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Shift in Pakistan's policy on Afghanistan

Raza Khan - 5/6/2010

ISLAMABAD (Pakistan): Of late a significant shift is apparently taking place in Pakistan decades-old interventionist and destructive policy regarding its western neighbour, Afghanistan, raising hopes of bringing down the intensity of anti-government insurgency spearheaded by Al-Qaeda backed Taliban in the war-ravaged country.
Pakistan’s all-powerful military and intelligence establishment, which authored and executed the country’s policy of making Afghanistan ‘strategic depth’ since late 80s and backing Afghan Taliban since mid 90s, has given strong indications that it is ready to forego locating ‘strategic depth’ and reduce, if not altogether give up, support to Taliban.
Recently on several occasions Pakistan military chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani has stated that Pakistan did not want ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan as is generally perceived in purely military-strategic terms. Rather General Kiyani has argued that Pakistan conception of ‘strategic depth’ means ‘peaceful’ and ‘friendly’ Afghanistan. Some senior military officials at National Defense University, Islamabad, to whom WPR talked, interpreted ‘peaceful’ and ‘friendly’ Afghanistan as a condition where Pakistan’s rival India should have no political and more importantly military influence. Dr, Ashraf Ali, an authority on Pakistan policy on Afghanistan and Taliban, told Global Politician the way General Kiyani had come up with a new interpretation of ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan suggest the military, real formulators of Pakistan Afghan policy, was ready for adjustments in its much-criticized policy.
Since the erstwhile Soviet Union withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Pakistan has had sought ‘strategic depth’ which on the one hand meant raising and training Islamist militants on Afghan soil to fight in Indian Kashmir alongside local separatists. On the other hand ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan for Pakistani strategists meant to have a fall-back territory for its retreating troops in case of war with India apart from deploying some of the country’s nuclear missile launchers in Afghanistan so as to have a second-strike capability against India. Pakistan and India are declared nuclear powers.
Traditional Pakistan policy regarding Afghanistan centred on four main pillars: preventing Afghan Pakhtun nationalists from coming into power as well as dislodging and enfeebling central authority there; locating ‘strategic depth’ vis-a-vis arch rival India; supporting so-called Islamist outfits like mujahideen and Taliban; and making Afghanistan a virtual province. Most of these aspects of Pakistan policy have been mutually reinforcing.
The purpose of stopping Pakhtun, the majority ethnic community of Afghanistan, nationalists from coming into power has been to keep old Afghan irredentist claims on Pakistan’s Pakhtun inhabited parts at bay. Secular Afghan Pakhtun nationalists have had championed these claims. Pakhtuns are the second largest community of Pakistan and inhabit the North West Frontier and Balochistan provinces besides the country’s tribal areas called FATA. In order to achieve the policy objectives of preventing Pakhtun nationalists from getting power and gaining ‘strategic depth’, Pakistani strategists successfully dislodged central authority in Afghanistan in early 90s when last of the government set-up in pre Taliban era of Dr. Najeebullah was dislodged by Islamabad-backed mujahideen. Subsequently, Pakistan tried its utmost to prevent central authority in Afghanistan to revive by pitting one group against the other.
However, pursing of Pakistan policy goals religiously radicalized the whole of Afghan society particularly the profoundly tribal Pakhtun majority. The reason has been that for Pakistan the best antidote to secular anti-Pakistan Pakhtun nationalists and for creating power-political vacuum in Afghanistan had been apolitical and fundamentalist Islamist groups. This was the genesis of various groups of so-called mujahideen and Taliban in Afghanistan. Indubitably under Afghan Taliban regime (1996-2001) Pakistan find ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan as well as it also succeeded in browbeating Pakhtun nationalists. However, Pakistan’s policy of nurturing Afghan Islamist fundamentalists on its soil and funding also radicalized large parts of its own society particularly Pakhtuns besides making Afghanistan a hub of international terrorist organizations primarily Al Qaeda.
As under Hamid Karzai central authority keeps on strengthening in Afghanistan, himself a Pakhtun, and Pakistan support to Afghan Taliban having a huge blowback effect on the latter in shape of large-scale radicalization, Islamabad does not have a choice but to shift its policy. Pakistan loosing significant influence inside Afghanistan and Indian’s capitalizing on the situation has also had a big role in shifting of Pakistan’s Afghan policy. Moreover, with noticeable international presence in Afghanistan and expression of concern by World players regarding Pakistani intervention there, Pakistani decision-makers seem to have realized that the attainment of old policy objectives is no more possible. Therefore, for the first time Pakistani military chief has also offered to NATO and Afghan government to help raise Afghan National Army and promised that if Pakistan is entrusted with the task it could raise around 150,000 troops in four years.
Recently, Pakistan has also used its oldest and most reliable Afghan Islamist ally, Gulbadin Hikmatyar, chief of Pakistan-based Hizb-e-Islami Afghanistan, to join Karzai government. “This is also the indicator of changing Pakistan policy from pitting Afghan Taliban against Karzai government to asking its trusted and old Afghan Islamist ally, Gulbadin, reconcile with and thus strengthen Afghan polity,” Shamim Shahid, a known Pakistani journalist and analyst, having close contacts in Afghan government, told Global Politician.
However, the most quantifiable and valid sign of transforming Pakistan’s Afghan policy is the arrest and killing of several Afghan Taliban commanders inside Pakistan in the last couple of months. The most significant of these arrests is of Mullah Abdul Ghani Biradar, No 2 in Taliban hierarchy. He was arrested in Karachi reportedly in a joint Pakistan-US raid. Ghani’s nabbing was preceded by Mullah Abdul Salam and Mullah Mir Muhammad, Taliban shadow governors of Kunduz and Baghlan provinces (Afghanistan) near Peshawar (Pakistan). Subsequently senior Taliban leader Maulvi Kabir and Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar’s son-in-law Motasim Agha Jan have also been arrested.
Much of the crisis in Afghanistan in recent years has been the result of Pakistan interventionist policy regarding Afghanistan. Ultimately realizing the symbiotic relationship of crises in Pakistan and Afghanistan Obama administration came up with a new policy terming it ‘Af-Pak’. As Pakistan is transforming its policy towards Afghanistan it could have wholesome impact on the internal situation in Afghanistan.