Georgian War of August 2008. None of them has recognized Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s “independence.” Another intervention on the territory of a Russian neighbour, may let even those few international partners that Moscow still has today look for security and cooperation elsewhere. In a war on Crimea, Russia may, after the death of thousands of Russians and Ukrainians, be able to “get back” that treasured peninsula. But the price would be far-reaching international isolation, for years if not decades to come.

While these scenarios sound fantastic today, they would become feasible once bloodshed has started. As groups who would politically benefit from a Russian-Ukrainian escalation are on the rise in both countries, the likelyhood of an escalation in- rather than decreases. Against this background, the leaders of both Russia and Ukraine should keep reminding themselves what a military intervention of either of them would eventually lead to.