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Some Interesting Parallels with the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Process

Yoav J. Tenembaum - 5/24/2011

Overseeing the diplomatic landscape of the problematic peace process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority some interesting parallels emerge with the Egyptian-Israeli peace-making process of the late 1970s, particularly as applied to the period since Benjamin Netanyahu became Prime Minister two years ago.

Following Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel in November, 1977, there was a singular feeling of excitement. The prospect of peace in the region seemed nearer than ever. Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, visited Egypt the following month and met with President Sadat. A process of bi-lateral dialogue between the two former enemies was opened.

However, as time went by, difficulties emerged in the talks between Israel and Egypt. Negotiations stalled. President Sadat went as far as to declare he did not want to meet Prime Minister Begin. A sense of crisis ensued. To be sure, Sadat was prepared to meet other Israeli representatives, such as Defence Minister Ezer Weizmann, who was then considered to be a dove and made little secret of his disagreements with his Prime Minister.

Public pressure started to build up both in Israel and abroad against Begin's perceived obdurate positions. Indeed, the United States administration, under the leadership of President Jimmy Carter, did not conceal its sharply critical attitude towards Begin. An anonymous high-ranking State Department source was quoted as saying that a change of government in Israel should not be excluded if Begin's government did not change its positions. This led Begin to retort bluntly that "In Israel, governments are changed by the free will of the people and not by an anonymous official at the State Department."

As the pressure being exerted on Begin mounted, both at home and abroad, the Israeli Prime Minister remained adamant. He made it clear he would not display any further diplomatic flexibility, certainly not until and unless the Egyptians came back to the negotiating table.

To be sure, Begin had taken the initiative immediately after Sadat's visit to Israel. He had presented an Israeli peace plan, which was far-reaching as far as Begin was concerned, and was publicly praised by some world leaders.

However, the peace plan put forward by Begin was for all practical purposes forgotten by the international community once Sadat had decided to withdraw from the negotiations and had demanded further Israeli concessions.

Begin became, once again, in the eyes of the international community and the opposition in Israel, the extremist leader who would not make the necessary concessions in order to re-start the negotiations with Egypt.

Only during the intensive Camp David negotiations, convened by President Carter, did Begin – and indeed Sadat – agree to alter some of his previously held positions so as to be able to reach a framework agreement for peace. That was in September, 1978, ten months after Sadat's visit to Israel.

Even in the aftermath of the Camp David accords, a crisis emerged which seemed to derail the whole process. Indeed, Sadat, once again, refused to talk with Begin, even over the phone, during that crisis.

President Carter had to intervene personally again in order to ensure that a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt would be signed, after all.

Only by the end of March 1979, were all disagreements settled and a peace agreement between the two countries was finally signed.

Does it all seem familiar?

Historical analogies are to be drawn with care. No two events are identical. The personalities involved in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute are different; circumstances are different.

What can be learnt from the Egypt-Israel peace-making process is that crises are an integral part of international negotiations, particularly when seemingly intractable issues are on the table; that perceptions of leaders and positions can change as circumstances change; indeed, that patience pays off if both sides seem to be sincere in their quest for peace.

It is impossible to foretell how the current peace process will evolve. One thing is certain, peace initiatives by Israeli leaders are no guarantee of long-term international support. This is not to say that Israel should be diplomatically passive. There is a difference, though, between being passive and being patient. Begin was patient. Is Netanyahu patient as well? And if so, does he have a good reason to be patient for, as Begin did?