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Martial Law in Poland: A Precursor to Communism’s downfall

Michael Werbowski - 2/22/2010

“Solidarity in Poland successfully defied communist martial law for almost a decade and compelled a political compromise that ended the communist monopoly of power, which then precipitated the upheavals in neighbouring Czechoslovakia and Hungary, culminating in the collapse of the Berlin Wall.”

Zbigniew Brzezinski, excerpt from: “Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower”


On a frigid night from the 12th to the 13th of December 1981, a young man who was back then a first year student in political science at the University of Nantes in France, at around 2:00 A.M. stepped onto a platform at Warsaw’s central station from a train which had begun its journey in Paris and was continuing to Moscow. That 19 year old was me. A Pole involuntarily exiled in the west for nearly 15 years had returned home for the first time to see his father’s family. It was a bit of rude homecoming. Instead of going to the flat were I spent my first years, my father had to take me to a luxurious communist style tower the “Forum Hotel”. As a foreigner from the west, I was not allowed to stay with Poles (even family members) in their home or apartments under Martial Law directives.

At the same time as my father drove me through the streets of Warsaw deserted due to the imposed curfew, I recall seeing well armed and very alert looking soldiers about my age then, on foot patrols, army personnel carriers and tanks as they manoeuvred around the core of the capital. Telephone lines within and outside the country were cut off; borders closed, schools and theaters shut down and public gatherings were banned. I was basically, stuck and stranded in Warsaw, my birthplace. That night some 6,000, Solidarity union members and sympathisers were jailed or interned (see: Barbara J Falk “The dilemmas of dissidence in East-central Europe: citizen intellectuals”). The Military Council of National Salvation as it called itself in an Orwellian sense had taken over the country in this military putsch Polish style. This experience during my brief stay in Warsaw during those historic and dramatic events, which eventually led to the demise of communism have inspired me to write this paper which I am presenting to you now.


Background to the Polish crisis: events which let to the imposition of Martial law and the international context at the time.

In August of 1980, began the first stirrings of a workers’ led, popular revolt which threatened to engulf the entire country. Thousands of shipbuilders at the Lenin shipyards, spurred by the charismatic leadership of Lech Walesa, formed the “Inter Factory strike committee” or MKS. Among the committee’s main demands (21 items in all) were the right to strike, the right to form an independent trade union for the workers, freedom of expression and the initiation of economic reforms to alleviate Poland’s bleak economic predicament. Solidarity or Solidarnosc was born. The intelligentsia, it seemed recognized the mass movement’s appeal and the regime’s lack of popular support and legitimacy. It also saw it was incapable of solving Poland’s chronic economic woes. The church stood firmly behind the new labor union during the crisis of confidence in the communist party’s leadership.

Furthermore the Polish Communist party (PUWP) was fractured and internally split and “unable to fulfil its leading role and its role as guarantor of Soviet interests in Poland” as Zbigniew Romanszewski wrote in his book “Poland under Jaruzelski”. It was highly corrupt. “Officials signing contracts at home and abroad swallowed the bacillus of consumerism and infected the whole apparatus of power, which, not subject to any public control, became a mafia cynically exploiting society for their own ends.” This observation even applies in today’s post –communist socio-political context in Poland.


This new institution which resulted from the Baltic or Gdansk accords, would in theory as least, ensure from then on that the regime would at least be held, to some extent, democratically accountable for its actions or inactions; henceforth, idealistically speaking, there would be no more broken promises from the party leadership nor any more false hopes given to the workers and the masses. (Ascherson). From then on, the consequently independent solidarity movement began to pose a direct challenge to the communist regime. On August 31st the Gdansk agreements (For a full and detailed text of the protocols, see: “The Gdansk and Szczecin Agreements”, Appendix 2, pages 280- 295) which at first were only regional in scope quickly inspired labor unrest in other industrial parts of Poland. These accords which “would be an authentic representation of the working class” (Ascherson, p.173) resulted in the government yielding, at least in theory, to the workers’ demands mentioned previously. The main gain or prize concession in the Gdansk or Baltic historic document was that: “The right to strike will be guaranteed in the new union law…” (Ascheron, p.174). This landmark agreement was the first chink in the Polish communist party’s armour as it, “set a precedent for the potential further erosion of communist authority; not just in Poland but throughout the Soviet –led alliance.” (Document #7: “The Gdansk Agreement”, p.70)


An ailing economy portends the military crackdown

Poland was faced with the worst economic crisis in Europe (Ascherson). Production was in a free fall and inflation raged. In November of 1980 industrial output was $ 2.6 Billion short of the targeted amount and apparently during the birth pangs of Solidarity due to strike actions production fell by 12% (Acheron, p.121). Moreover, there were crop failures and basic foodstuffs were in short supply. Poland was also crippled by debt. Western powers arranged loans and credits at the behest of Warsaw. Poland buckled under the burden of Staggering interest payments (8.4 Billion) in 1979-80 periods). Coal production, a major export has also fallen. Despite the euphoria of the events of August, by November, both the Polish people and the party realized the country was in a dire economic state. Towards the end of 1980, the country owed the rest of the world $ 21 Billion. As the spring of 1981 approached, there were real fears among the authorities that even bread might become a rarity in shops, as cues outside supermarkets lengthened. The possibility of food riots couldn’t be excluded. Poland was not back then a member of the IMF and relied on a consortium of western banks mainly West German for their credit.


The Superpowers react to events in Poland

Edward Gierek, the Polish communist party chairman at the time, rushed home from a summer vacation with Brezhnev in the late summer of 80. In response to the growing strikes at the Polish Baltic coast shipyards the party prepared operation “summer -80” to deal with the situation. Repressive measures were envisioned. (See: “Solidarity to Martial Law”, p.7). The interior ministry planned to crush the strike, yet internal party documents showed the majority of the Poles supported the strikes. The party risked a national uprising if they acted with brute force to contain the workers’ movement. In addition, the threat of a “fourth partition” an oblique reference to a possible Soviet invasion overshadowed the fraught negotiations to register Solidarity and have it legalized and officially recognized by the courts and therefore the state. In response to the events of August 1980, the Kremlin created a crisis management team made of Communist party ideologue Mikhail Suslov, Soviet FM Andrei Gromyko, Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov and KGB boss Yurii Andropov.

Moscow pressured the Polish leadership to deal with the labor unrest. It took steps of its own by mobilizing four combat divisions for a possible intervention in Poland (Ibid, Doc. #5, p.50). The Soviets maintained pressure on Warsaw insisting the party restores its monopoly on power in Poland. It urged authorities to deal with “the dangers created by activities of the anti socialist forces,” and to “carry out measures by the state organs to strengthen socialist law and order (Ibid, Doc #9, p.83).” The party’s inability to reassert itself resulted in Gierek being replaced by Stanilav Kania in early September, 1980.

In the west the U.S was also alarmed about events in Poland. CIA reports noted the increasing chances of wider strike actions and the possibility of a Soviet invasion if Polish forces failed to reign in the workers and strikers. Washington sought an internal solution to the “Polish crisis”. President Carter wrote to his allies on August 27, 1980 the following: “The best outcome from very standpoint would involve accommodation between the authorities and the Polish people, without violence”. (Ibid, Document #8, p.81). In late September of 1980, Carter’s national security advisor Zbigniev Brzezinski convened a meeting to examine the Polish situation. The likelihood of a Soviet invasion was assessed. It was believed if this occurred that there would be widespread Polish resistance. Other factors which deterred Moscow from a military move into Poland according to Brzezinski would be the negative fallout on détente with Western Europe and the possibility of seeing China move closer to the U.S as a result of resurgent Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe (Ibid, Doc. # 10, p. 86).


The fall and winter of 1980 and the threat of an invasion.

In the fall of 1980, Solidarity although formed and well organized is still not yet a legal entity and the summer’s agreements remained lettre morte. The union threatened further strikes in November if the regime delayed to register Solidarity. The party bowing to the workers’ increased militancy, finally registered Solidarity as a legal and independent body on November 10th. Strikes were thus averted. Domestically tensions seemed to be dropping. However, the threat of a Soviet Invasion grew in early December a just as the Seventh Plenum of the central Committee of the Polish communist party was underway. The new chairman Stanislav Kania who had essentially ousted Gierek with Moscow’s blessings attempted what seemed to be feeble moves for a renewal with in the party which was demoralized and fragmented in the wake of its confrontation with Solidarity.

But clearly the party had no intention of sharing power. “Dual power is not tolerated in any state, and will not be tolerated here” Kania thundered (Acherson, p. 209). Any democratization under Kania at this stage was ruled out. However, the new party leader in order to consolidate his position and marginalize “extremist elements” within the party itself, became nominally at least a “moderate” and worked with Walesa and Solidarity towards achieving national unity in the country after the divisive developments of the previous summer. In December, all strike action was halted. The party and the newly formed union seemed to be coming to some sort of modus vivendi with each other. The Catholic Church for its part always playing the role of go between gave its blessing to this “reconciliation” process.

Yet although things seemed relatively tranquil on the domestic front, foreign factors ratcheted up tensions both in Poland and regionally. Neighbouring Warsaw pact allies began to feel increasingly edgy about the current state of affairs at the time in Poland. Disturbing developments took place in early December while the Seventh plenum was underway. As a reminder to Warsaw not to go too far down the road towards liberalization and democratization, the armies of several socialist allies were put on alert. Washington reacted by warning Moscow about the consequences to superpower relations if any military actions were to take place at the Kremlin’s behest. In Europe, London, Brussels (EC) voiced their deep displeasure concerning the Soviets’ military plans and warned them any such actions would signal a death knell for East West detente and end all ties in the security and defense realm between the two rival blocs.

The west’s concerns were prompted by Swedish and NATO intelligence reports, and satellites photos which proved that Soviet forces based in states neighbouring Poland (East Germany, Czechoslovakia were manoeuvring or perhaps more accurately encircling the “renegade” socialist state. Was an invasion in early December imminent? It was hard to know. Western governments were anticipating such a move and refused to be caught off guard as was the case with the Soviet let Warsaw pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 which quashed the Prague spring.


A Perilous Period

What irked the west most was the possibility of a break down of the governing machinery in Poland which would lead to chaos in the country. The high probability that unlike in the Czechoslovakia, there could be a blood bath and Poles due to their heroic character and like the Hungarians in 1956 might resist and invasion. A general insurrection would perhaps ensue against the Soviet occupiers if the tanks rolled across the border into Poland. This would cause a wave of “boat people” to flee to the west across the Baltic or even a confrontation between the western NATO fleet and Soviet navy. Such catastrophic scenarios were envisioned at the time.

There were also fears that an invasion could have roused the populations in the eastern European region to rebel as well, and even possibly leading to an East West military confrontation in Europe. It was also, feared such a move might lead to an implosion of the Soviet bloc or maybe even lead to the break up of the Soviet Union itself (Ascherson, p.212). According to London at the time: “There are three scenarios. The first: Poland avoids collapsing into chaos, and there is no invasion. Second: Poland does collapse into chaos, but there is no invasion. Third: Poland collapses and invasion takes place. The first scenario is of course the best. But the second, chaos and no invasion, is the worst from the view of Her Majesty’s Government…” was the British diplomatic assessment of the “Polish crisis”.

Within the Warsaw pact, East German Erich Honecker feared for his own regime’s fate and thus urged Moscow to take decisive measures to bring back Poland into line with other fraternal socialist states. In a letter to his counterpart Leonid Brezhnev on November 26, 1980, Erich Honecker writes: “According to information we have received from various channels, counter revolutionary forces …in Poland are on the constant offensive and very delay is the equivalent of death- the death of socialist Poland. And in a reference to a Warsaw pact joint action to quell the mass workers movement and restore the status quo ante , he adds: Yesterday, our joint measures would have possibly been premature; today they are essential; tomorrow they could already be too late.” (Doc. #18, From Solidarity to Martial law).

Meanwhile, Moscow and its Warsaw pact allies (mainly E. Germany and Czechoslovakia) was gradually building up troop strength in Poland’s border areas. In early December 1980, there was the spectre of a “creeping invasion” hanging over Poland. In one arrival document released after 1989, high ranking members of the Czechoslovak military command discuss “plans [which] assume carrying out two exercises. The first is huge divisional tactical exercises independently carried out on each division’s home territory and on the territory of the Polish People’s Republic over a period of 5-6 days. And in an ominous note the reported stated that: An order from the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces set thee date and time for crossing the state border into the territory of PPR…” (Ibid, Doc. # 19). These military operations were planned to take place between Dec.8Th and 10Th, 1980. A Warsaw pact meeting held on December 5Th in Moscow at the time held off any final decision on a possible invasion. Soviet soldiers waited for the order to invade. There the country was effectively under siege. Poles stuck together in united front to face this threat.


The Kuklinski File

Ryszard Kuklinski, a colonel on the Polish General Staff and a very close aide to General Jaruzelski was also a valuable informant on the situation and remained so until just before Martial Law was declared almost a year later. He was also involved in the initial planning stages for the internal operation. His notes secretly smuggled out of Poland raided alarm in Washington and prompted the Carter administration to take “forceful measures “to prevent a Soviet led invasion into Poland. In an urgent massage to the CIA he noted that the Soviet forces had agreed “to plan for introducing (under the pretext of exercises) the troops of the Soviet Army, the Army of East Germany and Czech army to Poland (Document N0.21).” However this did not ensue. At a meeting in Moscow were Warsaw pact leaders gathered ( East Germany, Poland , Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Roumania and the USSR) it was agreed to give Stanislaw Kania , the Polish communist party chairman one more chance to “clamp down” on the Solidarity movement.

The primary reasons for Moscow’s reluctance to intervene militarily were the sheer size of the country and that Poland was a key Warsaw pact member. Any actions against it would endanger the unity with the socialist bloc as the exuberant costs of the operation and eventual occupation increased the possibility of a bloodbath. But perhaps above all the “Soviet Union was in an advanced state of decline “, (see: “From Solidarity to Marital law”, p.16). It was at this point in the last month of the year that the Kremlin hobbled by its own internal difficulties and the quagmire in Afghanistan, decided to leave the Polish leadership to take action alone with the country and prepare for Martial law.


1981 or “year zero”

The New Year began without any invasion. The Soviets bogged down in Afghanistan had no real appetite for an invasion. Furthermore Boris Ponomarev a leading member of the Soviet Communist remarked:” The Poles are big enough to sort out their own affairs. The USSR is in no way comptemplating intervention.” (Acherson, p.225). An invasion was averted for now. In 1981, Poland stumbled from one crisis into another. Its economy was worsening at an alarming rate. The country had no coherent plan for any economic recovery. In April Poland’s creditors agreed to reschedule it’s ballooning foreign debt. $2.5 Billion was owed abroad to western banks. Poland’s total hard currency debt stood at $25 Billion (Acherson, p.270). Party Chairman Stanlislav Kania was beginning to lose his grip on power. The Solidarity trade union had eroded his authority and a “new man” was waiting in the wings, to take over the party and do things his own way.

General Jaruzelski began to emerge as the man who would save Poland from itself and foreign intervention. At the eight party plenum on Feb 9th, it was agreed (most likely with Moscow’s consent) that the acting minister of defense would become prime minister. Another key development took place in the ongoing show down between the authorities and Solidarity. March of 81, a violent confrontation between security services (SB) and the two Solidarity activists known as the “Bydgoszcz crisis “raised tension domestically to the breaking point between the authorities and the mass movement. This incident could have sparked a nationwide military crackdown. However, this was not the case. Nevertheless, secret preliminary planning was already underway for a military crackdown with Moscow’s blessings just in “ case of the need to introduce martial law” would be justified ( Document No.36) At this time Soviets continued to exert pressure on the Polish leadership to introduce martial as an alternative to a Warsaw pact intervention.

This would be the internal solution to the “Polish crisis” which would absolve Moscow of any direct responability for the use of force. Moreover such an operation would be “home grown” and most likely be successful without seriously compromising ties with western Europe and it wouldn’t damage détente or super relations in general within the realm of arms reduction talks. On the night of April 3rd, Soviet leader Yuri Andropov and Dmitiri Ustinov held secret meeting on the Polish – Soviet border with their number one and two counterparts, party chairman Kania and General and PM Jaruzelski (who was later to takeover as party chairman himself) and pressured the Polish leadership to set a definitive date for the adoption of martial law. Yet the Poles refused to commit themselves to any such action.

The Soviets were not encouraged by what they saw as a continuing display of excessive caution, but at the same time they recognized that they had to tolerate the current leadership in Warsaw. The politburo’s only conclusion after the meeting was to threaten Poland with cut off of Soviet gas and energy supplies and encouraging “hardliners” of the regime to take center stage in a final resolution of the conflict between the Solidarity unions and the party. This was part of a tactical move to effectively toss the ball into the Polish side of the court. A top Soviet member of the military brass Marshal Kulikov remarked emphatically “the common goal should be to solve the problems without the deployment of allied armies into Poland (From Solidarity to Martial law, p. 21).” He added: “If they cannot do so alone and then ask for help, this would be a different situation from one in which troops had been deployed from the outset.” It was at this crucial point that the Soviets led by an ailing Leonid Brezhnev decided and or agreed with both Kania’s and Jaruzelski’s positions on how to resolve the ongoing “Polish crisis”- impose martial law from within the country by means of using the nation’s armed forces and security apparatus without any foreign forces being part of the operation.


The West’s stance

The west again feared an outside Soviet military intervention. Western Europe adopted the common position at an EEC meeting in Maastricht in March that Poland should solve the internal dissent by its own means, without any foreign military meddling. The Reagan White House responded to the risk of Soviet force used in Poland by saying “that the Polish authorities may be preparing to use force….We are similarly concerned that the Soviet Union may intend to undertake repressive (without specifying in a Warsaw pact move) action in Poland (Acherson, p.264).” A state of emergency was nearly enacted but avoided at the time thanks to the adept maneuvering with Moscow of the Kania-Jaruzelski duo. World leaders were all preoccupied about the situation. The Pope, John Paul II sought to use his moral sway over his nation to achieve compromise over confrontation. The new American president Reagan (a stanch anti communist crusader) warned that any outside invasion or internal crackdown would have grave consequences for East West relations.

In Washington, the nail biting events in the spring of 81, seemed like a rerun of December 1980, when a military solution using Soviet troops was being seriously envisioned. The CIA considered Poland to be in an “extended, but controlled, conflict”. Ronald Reagan had become president in January 1981, and although an outspoken foe of the Soviets and a tireless crusader against communism, his advisors wanted to avoid a wider confrontation with Moscow. Col. Kuklinski was warned in Washington at the time that a Soviet invasion was still imminent. On the domestic front “the Warsaw agreements “concluded in the end of March, lessened tensions.

The government in this temporary truce between the authorities and Solidarity conceded its responsibility in the Bydogoszcz incident. This development surprised the Americans. As a reward for the regime’s temperance, the U.S began drawing up plans to provide an economic rescue package to Poland which stabilized the regime by alleviating the dire economic plight of the people. In April of 81, a food rationing system was introduced or imposed on all Poles. Coupons were disturbed first for butter and bread then later on for meat and later on included ‘sensitive items” such as liquor and tobacco.


A Prelude to Martial Law in Poland.

In mid summer of 1981, PUWP party congress took place. Just before the congress the Soviets conducted navel maneuvers in the Baltic Sea. Another powerful reminder was issued to Warsaw not to relent on the regime’s plans for crushing the dissent from within with an internal military operation. The alternative was clear: an outside Soviet led intervention and military occupation of Poland would take place. In response to the display of sea borne strength, the U.S warned about the “unacceptability of Soviet direct or indirect intervention into the internal affairs of the Polish people.” The term “indirect” was clearly a reference to Moscow that Washington would not countenance the possibility of a Soviet sponsored or backed military putsch or martial law being imposed in Poland. At the party congress Kania managed to sideline “hardliners” who feared Moscow might move into Poland if regime did not act soon. Henceforth, preparations for the proclamation of martial law moved forward. This would now be a “home grown” operation so to say, without any direct Warsaw pact participation. A National Defense Committee was set up in Warsaw (basically a precursor The Military Council of National Salvation which ran Poland during Martial Law) and met earlier in June in preparation for martial law. At this point “the basic stage of the conception –planning work was completed.” (From Solidarity to Martial Law, p.26). By the end of the summer of 81, as of August that year the KGB began secretly issuing notices in Moscow in anticipation of the official enactment of martial law in Poland. By then Moscow under an ailing Leonid Brezhnev who was still in control opted for “an internal invasion” as the solution to the “Polish problem”. Brezhnev was the “decisive voice against the (Soviet) invasion”. Afterwards for the rest of the year “stiff internal security measures were implemented and the militarization of the Polish (Communist) party proceeded (S. Bailer).”


The Warsaw Dairy of August 1981

An interesting insight into this period comes from the Polish author later exiled in France Kazimier Brandys who describes the atmosphere in the Polish capital that summer in August of 1981 in the pre- state of emergency period.

“In Warsaw, toward the end of July, I noted three types of rumours, three auguries. The first prophecy concerns a lighting military and police action. The government declares martial law and 70,000 people are arrested in one night by specially trained Security squads. The operation was given the name “Operation Tent” (for some unknown reason) and has it that the special squads are already billeted in Warsaw. The second prognosis foresees a gradual infiltration and erosion of the independent union movement concomitant with the build up of economic difficulties. And so, increasingly fewer goods on the market, increasing political tensions, conflicts and splits within the opposition, the weariness of society. Finally, people will want peace and order. The stick will triumph, and return to its proper place. The third prophecy is optimistic. It defines the events in Poland as “the longest of the nation’s uprisings”, one that will lead to lasting change. The reform of the sociopolitical model will filter into other countries in the bloc, and the Soviet Union itself will be faced with the need to reform. During those transformations Poland will be independent for the third time. It is also possible to imagine that the three auguries mentioned above are not mutually exclusive and that each of them could come true at some point.

Brandys observes the strange paradox at the time, he writes:

The catastrophe is not yet entirely real. It is present in your words and thoughts; you can feel it in the air, but there are no scenes of collective despair and the promenading crowds seem carefree enough. There has just been a decrease in western tourists.”

The perception of the regime among the populace is described like this:
The government has found itself in a most strange position. The “people”, who had before existed in name only, are now going out into the streets. For thirty years the government has been boasting that socialism has brought the people to the centre of the city. But that’s one thing, and quite another when the people go out into the streets. The government knows that the moment free elections are announced, it would cease to exist overnight, and it does not find that very encouraging. The government says that production is falling; it’s your fault; you’re pushing the country toward a national disaster. It says after it has itself pushed the country toward disaster for ten years now.

And in a reference to Poland’s economic plight back then he muses: “A decline in production is fatal evidence against any government: it indicates a poor economy and lack of social confidence. The populace feels that the present government is a continuation of the one that brought the country to economic ruin. People work poorly under such a government. There are two possible solutions: either carry out swift and profound reforms or leave office. Neither of these solutions is likely, since governments are not inclined to commit suicide.”


The Superpowers’ war of nerves over Poland and the general.

As martial law preparation advanced, the West essential the U.S increasingly believed an alternative to a Soviet led invasion was likely in the form of a Polish military in tandem with the security forces orchestrated operation. American intelligence analysts believed that: “As tensions mount, Jaruzelski might additionally invoke a state of emergency or some variant of martial law in order to gird the nation against a threatened Soviet invasion.” (Doc. # 52). The Soviet sought to undermine Kania’s leadership and have him replaced by hardliners loyal to Moscow who would do the Kremlin’s bidding and “invite’ Warsaw pact troops into Poland, to finally deal with the ongoing internal dissent. By summer’s end in September the Soviets initiated “Zapad-81” maneuvers again another display of military might in the Baltic Sea off the Polish coast.

This action further unnerved Washington. Then a pivotal moment took place: Party chairman Stanislav Kania was effectively ousted at Moscow’s behest and consent and he was replaced by General Jaruzelski who had become de-facto Moscow’s new man in Warsaw . The general held all key position within the new leadership: he was Prime Minister, chairmen of the national defense committee and defense minister; a one man troika. However at this stage, the communist party as far as Solidarity was concerned had ceased to exist. From now on the opposition was faced with a more formidable opponent: The Generals and their army. This was a sort of what I call a “silent coup” by which the civilization government handed over power to the military.


Day “X”

As of mid November final preparation were being made in order to carry out the imposition of martial law. To use a few appropriate clichés the point of no return has been reached and the dye was cast: Martial Law had become inevitable. The plan was set into motion when in late November students at the Firefighters’ Academy in Warsaw went on strike. The strike was brutally repressed by ZOMO units, well armed government goons part of the “Milicja” or state security units which played key role in the martial law operations along with the army. This was a sort of “dress rehearsal of what was to come. Just three days before day “X”, Moscow had made no definitive military commitment to assisting the Military regime in the implementation of martial law.

Nevertheless Warsaw pact units were placed on high alert ahead of the operation. On December 12th operation “Synchronization” a code term for Martial Law was about to happen. Data shows that about 70,000 soldiers ,over 30,000 Ministry of Internal Affairs functionaries , around 1,900 armored vehicles warships, cargo aircraft and helicopters were used “to perfection “ in this operation. The army and police forces along with anti –terrorist units surrounded striking factories in the hands of solidarity and the workers. Poland had entered into a “state of war” with itself. Solidarity strikers were arrested and some intervened. (From Solidarity to Martial law, p. 34).

Solidarity’s passive resistance campaign has come to an end with the bloody use of force against the union by the military regime. This was highlighted in the following observations: “On 13 December, it became clear that the foundations of the regime are represented by its forces, were still strong. Solidarity’s program rejected recourse to violence: this is evidently why the Union was not ready for confrontation with the authorities in which the latter did not hesitate to use brutal methods of repression, which had been preparation for several months (“Poland under Jaruzelski: The state of war and normalization”, p. 262).”


Jaruzelski a traitor or a national hero?

It is perhaps worthwhile to quickly examine the role of the central actor in the martial law drama, General Wojtech Jaruzelski. One insightful source into his mindset was his aide Kuklinski, the top Polish army spy for the CIA who wrote this in a secret message to Washington at the time of the imposition of military rule in Poland: “I believe Poland (under martial law) followed the exact requirements and instructions of Moscow though perhaps a little later and not exactly in the style they wished and still being wished for the Soviet leadership. The interests of the Soviet Commonwealth had priority over the sovereignty of small and medium sized countries... He went on to remark how,” Jaruzelski kept a good face in a bad play. He always attempted to renationalize to justify the Soviet (backed) action….There was, however, no doubt that under the influence of these facts he could conclude that the actual danger to the Polish state’s separateness even with a limited sovereignty constitutes the U.S.S.R.”

For many Poles however, Jaruzelski was a nationalist hero rather than an odious villain. As Kulkinski points out unlike in other anti democratic military actions such as 1968 in Prague or Budapest in 1956 : “For the first time in the history of the Soviet bloc acts were committed in 1981 under national slogans and with national forces...acts which in other (Sovet Bloc) countries had to be executed by the Soviet army.”


Western reaction to the imposition of Martial Law

Western Governments were in a somewhat confused state about how to deal with and react to the Martial Law fait accompli .The first meetings held in the White house after 13th of December were attended by Vice President George Bush, Chief of Staff James Baker and Soviet expert Professor Richard Pipes and a representative of the NSC (National Security Council). Washington thanks to Ryszard Kuklinski was well aware of the eventuality of martial but was not sure just when it would take place. It remains unclear to this day then, if Washington new about the impending doom, and if so then why didn’t the American warn and inform Solidarity’s leadership in advance? The silence was interpreted as a green light to go ahead with the operations (The Haunted Land, Tina Rosenberg, p. 204-210). Perhaps the west didn’t want to provoke “futile resistance” and avert a bloody clash? NATO foreign minister met on December 13th. . Secretary of state Alexander Haig publicly warned against Soviet meddling into the internal crackdown saying, “the Polish nation should find a way for overcoming current difficulties by itself.”

In response to the imposition of Martial Law, the U.S announces sanctions against the Soviet Union such as a ban on shipping pipeline construction material. These sanctions were later lifted in November 1982 in return for NATO allies in W. Europe agreed on more restrictive control on high tech exports and trade credit agreements with Moscow. But during the martial law period a transatlantic rift emerged. “There was a reluctance “Western European governments specifically those of France and Germany, to risk détente by imposing serious sanctions on the Soviets”. Furthermore, “Western governments had convinced themselves that the communist regimes of Eastern Europe were both legitimate and popular ...They were therefore reluctant to regard Solidarity either as a disproof of that legitimacy or as a harbinger of things to come.” (O’Sullivan, p.170). Specifically speaking, Bonn (West Germany) which was engaged in an “Ostpolitik “dialogue with Moscow and took an “understanding view of the crackdown”. France’s left leaning socialists saw the move as stabilizing for Poland. Martial law was thus seen as the “lesser evil” and a patriotic endeavor which prevented an outright Soviet intervention. From this standpoint it was a “godsend.”

Martial law overall was seen in Western Europe as an internal Polish matter .It deserved harsh words of disapproval officially but privately leaders and policy makers were reluctant to go the sanctions route as not to rub the Russians in the wrong way and damage overall ties with the U.S.SR . As for the U.K PM Margaret Thatcher adopted a tougher stance, siding more with the Reagan white house while at the same time trying not to distance herself from her continental European colleagues.


The Aftermath: From December 1981 until December 1982

Martial law became institutionalized. Although is was officially suspended almost a year later on December 31st ,1982 since the crackdown took place new laws were enacted and codified. Military rule had changed in name only. This was very much like the normalization which took place in the post Prague spring Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Military rule was now legitimized at least in the regime’s eyes.

The Special emergency powers act (which resembled those imposed by western government in the post Sept 11th world) was decreed and enforced. Under General Wojciech Jaruzelski special powers were given to the head of state. Directives were given “to militarize industrial enterprises…and to subject workers to military discipline, to use powers of indefinite preventive internment on suspicion that the individuals may threaten the ‘security of state’ and to outlaw the distribution, possession and publication of leaflets and bulletins (Poland under Jaruzelski. P. 268).


On July 22nd after 586 days, the state council repealed martial law throughout Poland and also announced a partial amnesty for those convicted of political crimes. The dreaded and despised Military Council for National Salvation (WRON) was disbanded. That year on the 5th of October the Nobel peace prize was awarded to Solidarity leader Lech Walesa. A new era of pluralism and democratization had begun in Poland and the demise of communism in East central Europe was underway. The rest is history.


Concluding remarks and some afterthoughts

In this paper I sought to examine the background to the events of Dec. 13th in Poland. The socio political context and explain why what happened when it did. Yet there remain questions. The reasons for the exact day and timing of the military “crackdown” still remain unclear to me and perhaps to scholars as well. What is fairly certain is this: martial law was a brutal and blatant attempt to preserve the old order, to suppress any renewal from within or "bottom up" democratic reforms domestically. The party’s authority since the events of August, 1980, until the fateful day of December 13th, had been challenged and its legitimacy eroded. It refused to enter into any power sharing arrangements but chose instead to assure its survival with the use of military force. Martial Law only postponed the party’s day of reckoning and hastened the decomposition of the regime. The rise of Solidarity, its ability to remain a relevant force of continuous underground resistance despite the repression, combined with events beyond its control such as the arrival Gorbachev and Glasnost in the Soviet Union, led to Polish communism’s final demise and downfall. Martial law was also an admission of failure on the economic front. It distracted the populace from their daily material deprivations.

Yet it failed to address any of the root and chronic causes of the economic mess inherited from the corrupt and inept Gierek regime. However, it was from a strategic point of view, it was a successful, almost Blitzkrieg like in its rapidity operation most military historians might agree, in its execution. But geo politically it isolated Poland internationally and only worsened its economic woes. Poland emerged in the post Dec 13th era as a nation which would later spearhead the offensive against oppression and one party rule in the rest of the Soviet bloc. The events in Poland of the early 1980s perhaps didn’t play the decisive role in slaying the Soviet Communist dragon but it sure helped to wear down or exhaust the already very weary “the evil empire” before the final fall took place in the Autumn of 1989.