Home >> East Asia >> Japan  Email  Print Democratic Party of Japan: Birthpang blues continues Pranamita Baruah - 5/9/2010 Barely six months after Yukio Hatoyama’s Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) swept into power though a historic win in the House of Representatives general election in August 2009, trouncing the then dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had ruled the nation almost continuously for more than half a century, the new government already finds itself in a very sticky position on a number of issues.
Paramount among the string of issues which posed serious challenges to Hatoyama government are: the relocation of Futenma Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) in Okinawa; the termination of Japan’s refueling operations for the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan; and Prime Minister Hatoyama’s proposal for an East Asian Community (EAC), a pillar of his so called ‘yuai’ (fraternity) diplomacy. Reforming the country’s bureaucratic structure and endowing greater power to the elected representatives as was mandated in the DPJ’s election manifesto is yet another challenge for the government.
The Relocation of MCAS in Okinawa: It is considered to be the lynchpin of the planned realignment of US Forces in Japan. It is the central component of the “US-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”, adopted by both Japan and the US governments in May 2006. This plan basically aimed at reducing the burden on the people of Okinawa while ‘maintaining the deterrent capability of the Japan-US security alliance’. Under this, the US had agreed to return the existing Futenma Air Base to Japan by 2014 after building a replacement facility in Camp Schwab in the city of Nago in northern Okinawa. At the same time, it has also been agreed to transfer to Guam around 8,000 US troops and 9,000 family members from the Third Marine Division, although with Japan bearing 60 percent of the cost infrastructure upgrades on the island. The realignment plan was reiterated further with the signing off on the Guam International Agreement in February 2009 during US Defence Secretary Hillary Clinton’s visit to Japan. However, the DPJ leaders have taken the position that the 2006 Agreement should be scrapped. In fact, Hatoyama himself has emphasized on the transfer of Futenma Air Station to ‘out of the prefecture, if not out of Japan’. However, post election period saw somewhat softened attitude of the DPJ toward the realignment. The government now has merely committed to move in the direction of reexamining the realignment plan’.
Despite Hatoyama government’s reluctance to implement the 2006 agreement, it remains true that the realignment of US Forces in Japan is integral to the worldwide reorganization of US forces in the post 9/11 period to respond to the rising global security and military threats. In East Asian region particularly, with China’s growing militarization and North Korea’s nuclear threat, it seems necessary for both the alliance partners to come to a decision on the relocation of Futenma base. Any delay in implementing the plan may seriously damage not only the future prospect of the Japan-US security alliance and jeopardize Japan’s defense, but also compromise the Pentagon’s strategy in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.
Though the election controversy continues to linger, the truism is that there is no alternative site for the facility to be relocated. Notwithstanding the different stances, the likely scenario in the coming years seems to be maintenance of the status quo.
The Termination of refueling operations in Afghanistan: It emerged as another irritant for the Hatoyama government in improving Japan’s security alliance with the US. Immediately after the 9/11 incident, in an effort to support the US led War on Terror, the LDP government in Japan pushed through the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML), though Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution does not permit such a step. Soon, Japan started providing supplementary marine logistic support of its Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF) in the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. In 2007, however, while raising questions regarding the alleged diversion of Japanese fuel for US warships to carry out operations in Iraq, the DPJ demanded the termination of the refueling mission.
After the inauguration of Hatoyama government, despite repeated appeals by the US, UK and Pakistan to continue Japan’s refueling operation even after expiry of the Anti Terrorism Law in January 2010, the new government stuck to its decision not to extend the operation further. Though it upset the US, a $5 billion non-military aid was offered by the Hatoyama government to Afghanistan. It did not, however, assuage the US feeling.
The East Asian Community (EAC) Concept: One of the basic components of Hatoyama’s ‘yuai’ (fraternity) diplomacy is to strengthen Japan’s foreign relations in Asia. The centerpiece of it is the proposed East Asian Community (EAC). Initially, by leaving the details of such a community excessively vague, Hatoyama fueled suspicion. In Hatoyama’s framework of things, the US was perceived to be excluded, an idea not quite welcome by other Asian countries.
The US was suspicious of Hatoyama’s intention as he did not share information on it to President Barrack Obama during Japan-US summit talks in September, 2009. However, during his meeting with Chinese leader Hu Jintao, Hatoyama discussed about building an EAC so that the two countries could overcome their differences and establish a relationship of trust. In September 2009 itself, during his speech to the UN General Assembly, Hatoyama broached the subject of EAC once again by stating that he was looking forward to such community taking shape as an extension of the accumulated cooperation built up step by step among partners who have the capacity to work together, starting with fields in which they can cooperate- Free Trade Agreements, finance, currency, energy, environment, disaster relief, etc.
This discrepancy on Hatoyama’s part led many US observers to believe that Hatoyama deliberately avoided sharing his EAC proposal with Washington. Their suspicion soon aggravated further when on October 7, while speaking before the Foreign Correspondents Club in Tokyo, Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada mentioned about the inclusion of Japan, China, South Korea, ASEAN, India and Australia in the proposed EAC. While stating that “Japan has its national interests and the US has its own”, Okada clearly excluded the US from his vision. On the same issue, just a few days later, on October 10, during the trilateral summit meeting with Chinese Premiere Wen Jiabao and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak in Beijing, Hatoyama also stated that “Until now, we have tended to be too reliant on the US.” He further stated that although the Japan-US alliance remains important, but as a member of Asia, he would like to develop policies that focus more on Asia.
Hatoyama’s concept, however, did not receive as much support from the Asian states as the DPJ expected. Many countries showed apprehension over the non inclusion of the US in the proposed EAC. In fact, during his discussion with Hatoyama, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong expressed his concern on that issue. According to Loong, any East Asian framework would require to include the US. Although both China and South Korea agreed to study the EAC concept, so far, they have not showed much interest in it either.
It seems the EAC concept has not been able to gather much support particularly because it remains vague, both in its substance and purpose and in terms of the role envisioned for the US and China. Questions have also been raised regarding how Hatoyama’s proposed EAC would accommodate China, which differs radically from Japan, the US and other democratic states when it comes to certain core issues such as rules of economics and trade, freedom of speech and press, business ethics, intellectual property rights and intellectual property rights. All these questions need to be answered, along with an unequivocal statement as to whether Hatoyama intends to include the US in his proposed EAC or would keep the latter out of it.
Each of the three issues mentioned above bear directly on the core issues of the Japan-US alliance. So far, current DPJ government’s steps in addressing them have not been very reassuring. In the last few moths, both Washington and Tokyo seem to have drifted from the earlier stances. In fact, both are trying to strengthen their bilateral ties with China. Under the circumstance, any miscalculation on Hatoyama’s part can jeopardize the more than five decades long security alliance with the US.
Domestic Issues
As in the foreign policy front, the DPJ government is also confronted with a number of domestic problems, including the political fund scandal issue involving certain key leaders of the party, including Hatoyama and DPJ Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa. Hatoyama’s former state-paid aides were indicted over the alleged misreporting of political contributions. Then on March 1, 2010, four trade union members were arrested on suspicion of violating the Political Funds Control Law with regard to donations allegedly received by the election campaign office of DPJ Lower House member Ms. Chiyomi Kobayashi.
These scandals have fueled criticism that Hatoyama administration is not different from that of the LDP on issues of scandal. Hatoyama’s abilities in leading the government seemed to be outmaneuvered by other coalition partners on key issues like the relocation of the Futenma base and the compilation of the budget from April 2010. Ozawa is also accused by his detractors of exerting his influence and is seen as a dual power structure within the current government.
Budget is another issue that led to Hatoyama’s approval rating going downhill. While launching its coalition government with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Peoples’ New Party, the DPJ pledged to cut waste in the use of taxpayers’ money and put more cash into the hands of consumers. Although Hatoyama government managed to compile the fiscal 2010 budget by the end of 2009, it failed to deliver on some of its own major pledges, notably by effectively continuing provisional surcharges on gasoline taxes. Despite growing national deficit, the DPJ government announced to release 7.2 trillion yen ($80.9 billion) as a supplementary budget for the year through March 2010. Hatoyama cabinet also decided to put a $494 billion cap on capital-raising through issuing state bonds for the budget in 2010. But questions were raised on the capability of the government in curtailing Japan’s mounting debt. Doubts were further aggravated as Hatoyama ruled out the possibility of setting income limits on eligibility for child allowances.
Recently, the Hatoyama government has decided to abolish tolls, on an experimental basis, for 50 sections of 37 expressways in Japan on trial basis from June 2010 till the end of March 2011. The policy is aimed at lowering transportation cost as well as revitalizing local economies. But questions have already been raised on the success of this policy as it would create several other problems, including the necessity of having more tax money in maintaining and repairing expressways; more emission of greenhouse gases due to increasing traffic; possibility of a decline in customer number in public transportation, compelling bus, ferry and train companies to either reduce or terminate services. Due to all these negative effects, Japanese people do not seem to be in favour of this decision. In fact, in a recent poll, it was revealed that the toll-free expressway policy received the lowest support. The DPJ government needs to heed to public opinion before implementing such policies. Otherwise its support will go down further.
Reforming the Bureaucracy: Right from the time of assumption of office, Hatoyama government has been insisting on the necessity of curbing the overwhelming power of the bureaucracy. Considering the existing bureaucratic structure, which has come to enjoy enormous power during more than half a century long LDP rule, as a foreign imposed element during the post war period, the DPJ government aspires to correct the historical wrong by giving the policy making power to the elected representatives instead. To achieve that goal, the Cabinet already endorsed a bill on February 19, 2010 and submitted it to the Diet for consideration. This bill, designed basically to revise the national civil service law, suggests to establish within the Cabinet Secretariat a Cabinet personnel bureau headed by a parliamentary deputy chief Cabinet Secretary, a senior vice minister or a person picked by the prime minister. While centralizing personnel management, the proposed bureau is to comprehensively manage appointments of senior officials at all government offices. The bill also proposes to formulate a cross-sectional list of candidates for senior officials at all government ministries and agencies, and make appointments from the list.
The aspirations of the proposed bill are undoubtedly very high. It tries to wrest control power from the bureaucratic structure, the influence of which is deeply entrenched in the Japanese society. It also gives the chief Cabinet Secretary the authority to test the competence of candidates (including people recommended by Cabinet ministers themselves) for high-ranking posts. The bill also offers to different ministries the discretion of drawing bureaucrats from the list provided by the bureau. Above all, it proposes to treat at par bureaucrats such as administrative vice ministers, bureau chiefs and department chief, who can also be made a department head without deeming such moves a demotion.
The implementation of this bill, however, seems to be a challenge for the DPJ. Some major loopholes of this bill have already been pointed out. Firstly, the proposed bill entrusts the Cabinet ministers with power to deal with appointment and evaluation of high ranking bureaucrats. But it does not specify the measures to be adopted to check if the choices made by the ministers are not biased or prejudiced. Secondly, in Japan, the bureaucracy enjoys so much power that even the military has been made subordinate to it. Over the years, it has also been able to marginalize the political leaders. So, to bring about a meaningful reform in the bureaucratic structure, the government has to bring about certain drastic reform in other power structures (particularly political and military structures) as well. The whole process will certainly take years. Thirdly, in the context of the overwhelming power of the bureaucracy, the example of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB) can be rightly cited. The CLB is considered as “the Prime Minister’s in-house lawyer and a check on Diet legislation” , as most of the draft bills cannot become without its consent. CLB has also exerted its authority in interpreting the pacifist clause of the Japanese Constitution which deters Japan from using force as a means to settle international disputes. Under such circumstance, it does not seem possible for the CLB to let the government wrest its power without a fight. Lastly, the Japanese society is still not favourable towards any dramatic change. In short, the DPJ government has still to face plenty of hurdles ahead in implementing the new policy.
Slumping Rating: The declining approval rate of the DPJ government has been clearly indicated by the recent gubernatorial election in Nagasaki, when the DPJ supported candidate was defeated by a candidate officially endorsed by the DPJ and its two coalition partners. This was considered a serious blow to the party due to its general dominance in Nagasaki Prefecture. In the last Upper House election, the DPJ was able to monopolize the two seats allocated to Nagasaki prefecture. It also captured all four single-seat constituencies in that prefecture for the Lower House election last August. Nagasaki election result showed that the DPJ needs to focus on improving local economies and strengthening the regional arms of its political machine if it desires to keep the Japanese voters satisfied.
With Hatoyama’s approval rating plunging down in the last few months, it was speculated that the DPJ might opt to replace him if his cabinet’s popularity rating threaten the party’s chances in the Upper House election to be held July, 2010. There were speculations within the party regarding the possible replacements of Hatoyama. Interior Affairs Minister Kazuhiro Haraguchi is a strong aspirant to hold the Prime Minister’s office. Although he does not have a broad support base within the party, he is likely to be backed by DPJ strongman Ozawa. Besides, Haraguchi has support from two of the most influential Japanese media-Yomiuri Shimbun and Nippon Television Network Corporation. However, the Asahi Shimbun, another popular newspaper in Japan and rival of the Yomiuri has extended its support to Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada to replace Hatoyama. Under such circumstance, it seems possible that if Hatoyama decides to step down or replaced by the party, both Haraguchi and Okada are likely to emerge as strong contenders to succeed Hatoyama.
The opposition LDP has not been able to capitalize on the waning approval rate of the DPJ government. Although it has adopted a new party platform, the Japanese people are not yet convinced about it. This is because the LDP focuses too much on criticism of the DPJ and less on the party’s visions of Japan’s future. According to the revised platform, the LDP’s basic stance is neither market fundamentalism nor unprincipled intervention in the market. But it fails to mention what exactly then the party’s new stance on economy is based upon. Just by criticizing the DPJ policies as ‘socialist-like’ will not generate public support for the LDP. Instead, the LDP should identify what they consider defects in the DPJ’s policies and then come up with their own policy solutions and clearly explain to the public.
So far, the DPJ government has spent a lot of time and effort in projecting itself different from its predecessor. The Japanese public seems to await, with increasing impatience, if the DPJ will be able to translate its pre-election promises into policies. However, due to allegations like lack of transparency and fund scandals within months of the assumption to office, the future credibility of the Hatoyama administration has already been dented to some extent. The failure of the LDP in regrouping itself and regaining people’s trust seems to have made Japanese future political scenario all the more uncertain.
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