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Home >> Global Organizations >> Courts, Laws & Crime Realist's Case For Genocide Intervention Sean-Paul Kelley - 4/24/2005 free video editing software In 1967, Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin, an admirer of Lemkin's, rose in the empty well of the Senate to give the first of his 3,211 speeches about genocide. He pledged to give a speech every working day until the convention was ratified. From 1967 to 1986 he spoke daily, trying desperately to antagonize the Senate into action, perhaps even attempting to shame it. At times he spoke about the deaths of millions of Nigerians in the Biafran War. "In 1971 he drew attention to the murder of more than a million Bengalis in Pakistan," recounts Samantha Power in a March 2002 interview in the Atlantic Monthly.[vi] With persistent prescience he drew attention to the deaths of more than 100,000 Hutu in Burundi and during the darkest days of the Cambodian horror he called attention to its most blatant inhumanities. In 1985 Ronald Reagan visited the Bitburg Cemetery in Germany: infamous home to many SS graves. The resulting domestic outrage and pressure convinced Reagan that pushing for the ratification of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide would "appease his critics."[vii] After 19 years of haranguing the United States Senate, Proxmire saw an opportunity. An astute, if quixotic, politician, he gladly accepted the support and hurried the treaty through the Senate. In 1986, "with various reservations that immunized the United States from being charged with genocide" the Senate ratified the treaty by a vote of eighty-three in favor, eleven opposed and six not voting.[viii] It would be the 98th nation to ratify the convention. Perhaps "never again" finally meant "never again."[ix] The Legal Case: an Excuse for Inaction "Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity, and Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such and odious scourge . . . The contracting parties confirm that Genocide, whether committed in time of peace or of war, is a crime under international law that they undertake to prevent and punish (emphasis added)."[x] The solemn preamble of the landmark 1951 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.s 277 (henceforward referred to as CPPCG) unequivocally designates genocide as a crime under international law. "Genocide whether in time of war or peace, [is considered as] any acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group."[xi] Genocide consists of, but is not limited to, "killing members of the group, imposing measures to prevents births within the group, [and] causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group." According to the CPPCG, genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct public incitement to genocide, attempt to commit genocide and complicity in genocide are all actionable crimes.[xii] The United States, as signatory to the CPPCG, has a legal-and of course moral-obligation to prevent and/or punish acts of genocide in concert with the United Nations, or alone if necessary.[xiii] Signed by the president and ratified by the Senate, the treaty is, based on Article VI, § 2 of the United States Constitution, the supreme law of the land.[xiv] Why then have American policymakers so uniformly failed to act in the face of genocide? The conflict between sovereignty and the legal obligations of the global community is the most frequently cited objection. Often American policy makers claim they have "no mandate." The convention, however, clearly affirms that states are to "call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action . . . as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide . . .."[xv] Furthermore, a broad interpretation of the CPPCG does not preclude unilateral acts of suppression or prevention.[xvi] The persuasive voices of intervention make an identical claim: "states are responsible for protecting their citizens from avoidable catastrophe, but if they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states."[xvii] UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, recently made the same argument: . . . If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda or a Srebrenica--to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?[xviii] States, in cases like Rwanda, where no outside nations have any vital interests at stake, should act on their own if necessary. Another common excuse governments make is denial. "In each case government officials-from low-level diplomats to Presidents-said they didn't really know what was going on, or didn't know it at the time, or even if they had known, they couldn't feasibly have done anything to stop it."[xix] During WWII a young Polish diplomat named Jan Karski traveled to Washington DC to meet with Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter. He told Justice Frankfurter of Nazi policies toward the Jews and what was really happening. Frankfurter's response was an incredulous, "I don't believe you."[xx] Late in 1944 the director of Roosevelt's War Refugee Board "wanted to publish the report of two Auschwitz escapees," writes Power. His request was denied.[xxi] During Hussein's Kurdish repression Larry Pope, former State Department office director for Iran and Iraq, says, "We knew something dreadful was going on."[xxii] Alas, nothing was done. The Clinton Administration's record on Bosnia and Rwanda is no better. Avoiding intervention in cases of genocide by "spin" is another timeless government favorite. "Great pains were taken in Washington [during the Bosnian crisis] to suppress any use of the word 'genocide,' for fear of activating the obligations of the convention," writes Urquhart.[xxiii] "The Clinton Administration," writes Urquhart again, "obsessed with the loss of eighteen Rangers in Somalia six months before, was determined to block any serious UN action in Rwanda. To this end it once again engaged in ignominious efforts to avoid the use of the word 'genocide.'"[xxiv] By calling genocide "crimes against humanity," "atrocities," "ethnic cleansing," "and possible acts of genocide" (one of the more dubious and unoriginal excuses) politicians hope that spin will excuse their inactivity. Ms. Power eloquently describes the many more American attempts to avoid using the "G" word because, as she says, "actually using the word" and calling it the crime it is "would create a legal and moral obligation to intervene."[xxv] "Be careful," states one internal Defense Department from May of 1994, "Legal at State was worried about this yesterday-genocide finding could commit [the U.S. government] to actually 'do something.'"[xxvi] Ignominious indeed. If the legal case is clear why has America failed in its legal duty? More often than not the United States government abdicates its international obligations when acts of genocide are being committed because it is unwilling to expend (often times minimal) resources for humanitarian intervention. "The battle to stop genocide," Power writes," has thus been repeatedly lost in the realm of domestic politics."[xxvii] One of the more persuasive critics of American inaction, Power "concludes that the failure of the United States to act [is mostly] a lack of will."[xxviii] Again, the American failure to take action in Rwanda is instrumental. Remembering former Clinton National Security Advisor Anthony Lake's quote that we had "no mandate" in Rwanda, the Defense Department's internal memo discussing the necessity of avoiding the word genocide, and Clinton's obsession with loosing 18 soldiers in Somalia, it becomes clear that domestic issues were paramount. Although avoiding political problems is the hallmark of all presidential administrations dissembling about genocide is inexcusable. American policy makers are not solely blameworthy. The American media and the American public are equally to blame. "Ancient hatreds going back hundreds of years," has been a constant refrain in many of the more sad episodes of the nineties. How many times during the Bosnia genocide did pundits and politicians on CNN utter this remark? "But the next time you hear a story like the one that ran on the front page of The New York Times in October 1997, reporting on 'the age old animosity between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups,' remember," writes Phillip Gourevitch, "that until 1959 there had never been any systematic political violence recorded between Hutus and Tutsis-anywhere."[xxix] Blanket generalizations of this sort convince people that such conflicts are "biblical" in scope and ultimately insoluble. They convince us that we have no responsibility to be informed citizens of the world. By Way of History A brief survey of twentieth century historical examples is necessary to clarify what is and what isn't genocide. If a nation is committed to a course of action it must understand what it is attempting to prevent and punish first. The most common definition of genocide, how it is beginning and what it really looks like is straightforward. The CPPCG states that, any acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group," shall be considered as attempted genocide or actual genocide. Such acts as preventing births, inciting genocide, the creation and utilization of concentration camps, resettlement (i.e. ethnic cleansing), the documentation of genocidal activities, such as Nazi documents found at the end of WWII can all be considered evidence of attempted genocide or actual genocide. Further indicators of genocide, most often downplayed by the press, are survivor accounts that are so terrifying as to be unbelievable.[xxx] An examination of the historical record is instructive on this point. Armenia Armenia was as clear a case of genocide as the Holocaust or Rwanda. In 1915 the Turkish government embarked upon a systematic course of events designed to eradicate Anatolia of its Armenian problem. Armenian intellectuals and local notables were rounded up and executed first. Then Armenian schools were closed. Teachers who refused to convert to Islam were executed. Deportation orders were posted all over Anatolia. "By continuing the deportation of the orphans to their destinations during the intense cold," one Turkish leader wrote, "we are insuring their eternal rest."[xxxi] The Holocaust The Holocaust is, in some ways unfortunately, the standard definition of what genocide is. The nature of the Holocaust is so well known that often, other cases of genocide, that do not measure up to the Holocaust, are not considered real genocide at all. We are all to aware of the gas chambers and ovens at Auschwitz, the guerilla war that raged in the Warsaw ghetto, the dehumanization that Jews were treated to at the hands of their tormentors. The Holocaust is still with us, here in America, home of the Holocaust Memorial. Cambodia The next generally accepted case of genocide occurred in Cambodia. However, Cambodia fails the genocide test on the most important count. The Genocide Convention states that, any acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group," shall be punishable as genocide. It is important to note that the genocide convention does not include political groups as a "suspect" category. No matter how horrific the events in Cambodia were (and they were apocalyptic) it was not genocide. Autocide, perhaps, genocide, no.[xxxii] It was systematic, large scale, organized and well documented. What occurred in Cambodia were certainly "crimes against humanity." But it was not directed at one ethnic, national, religious or racial group in particular. The horrific events in Cambodia were inflicted upon Buddhists, Muslims, Catholics, Capitalists and just about every one else who was not Khmer Rouge, which it is important to note, was a political group. All suffered horribly. >From a legalistic point of view the case for genocide cannot be made. Was what happened in Cambodia unimaginable? Yes, it was. Could it have been prevented? Yes, the Nixon administration had been trying to make that point for several years. Should the leaders of the Khmer Rouge be held accountable for their crimes? Yes, they should be punished, but it should be under domestic Cambodian law or other appropriate international legal remedies. Tibet The history of China in Tibet is not very positive. The Chinese occupied ("liberated") Tibet in the fifties after the communist revolution had been consolidated. They soon embarked upon a campaign to assimilate and Sinicize the Tibetans. They overthrew the old religious regime in Tibet and began a rapid modernization process. Tibet suffered the Cultural Revolution as much as any other Chinese province. Claims of genocide in Tibet have centered on Chinese attempts to assimilate the Tibetans and the "one child" policy. For years, many outsiders claim, the Chinese have tried to prevent births within the group and that the desecration of Buddhist temples constitutes "serious mental harm" and "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part."[xxxiii] To be sure, Chinese behavior in Tibet is appalling. But Chinese behavior inside of China is appalling as well. What many do not realize is that the Chinese "one child policy" does not apply to the hundreds of state classified minorities, of which the Tibetans are one. There is no forced resettlement, and there is no deliberate attempt to desecrate Tibetan religious sanctuaries. On a recent trip to Tibet the author saw no evidence of such things at many of the famous Tibetan monasteries. The Chinese authorities actually seem eager to preserve Tibetan heritage as a boon to tourism. The claims of Chinese genocide in Tibet are, in the author's opinion, bogus. Iraq Acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part an ethnical group shall be considered genocide.[xxxiv] Kurdistan is as rugged as its people are hardy. When, however, Sadaam Hussein set out to eradicate rural Kurdish life (as a result of their support for the Iranians in the Iran-Iraq war) they faced a foe unlike any they had ever encountered before; one armed with invisible chemical agents. The genocide in Kurdistan started as most other genocides begin: mass resettlement. Kurds were herded into "collective centers where the state would be able to monitor them."[xxxv] Next Hussein's troops "destroyed several thousand . . .villages and hamlets and killed close to 100,000 Kurds, nearly all of whom were unarmed and many of whom were women and children," writes Power.[xxxvi] In March of 1988 Kurdish rebels, in cooperation with the Iranians "routed" the Iraqi's in a village called Halabja. Many have regarded the reprisal as a "Kurdish Hiroshima". On March 16, 1988 the Iraqis launched the first of many chemical attacks against the Kurds. Mustard gas, VX and the biological agent aflatoxin were all used. After a long campaign, Hussein and his lieutenants exterminated rural Kurdish life. "Hussein," writes Power, "did not set out to exterminate every last Kurd in Iraq," but it was the destruction of rural Kurdish life that he accomplished. Clearly this was genocide. Bosnia Bosnia, beginning in the early nineties, was splashed all over the television. Most remember the haunting footage of the concentration camps. The stories of ethnic cleansing, the forced resettlements, the rapes of Bosnian women, the forced deportations, murders of military aged men and the fatal shellings of markets are still with us. The case for Bosnia, although not over, has been settled to a great extent. Even now Slobodan Milosevic, the butcher of Belgrade, is on trial for genocide in the Hague. Rwanda The case of Rwanda is also near to being closed. There is a functioning tribunal that even now is trying Hutu perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide. Many have been convicted. Rwanda began as most cases of genocide begin. First, the demonization and dehumanization of the persecuted minority begins. In Rwanda there was no resettlement interregnum. The Hutus proceeded straight to massacre and genocide. Almost 800,000 people were killed in 100 days. It was an awful spectacle that no nation wanted any part in. Kosovo Kosovo in many respects can be regarded as genocide prevented. It was clear to everyone what Milosevic and his cronies were attempting. The world had witnessed what was done in Bosnia. Finally, the West acted. 79 days of bombing commenced until Serbia relented and thousands of Kosovar Muslims returned home. The "Realists" Case for Intervention The realist's primary complaint about the "idealist's" foreign policy agenda is his reliance on naked diplomacy. "Diplomacy," says the realist, "must be backed by the credible threat of force to succeed." But humanitarians recoil at the use of force all too often, fearing collateral damage more than a hundred thousand shattered lives. Action has a price and the world is as the world is, not as we would have it. Utopia cannot exist in a world where power remains the only effective currency. When people are slaughtered simply for whom they were born as an activist, preventive foreign policy is demanded. Here the realist, the pragmatist, if you will, has his day. The best case for intervention can be summed up by a five hundred year old political maxim: "you only postpone a crisis to your own disadvantage."[xxxvii] It is that simple. Might intervention in Rwanda have prevented the disintegration of Zaire? Could it have prevented the bombings of American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania? Had we warned Hussein that his actions against the Kurds would entail unpleasant consequences; would there have ever been a Gulf War? And what of Bosnia? Had intervention been attempted from the start, perhaps there would never have been a Kosovo that threatened to split NATO and erupt in Macedonia and Bulgaria, among other places, not to mention the hundreds of thousand of Muslims that would still be alive today, enjoying their lives as best they can. The statesman has, as his ultimate task, the preservation of peace for the greater good of the community in which his nation resides. If his nation resides in a community of shared values then this moral charge becomes even more sacred. Not only is it morally right to prevent and punish acts of genocide; it is politically prudent as well. This is a realism for our time; a realism guided by a clear sense of our shared values. The prevention and suppression of genocide can preclude region-wide instability and create incentives for positive and responsible international behavior. But that is not its limit. Preventing and suppressing genocide enhances American prestige and credibility. Finally, by fostering a humane international society America can promote the spread of its values. We can create a better world but it requires action. Intervening in Iraq, in some forcible way, whether by cutting off Sadaam's $500 million in agriculture credits or by the credible threat of force, could have deterred his subsequent invasion of Kuwait. Our hands-off policy emboldened him instead. Constantly American policy makers refuse to take small steps to prevent bigger catastrophes. As such we inevitably court the disaster we seek to avoid. A serious interest in Rwanda might have prevented a great deal of disintegration in Central Africa as well. General Dallaire's request for only 5000 men and a minor alteration in the rules of engagement might have prevented the deaths of 800,000 people. Kofi Annan, however, said "no." A clear interest in the region, instead of abdication, might possibly have deterred Osama bin Laden. After September 11, perhaps American policymakers see that abdication does not equal solution. Finally, a forceful, early intervention in Bosnia would most likely have prevented the Kosovo crisis several years later. "You only postpone a war to your own disadvantage," sayeth the Sage of Florence.[xxxviii] Each of these examples fit a narrow interpretation of what the "realist" would call the "national interest." In a time of hyper, 24/7 media, the classic definition of what the "national interest" is must be enlarged. Critics will certainly level the charge that "hindsight is 20/20." So be it-but we do not elect our leaders to be wrong-we elect them to be right, to lead, protect and inspire us. Churchill is a hero today precisely because he saw the future. He used all of the necessary tools at his disposal to guide his nation and his young upstart cousins into a new world. Yet he was a deeply moral man, and this, more than anything else, is the statesman's charge. A framework for prevention Several steps can be taken in the future to prevent, halt and punish the perpetrators of genocide. There are warning signs. When newly democratic nations move from a state of ethnic tension to that of ethnic polarization, demonizing and "scapegoating" are next. Aiding nations with their early experiment in democracy by encouraging dialogue, consensus and reconciliation is a good first step. The success of South African truth commissions is instructive on this point. Options such as these will fail at times. The anger and rage of perceived injustices is difficult to overcome. In such cases little massacres, as trial balloons, will follow. Sometimes these will be preceded by expulsions and resettlement. Firm credible warnings, followed by sanctions must be used. When conditions of wholesale slaughter, mass deportations and concentration camps emerge, armed intervention must be made in concert with the United Nations, or unilaterally if necessary. When refugees pour across international borders nations must shift their bias towards believing the victims of genocide versus being skeptical of their claims. The burden of proof must be shifted to the perpetrators of crimes against humanity away from the victims. Too often the American government persists in "blaming the victim." This was all too evident in the early days of the Bosnian crisis when Bush I spoke at length about "atrocities" being committed by all sides. Man has proven with great alacrity his ability to commit the unbelievable. We must listen when we do not want to. Genocide is preventable. With a little more knowledge, understanding and willingness to engage the world another Rwanda or Bosnia might never happen again. It is possible to prevent this most unfathomable of crimes. When the Armenians were being persecuted and Ambassador Morgenthau pleaded with the US Dept of State to find some way to intervene, whether financially or just verbally the claim that, "we just don't know what is going on," was used. In the case of the Holocaust, the United States turned back Jewish migrants. We refused to believe anything that we heard and often reverted to blaming the victim. This went on for a long time during WWII. There were proposals to bomb the railheads leading into Auschwitz and Dachau but we were afraid it would lead to reprisals. How bad could it really get? When you are being gassed daily, does the fear of bombs raining down on you and your oppressor really register? In Kurdistan, after several thousand Kurds showed up at the Turkish border, use of the "G" word was vigorously avoided. Even after video footage was released, showing Sadaam's gassed victims in Kurdistan, the American government still refused to acknowledge that genocide was being committed. As Bush II readies its campaign against Sadaam Hussein the charge of genocide is not one of the indictments being made against him. He is called a serial aggressor, a brute, and a tyrant, yet we still fail to label him as a genocidaire. In Bosnia, as the whole world witnessed video footage of skeletal Muslim men in concentration camps, giving the victim the benefit of the doubt was out of the question. Bush I went to great lengths to avoid the use of the word genocide. Speaking loudly, clearly and precisely is the first step towards ridding the world of this grave menace. The doctrine of non-intervention, the foundation of all post-Westphalia interstate relations, died the day the first bomb was dropped in Kosovo. Perhaps at the dawn of the 3rd Millennium, the old reasons for killing, tribe, state, power and greed, have been superceded by the powerful moral contention that human rights must be enforced and crimes against humanity be punished. It is an idea worth pursuing, an idea whose time has come. To say "never again" is no longer enough. We must prove it. "A People Killed Twice," Guardian Weekend, January 27, 2001. Katie Bacon, "Never Again, Again," Atlantic Unbound: Online Edition, March, 2002. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S 277, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/x1cppcg.htm The Constitution of the United States of America. Phillip Gurevitch, "We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories From Rwanda." Picador; New York, 1998. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince. Translated and edited by Robert M. Adams, New York: Norton, 1977. Minutes of the 1999 UN General Assembly Samantha Power, "A Problem From Hell." New York: Basic Books, 2002. Samantha Power," America and Genocide," The New York Review of Books. March 14, 2002. Report of the ICISS, International Development Research Center: The Responsibility to Protect: December 2001. Brian Urquhart, "Shameful Neglect," The New York Review of Books. April 25, 2002. [i] The life of General Romeo Dallaire is instructive on this account. He was discharged from the Canadian Military in the late nineties for "medical reasons" and was recently found passed out drunk in a park in his native province. But just a Dalllaire's life is shattered, those too, of countless Rwandans and Bosnians are wrecked even more so. [ii] Brian Urquhart, Shameful Neglect, New York Review of Books, April 25, 2002, 12-14. [iii] Ibid. 12. [iv] Ibid. 12. See also, Power, "A Problem from Hell." [v] See Samantha Power, "A Problem from Hell." [vi] Samantha Power, Atlantic Monthly Online Edition, March 14, 2002. [vii] See Urquhart, 13. [viii] Urquhart, 13. [ix] The reservations are considered by many nations as violations of the Treaty of Vienna, which states that, "a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to perform a treaty." See Danish objection, dated 27, December, 1989, in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S 277, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/x1cppcg.htm [x] Convention on the Prevention and Punishmen of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S 277, entered into force Jan. 12 1951. http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/x1cppcg.htm [xi] CPPCG, Article 2 [xii] CPPCG, Article 2, §§ a, b, d, e, and Article 3 sections a through e. [xiii] The United States acceded to the CPPCG on 25, November 1988 with two reservations and four special understandings. These reservations and understandings notwithstanding should not prevent the United States of America from acting in obvious and egregious cases of genocide such as Rwanda, Iraq, Bosnia and Kosovo. [xiv] Article VI, Section 2 of the United States Constitution states: all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land. [xv] CPPCG, Article 8. [xvi] However, it should be noted that acts of punishment are to be tried by "a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which the acts were committed . . .." [xvii] The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the ICISS, International Development Research Center (of Canada), December 2001, p. vii. [xviii] Minutes of the 1999 UN General Assembly. [xix] Katie Bacon, "Never Again Again," http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/interviews/int2002-03-14.htm. [xx] Power, 33-34 [xxi] Power, 35. [xxii] Power, 186. [xxiii] Urquhart, 13. [xxiv] Ibid. [xxv] Bacon, Atlantic Unbound. [xxvi] Ibid. [xxvii] Samantha Power, "Genocide and America," The New York Review of Books, March 14, 2002. [xxviii] Quoted in Urquhart, 14. [xxix] Phillip Gourevitch, "We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories From Rwanda." Picador; New York. P. 59. [xxx] See Samantha Power, op. cit. [xxxi] Quoted in Power, 2. See also, "A People Killed Twice," Guardian Weekend, January 27, 2001, p. 35. [xxxii] I would define Autocide as the wholesale destruction of a nation's political elite by that nation's leaders, whether they are legitimate or not. [xxxiii] See Article 2, § b, c, d of the CPPCG. [xxxiv] Article 2, CPPCG. [xxxv] Power, 171. [xxxvi] Power, 172. [xxxvii] Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince. Translated and edited by Robert M. Adams, New York: Norton, 1977. page 11. [xxxviii] Ibid.
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