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Ukraine as a link between East and West?

Aaron Beitman - 3/13/2010

Ukrainian leaders since 1991 have employed different strategies for navigating the cramped geopolitical space between Russia and the West. Viktor Yanukovych will be the latest to chart a course through these treacherous waters, following his triumph over Yulia Tymoshenko in February’s presidential elections. In contrast to Yanukovych’s 2004 victory, domestic and international observers roundly affirmed the February votes as free and fair. Though the Orange Revolution has been read its obituary, the February votes should be seen as healthy steps towards democracy in a region that has in recent years experienced backsliding. As Ukraine’s new president designs his foreign policy, his plan for Ukraine “to become a bridge between Russia and the West” will be met with a host of challenges. First, he must bring coherence to the overwhelming political disarray in Kiev driven by constitutional ambiguities. Moreover, Yanukovych must revive Western enthusiasm for Ukraine, which has ebbed following the Obama Administration’s ‘reset’ of relations with Russia and continued EU ambivalence towards Ukraine’s membership in Western institutions. Despite his “pro-Russian” stance, Ukraine’s new leader must also manage Moscow’s sometimes heavy-handed use of energy policy as well as uncertainty over Crimea and Russia’s Black Sea fleet.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONDUNDRUM

Ukraine was the last former Soviet republic to adopt a post-Soviet constitution, which went into effect on June 28, 1996. Though initially in favor of a full presidential system, then-President Leonid Kuchma changed direction in 2002 to support a semi-parliamentary system. Kuchma’s reversal aimed to deny rival and then-presidential contender Viktor Yushchenko the extensive powers enshrined in the 1996 constitution. As part of the 2004 compromise agreement allowing Yushchenko’s ascension to the presidency, Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc agreed to support reforms weakening the presidency. The reforms have created an ambiguous system where president and Parliament battle over policy turf. Without clear constitutional powers to shape Ukraine’s foreign relations, Yanukovych will be attempting bridge building with one arm tied behind his back.

OPEN OR CLOSED?

The U.S. has eased previously exuberant support for Ukraine, in part to secure Russian cooperation on issues such as Iran’s nuclear program and global non-proliferation. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration has indicated it will not accept any country’s assertion of a sphere of influence and has reaffirmed support for NATO’s open door to aspirants such as Ukraine. The combination of the U.S.-Russia ‘reset’ and the resumption of ‘Ukraine fatigue’ after years of political deadlock in Kiev means that Yanukovych must move quickly on reforms in order to be taken seriously in Washington.

While Yanukovych is unlikely to lead Ukraine through NATO’s door when less than one-third of the population supports membership in the trans-Atlantic alliance, closer ties with the EU are universally popular in Ukraine. Many Ukrainians see EU membership as an important step towards greater economic prosperity and political strength. However, there continues to be serious ambivalence about admitting this large, relatively poor country into the EU. By avoiding explicit recognition of Ukraine’s EU aspirations and refusing to address stalled progress on restrictive visa regimes, the EU has indicated that “the door is neither open nor shut” for Ukraine. Yanukovych should push for economic and democratic reform, but it is unclear whether Ukraine’s progress will convince Brussels of anything.

THE RUSSIA QUESTION

Immediately following his victory, Yanukovych promised to restore close ties with Russia. Though Russia has welcomed his overtures, Ukraine’s new president will have to work hard in order to avoid conflict with Moscow over Crimea, the Black Sea fleet, and energy. Though Crimea is not the tinderbox it was, its significant Russian population and hosting of Russia’s Black Sea fleet mean that it remains squarely on the radar. As the Black Sea fleet is scheduled to be withdrawn in 2017, there has been concern over Russia’s willingness and ability to keep that schedule. Yanukovych has suggested that he might allow Russia to keep the fleet at Sevastopol beyond 2017, but such a move would be unconstitutional.

Energy is yet another area of concern. Ukraine’s economy is said to be the single most energy-intensive in the world. Total reliance on Russia for domestic energy needs combined with the significant fees Ukraine earns as a transit country for Russia gas to Western Europe help demonstrate Ukraine’s troubling energy dependence on its Eastern neighbor. For his part, Yanukovych has sought to resurrect a scheme to get discounted Russian gas in exchange for a Russian ownership stake in Ukraine’s gas transit system. While this will undoubtedly raise the ire of his political opponents, Yanukovych wants to head off the impact of new pipelines that will bypass Ukraine to satisfy Europe’s energy thirst.

CONCLUSION

As enthusiasm over its democratic progress subsides, Ukraine’s foreign policy challenges will loom ever larger. Obama’s ‘reset’ and EU ambivalence dampen Kiev’s Western aspirations. Moreover, Russia will likely continue to leverage energy against Ukraine in order to extract concessions. To top it off, President Yanukovych leads an intensely divided country, disillusioned by the unmet promises of the Orange Revolution. With great potential to impress and disappoint, Ukraine’s foreign policy trajectory over the next year should be watched closely. For Viktor Yanukovych, building a bridge over the Sea of Azov may prove easier than successfully positioning Ukraine between East and West.