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NATO and Its Crisis

Dr. Gary K. Busch - 6/13/2011

A few days ago US Defence Secretary, Gates, made a speech which dispensed with the diplomatic niceties and told the truth about the imbalance of contribution and capabilities within the transatlantic military pact of NATO. This signals a major shift in European policy by the US and will have a profound impact on the European economies.

There is a lovely Russian word which describes the state of NATO;, kvastism. This is a word that is derived from the Russian (indeed pan-Slavic) word for tail; as in the tail of a dog. In its simplest form it can mean the "tail wagging the dog"; an alliance being led by its tail. However, Russian is a more subtle language as well. Its diminutive, kvastik, can mean something coming to the "tail end" of its life. In both senses of the word, kvastism is an appropriate epithet for NATO.

In his final address to his troops in New York, General George Washington, soon to be the first President of the United States, put forward an important tenet of American foreign policy when he said, "Beware entangling alliances." He was warning the fledging nation against becoming involved in the major European sport of internecine bickering and mutual destruction. This is a warning that resounds through the intervening two hundred and thirty-odd years since Washington's speech.

Europe was, is and forever will be a cockpit of petty nationalisms and jealousies where the concept of national sovereignty is important but is of recent origin. There is a popular fantasy in which people refer to European nations as if they have been around for a long time. This is patently untrue; the landmass has been there but the united organised sovereign nation state is of relatively recent origin. Much of what is now counted as Europe did not exist until the end of Napoleon's Grand Tour of the continent.

Holland and Belgium weren't established until the mid-1820s; Germany until Bismarck in the 1860s was a hotbed of petty princedoms; Italy didn't come into existence until the early 1870s. Most of what is now Eastern Europe and the Balkans was made up of small regional entities owned and operated by some more powerful local political entity. When Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote, "workers have no country" they were not only writing rhetorically. For most workers in Europe this was a fact. They were occupied nations; sometimes by a foreign power; sometimes by an imposed twiglet of the Hapsburg-Hanoverian family trees. This included the waning days of the Holy Roman, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian empires. These nations barely surfaced until after the First World War, only to be subsumed again in the maelstrom of World War II. These maxi and mini-states of Europe emerged from World War II as international basket cases. It wasn't until almost three years into the Marshall Plan that they were able to afford a foreign policy. Only Britain and Russia (the two nation states not to fall to Napoleon) and the rump state of France proceeded to their own political reorganisations unaided. These maintained some continuity with the past, even if this vision of the past was economically sustainable only through the exploitation of their foreign colonies.

The post-war nations of Eastern Europe defaulted to their original status as nations occupied by a powerful neighbour, the Soviet Union, until the early 1990s and Germany was not reunited until 1990.

And today in these reconstituted states of Europe there is little respite from the very tribalisms and divisions that have always plagued them. Europe has never resolved the questions raised by the Thirty Years' War. The ethnic splits that divide countries like Germany, Belgium, Ireland, Holland and others mirror their Catholic-Protestant schisms. The Balkans are divided at the margins of the Ottoman Empire where Muslims and Christians face each other across a great divide. In the Ukraine there is a split between the Christians of the Uniate and Orthodox churches. In Russia some of the earliest victims of state persecution were not aristocrats or anti-Communists; they were the "Old Believers" who were sent on internal exile along the uncharted reaches of the Yenisey and Lena Rivers because they used three fingers to cross themselves instead of two. Many of the Scandinavian and Czech immigrants left their countries because of religious fundamentalism.

It is wickedly ironic that the seat of European unity is installed in Brussels (a French-speaking enclave in a Flemish region) where language-ethnic riots are not infrequent and whose country operates a parallel ethnic track in every ministry. For example, there is a Flemish-speaking foreign service and a French-speaking foreign service. Promotions, etc. are made by "track" and in strict proportions. There are similar parallel divisions in every government agency, ministry and many municipalities. On reflection, Belgium probably is a good mirror of European unity.

In 1949 it made some sense to create an alliance to preserve the unity of the wartime alliance in the face of the perceived Communist threat in Soviet-occupied areas of Eastern Europe and the outbreak of the Korean War. The unequal relationship between US military might and economic muscle and the pitiful remnants of the Western European armies and a "degraded" European infrastructure was tolerated by US planners because they knew that if a vacuum was left there were candidates ready to fill it. The goal, according to Lord Ismay, the first NATO Secretary General was "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down".

The major battle in NATO over the years has been to convince the European NATO partners that the US was actually willing to stand behind its commitment to Europe; to risk the Mutually Assured Destruction of Boston, Chicago and New York for restraining a land incursion into Germany by the Soviet armies. This policy criterion has frequently thwarted proper military assessment and deployment. The US was forced to establish land-based Tomahawk Cruise sites across Europe in the face of a wave of European public protest at sites like Greenham Common in England because the European governments insisted that the US commit these to land sites in Europe. It was generally agreed that these missiles would be much more effective, secure and available for use if they were carried underwater on mobile submarine launching systems and as part of the Tactical Air Force. The Europeans fought against this at every step, as they were sure that their political masses required the visible presence of US troops and equipment.

NATO solved the problem of commitment by instituting a culture of planning. With a clearly understood mission, NATO planners (composed of representatives from all the constituent nations except France from 1968 to 1995) analysed every possible contingency. For every contingency, they generated a plan. For every plan, they allocated forces. For every force, NATO devised endless training exercises designed to make execution as automatic as possible. This has been NATO's main achievement; they created a system of automated, conditioned responses that were to be executed so rapidly that participants did not have the time or opportunity to pause, reflect and potentially renege.

The planning and exercise process, quite apart from being necessary for military preparedness, was also an instrument that psychologically and operationally locked in the actors. Under such circumstances, given the doctrine and the particular plan that applied, units in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the Netherlands, and Sicily all went into motion. In operational terms, the goal was to make the commitment of forces as thought- free as possible. Even complex war fighting doctrines like Air-Land Battle, which foresaw a fluid and unpredictable battlefield, still contained highly routinised, automated procedures for the initiation of and response to conflict. NATO's internal battles were referred to countless planning cells that packaged a basic strategic challenge into an array of automated responses.

In many respects, scenario construction, contingency planning, war gaming, and repetitive exercises was the only thing holding NATO together, staving off the fear of a last minute double-cross. However, by 1992, the rock on which the church rested, the Soviet threat had largely disappeared or, like the smile on the Cheshire Cat, appeared only when required. Without that threat, contingency planning collapsed. War gaming is built on a foundation of agreed and tested assumptions. Exercises become intellectual in nature, not preparatory, and derive from a set of predetermined responses to variable cues. As was seen but not learnt in the failures in Bosnia, NATO operates in a highly undefined set of circumstances. Having debated the meaning of NATO ever since the collapse of communism, NATO suddenly found itself with a mission; one wholly unanticipated even despite the collapse of European planning in Bosnia. To react to the events in Kosovo NATO found it had no plans, no war games, no exercises and no one was on automatic pilot for any of the knee-jerk responses required. Therefore the inevitable happened: everyone became wholly unreliable. This was a case of deja-vu.

In the early days of the war in Croatia and later Bosnia it was the Europeans who insisted on excluding the US (except financially) from its military and political planning. Egged on by Genscher's insistence that Croatia and Slovenia should be free, the leadership of Croatia (Tudjman and his Ustash cronies) was emboldened to declare its independence from the Yugoslav Federation based on territory that included many ethnic Serbs. These Serbs had already had a long experience with ethnic cleansing conducted by the black-shirted SS battalions of Croatian Ustashi of Ante Pavelic. The Serbs needed no reminder of their welcome in an independent Croatia. They turned to Russia and asked for assistance. Russia and US politicians and military leaders discussed this amongst them and felt that a common resolution was possible. However, before anything was undertaken the Europeans in NATO vetoed this initiative. They reiterated that "Croatia is a European problem" and had to be dealt with by the Europeans if they were ever to maintain any credibility as a politico-military force. Lord Carrington and David Owen were dispatched to bring to the Balkans their skills in diplomacy honed in the debacles of Rhodesia and Portadown. They were able to achieve what everyone expected and feared that they would achieve and soon it was the responsibility of the US and the Russians to bring the parties to table and establish the fragile Balkan peace despite the Europeans

Even after that spectacular misadventure, NATO decided to intervene in Kosovo. As in Croatia and Bosnia NATO's exquisite preplanning process with its branching logics and pre-negotiated solutions was not in place. Rather, Yugoslavia required planning on the fly. Basic strategic decisions had to be made in parallel with operational implementation and tactical deployment. NATO was simply unable to cope with that because its strategic planning process assumed a dramatic separation in time between strategic planning and operational implementation. NATO strategy has to be discussed at various levels in dozens of working groups, hammered out over years and locked into place. In Kosovo there was no time for that planning and no time to generate the requisite political consensus. NATO agreed on a bombing plan and settled for paralysis in all other areas.

NATO planning and action requires consensus among its nation states and a willingness to suppress narrow national interests. This is a polite phrase that means that each country has limited political leeway within its domestic constituencies that permit a course of action that is tolerable. This is not the same for every country so NATO reflects the lowest common denominator of national tolerances. Because of their various histories and aspirations in the Balkans, commercial, political and military, some nations are more equal than others. Germany saw itself as a Balkan power with commercial and military ties to the Slovenes, Croats and the Bosnians. The British were determined to maintain the fiction that they were a ranking military power and had an autonomous strategic stance outside Europe and between the Europeans and the US in NATO. The French merely wanted to sell military equipment and to get the US to pay for the suppression of the Yugoslavs. The others thought that it was important as Europeans to show they had some independent military capability. The amount of bombs, missiles and other tactical devices used in the first two weeks of the Kosovo campaign exceeded the total arsenal storage of the totality of the European Community. The amount spent per day on the bombing of Kosovo, including indirect costs, amounted to over $12.5 million. It would have been far cheaper to buy Serbia than to bomb it. NATO could have offered each Serb $100,000 a head plus moving costs and still saved money. Under NATO rules the US was obliged to pay two-thirds of these costs.

The notion of costs and contributions, highlighted by the European failure in Kosovo to match its budgets with its ambitions, is the root of the current problem. Europe, despite its elaborate plans for a European Defence Force, has refused or been unable to pay for the maintenance of a national military. Defence spending has dropped from an already low level by around 15% in the last ten years. This general statement masks the fact that the biggest cuts have been in the adequate provision of transport aircraft. Most of the transport of military personnel has had to be done by the US. Left on their own the Europeans would have to walk, paddle or catch cabs to the frontline.

This is not to say that the Europeans, especially those in the Common Market/EU didn’t make arrangements for a European Force. In the early 1950s, France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries made an attempt to integrate the militaries of mainland Western Europe, through the treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC). This scheme was vetoed by the French Gaullists and the French Communist Party. The Europeans tried again in 1954 with an amendment to the Treaty of Brussels. They succeeded in replacing the failed EDC by establishing the political Western European Union (WEU) out of the earlier established military Western Union Defence Organization. Out of the 27 EU member states, 21 are also members of NATO. Another 3 NATO members are EU Applicants and 1 is solely a member of the European Economic Area. In 1996, the Western European Union (WEU) agreed to create and implement a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO. After the passage of the Lisbon Treaty these functions were passed to the EU.

On 20 February 2009 the European Parliament voted in favour of the creation of Synchronized Armed Forces Europe (SAFE), directed by an EU directorate, with its own training standards and operational doctrine. The EU is pushing for a unified European Defence Force, notionally within NATO but separate in terms of action. That is a polite way of saying the Europeans want an autonomous defence force but that the US should contribute two-thirds of the cost. In fact the US is now paying 74% of these costs.

The simple fact is that the Europeans do not fund their military as they have agreed. They have not paid their way in Afghanistan and the current operation in Libya is a joke. The Europeans (calling themselves NATO) have run out of ammunition, bombs and money. The US spent almost $1.5 billion in the first wave of attacks by the French and British. As Gates said in his speech, ““Despite more than 2 million troops in uniform – not counting the U.S. military – NATO has struggled, at times desperately, to sustain a deployment of 25,000 to 45,000 troops -- not just in boots on the ground, but in crucial support assets such as helicopters; transport aircraft; maintenance; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and much more.” He went on ““We have the spectacle of an air operations centre designed to handle more than 300 sorties a day struggling to launch about 150. Furthermore, the mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country – yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the U.S., once more, to make up the difference.”

Congress, and the American people, understands that the Cold War is over. From whom are we protecting the Europeans, other than themselves? The US operates scores of military bases across Europe – for what? The US pays a small fortune in stationing aircraft abroad. Right now the US operates air bases in Europe at: Ankara AS, Araxos AB. Aviano AB, Bitburg AB. Comiso AB, Decimomannu AB, Einsiedlerhof AS, Geilenkirchen AB, Ghedi AB, Hahn AB, Hellenkion AB. Incirlik AB,
Izmir AS, Iraklion AS. Keflavik NAS, Lajes Field, AZR, Lindsey AS, Morón AB, RAF Alconbury, R,,AF Fairford, RAF Lakenheath, RAF Mildenhall, RAF Molesworth, RAF Upwood, Ramstein AB,Rhein-Main AB, San Vito del Normanni AS, Sembach AB, Soesterberg AB, Spangdahlem AB, Stavanger AB, Zaragoza AB, Zweibrucken AB, Burgas AP, Mostar AB, Taszar AB,Tuzla AB. Those are just air bases.

This costs a small fortune for men, aircraft, repair facilities, communications, etc. Why? Some, of course, like Incirlik, are important to the US effort against its main enemy Al Qaida but most can be safely relocated. The weapons systems and equipment used by the Europeans are largely two generations behind. A good deal of modern warfare does not require pitched battles with lots of troops shooting each other. Unmanned aircraft, satellite pulses, electronic warfare are gradually replacing more conventional systems. The Europeans are not keeping up. They can’t even finish their fighter jets on time. The many malfunctions on the French carrier, De Gaulle, have been partially rectified and it didn’t have to be towed to Libya but was able to make it under its own power this time.

Like it or not, the US is going through a period of severe austerity, with the defence budget being cut substantially. Troops are gradually being withdrawn from both Iraq and Afghanistan, but the b=need for a reduction in marginal expenses will certainly involve reducing the forward presence of American troops and equipment in Europe. The Europeans will have to start paying for their own defence. The austerity demands of the failing Euro and its bailouts do not leave a lot of funds available for this. So the Europeans will have to find a different way of protecting themselves. Perhaps they will declare, like Switzerland, their neutrality and cut back entirely.

This would be very good news to the various African countries in which the French, in particular, have been busy massacring civilians; as in the Ivory Coast. French military cutbacks come too late for the dead of the Cameroons, Algeria, Rwanda and Abidjan, to name a few, but may inspire others seeking democracy to think they stand a better chance.