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Obama’s policy toward the Caucasus and U.S. credibility

Dr. Fariz Huseynov and Tamerlan Vahabov - 6/1/2010

The U.S. image in Azerbaijan has never been as bad as it is now and anti-American rhetoric in this predominantly Muslim country bordering Iran is unprecedented. President Obama’s “reset” policies towards Russia can have certain far-reaching implications for the U.S. interests and credibility in new democracies of the ex-Soviet Union. Azerbaijan is one example where President Obama’s “reset” policies with Russia can significantly damage U.S. interests in European Union energy security, NATO ISAF supply routes and democracy.

The two conflicts are key and intrinsically linked with these issues: Turkey-Armenia borders and Nagorno Karabakh (NK) conflict. Although during the presidential campaign Obama mentioned self-determination principles in NK conflict, he did not want to take an active part in this conflict because Azerbaijan’s prospective solution might not be in line with Russia’s interests and could damage the spirit of “reset” policy. However, when Azerbaijan started actively objecting to opening the borders, Turkish PM Erdogan had to visit Azerbaijan in May 2009 to assure Baku that Turkey would not open the borders until Armenia had withdrawn from the invaded lands.

The “reset” policy towards Russia was criticized because of its conciliatory tone with regard democracy and human rights issues in Russia. Obama administration’s view of the region as well as the NK problem through the prism of reset policy with Russia, which includes softened tone on democracy problems, can severely affect the U.S. credibility in the former Soviet space. Democracy is an important dimension that can be threatened if the U.S. views Azerbaijan solely from reset policy (with Russia) standpoint. Unlike Russia, where positivism in bilateral U.S.- Russian relations has long been absent and where “reset” policy is meant to mend tensed relations, Azerbaijan presents a different case. Cooperation on a number of important political, economic and military affairs has long been present in the U.S.-Azerbaijani relations. Such dual-track approach as, supporting and cooperating with Azerbaijan on a number of strategic issues on the one hand and monitoring its democratic credentials on the other hand, used to provide excellent avenues for preserving U.S. regional interests. The U.S. needs to have a positive image in Azerbaijan, which it clearly lacks now, in order to support Azerbaijan’s democratic transition and incentivize it through close cooperation. Positive U.S. image would retain American legitimacy for helping foster democratic culture for both government and grass roots activities, which need to be inspired. Currently, Baku’s increasing interdependence with Moscow and apparent inactivity of the U.S. in NK conflict could automatically place Azerbaijan in the same box with Russia for Washington’s foreign policy radars. Thus, there is a chance that the elements of the U.S. policy of reset, such as tempered U.S. tone with regard to democracy issues, can be applied to Azerbaijan and affect its democracy at all levels.

Azerbaijan’s further tilt towards Russia not only endangers democracy but also threatens strategically important energy projects such as NABUCCO gas pipeline. Azerbaijan as a supplier of oil and gas had bargaining power over Turkey and EU members. President Ilham Aliyev showed his firm reaction by signing natural gas deals with Russia and Iran to demonstrate Azerbaijan’s flexibility in terms of customer selection. Azerbaijan is also an important military partner for the U.S. It is the only potentially viable transit route for NATO ISAF troops supply, except Russia and the unstable Khyber Pass in Pakistan. As a sign of protest, Azerbaijan recently put-off joint military exercise with the U.S. Washington’s inactivity in NK conflict and related fierce criticism of the U.S. in Azerbaijan can put these projects in danger.

NK problem is the key for preserving U.S. interests in European energy security, ensuring NATO supply routes and supporting democratic transformation in secular Azerbaijan. The U.S. should use its new closer relations with Russia to reach a solution in NK conflict through updated Madrid principles offered by Minsk group co-chairs and mostly accepted by Azerbaijan. A solution in NK will solve Turkish-Armenian border problem, too; whereas, insisting to open the borders will solve none and furthermore threaten the U.S. interests in the region of the South Caucasus; the South Caucasus that combines problematic Iran, major power Russia, threat of religious radicalism, authoritarianism and energy hydrocarbons destined for the EU markets.