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The Curious Case of Macedonian Parliamentary Elections: Part II. Causes and Consequences

Igor Siljanoski - 7/19/2011

On June 4th, 2011 Macedonian citizens living outside of the Republic of Macedonia voted for the first time in a Macedonian parliamentary election. At stake in the second in row early elections were three newly created seats in the “Sobranie,” the Macedonian House of Representatives, all of which were won by deputies from the governing party VMRO-DPMNE. The next day the party won the early parliamentary elections in the country with much diminished share of the national seats.



Weeks before the Macedonian parliamentary elections, the opposition parties publically stated that the country was not prepared for the June 4th elections in the newly formed election units outside of Macedonia. They went as far as calling the whole process the biggest election falsification and that it could only benefit the ruling establishment of the governing party. They also pointed to the many deficiencies in the process, both technical and democratic.



It is worth asking about the driving force behind a decision to have Macedonia’s first worldwide elections. Why was this decision made? How do we explain the results? What are the consequences of such an election? These are questions that were important for the country to understand. Yet, as soon as the election was over, the entire June 4th affair was largely forgotten by everyone, including the media.



The VMRO connection to the Macedonian Diaspora



The June 4th election was a realization of one time promise given by one person, Nikola Gruevski, leader of the official opposition party VMRO-DPMNE in 2004 in front of a sizeable audience of Macedonian immigrants in Detroit, Michigan in the United States. The promise was repeated on few more stops in the United States and notably in Melbourne, Australia. His promise was, in his own recollection, made on behalf of his party. It can only be speculated that the promise was preceded by a strong desire and ask by the immigrants present at the meetings or behind closed doors to be represented in the Macedonian parliament and in government.



Before the Macedonian Diaspora could influence the 2011 parliamentary elections it played a key role in forming the original electoral party of VMRO in Macedonia. The party was officially formed in June 1990 but its origins run much deeper. Many Macedonians abroad were victims of persecution either connected with the Greek Civil war that culminated in 1948-49 or in Yugoslavia where the idea of an independent Macedonian state was not in the plans of the federal authorities. Working in exile, these Macedonians carried the ideas formed in the early 20 century in Ottoman occupied Macedonia. The most prominent organization in an extremely turbulent and confusing period was titled Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization IMRO. The Macedonian acronym was VMRO. The name struck a chord in the Macedonian immigrant community and the name survived till 1990. What was a movement became a political party. Although details of the story of the origins of VMRO in North America and Australia remain murky, the 2004 meetings was nonetheless a homecoming of sorts for a new and energetic leader of the party carrying the tradition of the historic VMRO.



The Diaspora’s role in forming the party in Macedonia is not without significance for the current events. At the time of the Macedonian declaration of independence there was hardly any capacity to form an opposition party to the ruling Socialist/Communist party that was left with the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The socialist party was rebranded as Social Democratic Union of Macedonia. The formation of VMRO was the much needed shot of pluralism in the new state. The party was received well by the population and so was the young leader Ljupco Georgievski at its helm. The party was still weak and did not have enough support to win the first election, let alone to muster any of the revolutionary reforms and purges that would remove the former regime from power (like in the Czech Republic two years earlier).



The SDSM was on the surface a social democratic party but winning the election it moved to the right of the political spectrum to become the party of the elites as opposed to the working people in the new republic. The party implemented Macedonia’s first privatization plan with mixed results and disappointed many who expected a more orderly and more just privatization of the socialist enterprises worth saving and being built over many years in the former country.



Eventually, the VMRO party met electoral success but only for a short period of time. Their victory was based on a perception that the party was closer to the ordinary folk and that unlike the SDSM it was less likely to plunder the state treasury for the benefit of its own members. Once in power, however, it did not fare much better than the socialists. In the first place, lacking parliamentary majority it struggled to form a new government. Once established as a government, VMRO was not immune to the possibilities that allowed the government to benefit from the transition.



As a result of their policies, both leading Macedonian political parties in effect prolonged the economic transition to the detriment of economic growth and political stability culminating in 2001 with the Albanian insurgency in Macedonia. In the turmoil of the Macedonian Albanian conflict the VMRO lost the political battle and was forced to cede power to a unity government.



Meanwhile, the Ohrid Agreement, a series of constitutional guarantees won by the Albanian minority parties as a result of the piece deal brokered by the United States, ended the open hostilities and moved the country furthermore into a civic society. The VMRO party was a pan Macedonian national party and Macedonia was healing from an event that brought bitter and deep divisions to the surface that the party could not at the moment bridge or soothe. Its main vision was for Macedonia to be the country of the Macedonian nation. The realization of this vision was untenable without a formal and open recognition of the reality of the ethnic and religious make up of the Country.



The VMRO’s bridge to the future at the time was Boris Trajkovski, a VMRO backed President that won a close presidential race in 1999. The race was so close the new president could not take the oath of office until all of the appeals to the vote count run their course. Once the crisis entered a post conflict phase Trajkovski’s manner gave everyone from the foreigners, the ambassadors and statesmen in Macedonia and the political parties’ confidence in at least one institution, the Presidency. At the time he received praise for handling the very heated atmosphere following the chaos of the spring and summer of 2001.



Following the loss of power by the party, Nikola Gruevski, previous finance minister to the now embattled leader of VMRO Georgievski managed to win a leadership position in the newly rebranded VMRO-DPMNE. He also managed to keep a large portion of the VMRO supporters in a slight to the original leader. While in opposition, Mr. Gruevski built support for his party. With no pressure that comes with governing he could concentrate on building a wider base for his Party. The wider base at home meant they would take in more educated, respected and more astute candidates, administrators and organizers, something sorely lacking with their first adventure in power. The search for support in the Diaspora was curious but part of the same effort to consolidate and widen his party’s support. This however was not the quest for intellectual power for the party, only for feeling the party roots and soft power over the Macedonians.



The nationalist Macedonian immigrants, a small but vocal minority among the many Macedonians residing abroad have helped with the formation of an alternative all Macedonian party in Macedonia. Now that the party finally gained legitimacy in Parliament and looked poised to replace the SDSM they sought victory for themselves. The new leader won their affection by speaking the same language of uncompromising defense of the Macedonian domain, identity, and name and about economic prosperity for the republic.



The final piece of the puzzle was the engagement of these passionate Macedonians in Macedonian affairs. The promise to have Macedonians everywhere vote in one of the next Macedonian elections sealed the popularity of the leading party with expatriates. The party won the parliamentary elections of 2006. The election was mired with irregularities and the outcome was a minority government let by VMRO. The government was formed with the largest Albanian party as a coalition partner.



The 2011 election call



The political circumstances in the country did not at first appear that dire for early elections so the election call came to Macedonians as a bit of a surprise. The VMRO-DPMNE had a comfortable lead in the parliament and barring one or two smaller affairs (a regular feature in Macedonian politics) it was a rather tranquil time. Then, on January 28, 2011 the opposition party left the parliament in a show of, well, opposition. The official reason was the hard handed approach by the state to the media outlets led by a television station, A1. The officials claimed criminal activity related to unpaid taxes in a series of businesses with a single address at Pero Nakov Street and a common owner, Velija Ramkovski.



In the last months of 2010 Velija seemed to come ever closer to Branko Crvenkovski, the leader of the official opposition. The relationship was not new but the openness and expectation of future political partnership in front of cameras signaled renewed commitment of both to collaborate and the implication was that it would be against the current government, presumably in the next elections.



At the same time, the television station A1 and the affiliated press organizations controlled by Velija continued to relentlessly criticize the government at every opportunity. The offices of the A1 television were raided on December 25, 2010. In a display of state power Velija Ramkovski was arrested along with many of his associates and managers under suspicion of hiding taxes. The Macedonian revenue agency (UJP) was in the lead of the investigation but the heavy police presence protecting the financial inspectors gave the television and opposition parties a visual fodder to accuse the government of attacking the freedom of the media. The opposition immediately painted the arrests as politically motivated. The government promptly denied political motivation and dismissed suppression of the unfriendly media as unfounded. The opposition reacted by walking away from parliament in protest.



This was not a first time that opposition party boycotted the parliament but the lessons from previous times have shown a pattern. The pressure would increase for a compromise and the opposition would win the support of the ambassadors and the EU officials etc. The problem would be portrayed as non cooperation by the political parties on the European agenda and the pressure would increase for meetings, mediators and warnings from Brussels. In time the result would be the same, Macedonia would succumb under the pressure of others to fix the situation created by those who instigated the boycott and circumvented the institution in the first place by yet another political compromise.



It is difficult to assess whether the plans for opening the election to Macedonian citizens abroad had anything to do with the decision to go to an early election. The estimation that the elections would be low risk affair for the ruling party, however, probably played a significant role. The blame for the early election could be safely passed to the opposition and the three additional seats would help secure the party’s majority in Parliament.



The election showed how fluid the political landscape in the country is, that no one is politically infallible and that trust has to be earned outside elections. The media affair did not help the ruling party. Neither did the display of the previous poor record of the opposition party.



Voters did not care that the opposition left the parliament and wrestled the election by a staged protest. The issues in the election were entirely different. Perception of continuation of the political control over the public security sector and the judiciary by yet another political party seemed like betrayal of trust. The low and not improving living standard made worse by the global recession and rise in commodity prices were a serious issue as well. For all of the projects announced with enthusiasm by the government, the overall marks by the electorate for handling the economy and the euro integration were rather low.



The only saving grace and perhaps a reason for the return of the VMRO-DPMNE to power, albeit diminished one is the overall perception on the law enforcement and anti corruption front. Not all, but many, saw a small but significant rise in the rule of law as a hopeful sign.



Without admitting it, Macedonians liked the semblance of orderly revenue collection, adherence to regulations and rules and the appearance of budgeted items in the state budget. In short, westernization of the Macedonian fiscal affairs, albeit still weak, was the reason for the support of the current government. Last but not least of the reasons for the vote was the remaining perception of the nationalist character of the leading party, something the Macedonians have not yet abandoned as important.



Once the decision to go to an election was made, the elections abroad were a scramble. Questions abounded: Who can be a candidate? How many citizens have to nominate an independent candidate? How do political parties nominate candidates? Who can vote? What documents do you need? Where would you go to register or to vote? Where can you gain information on the candidates and the elections abroad?



Open ended questions of these seemingly simple concepts in the republic were repeatedly asked mere weeks before the vote. The deadline for candidates to be nominated and the voters to be registered was May 6th. Many of the most eager and most informed Macedonian immigrants saw the voter registration forms only days before that date. The church organizations and Macedonian halls in many of the Canadian and US communities with large Macedonian population received the forms barely on time and very little else. The whole election seemed to be an afterthought.



The results of the vote



The June 4th, 2011 election results confirmed that all three of the election districts abroad went to VMRO candidates. According to web sources containing Macedonian population numbers there are anywhere between 600,000 and well over a million Macedonians living outside Macedonia. The Macedonian State Electoral Commission was able to persuade 7573 Macedonian Citizens to register for the vote worldwide. Only 4079 (less than 1% of the most conservative estimate of the Macedonian population living outside the country) actually voted in the three electoral units abroad, labeled 7, 8 and 9. The winners were:



Risto Mancev in Europe with 1578 out of the 2494 votes
Pavle Sazdov in North America with 560 out of 994 votes and
Milorad Dodevski in Australia with 548 out of only 591 votes cast



These numbers reflect a campaign that was too short, too compressed and essentially buried in obscurity as far as the Macedonian citizens living abroad were concerned. Even in these painfully small numbers of Macedonians who voted there is a huge hole in the absence of independent candidates. The elections were a mirror image of the Macedonian political party landscape only with the predominance of one political party. In Macedonia the elections showed a strong electoral split among the available parties.



People were casting votes as easily for the opposition as for the ruling party. The second placed SDSM had a huge electoral victory in the elections, pushing the ruling party numbers into minority territory. In comparison, the external elections were baby steps if described generously. The result, however, was not accidental.



Putting aside the suggestions by numerous articles in the Macedonian media and the arguments of the other political parties that the June 4th elections experienced heavy irregularities in the voting process, lacked legitimacy or that the State Electoral Commission did dismal job with voter lists, it is clear that the outcome was a result of years of work by the ruling party, VMRO-DPMNE to gain the trust and affection of Macedonians abroad. The relationship was nurtured and strengthened by the overt patriotism of the Party and the emotional connection of Macedonians to their land.



Even with an election done by Canadian and Swiss election authorities together the result may have been the same. Even if the voter numbers were much higher and included the more numerous mainstream immigrants, there is a good chance that they would vote for the only party they recognize as the Macedonian national party, something well placed in their sub-conscience.



This is the case despite the fact that the state of Macedonian political organizations abroad, including that of VMRO is almost nonexistent and the fact that the Macedonians are divided, suspicious of each other and highly individualistic. That the turnout was low, the opposition weak and the timelines extremely tight made the result more secure but not more inevitable.



The decision to have an election abroad can then be explained by the calculation of the VMRO-DPMNE that it will win all seats it creates for the members of the Macedonian Diaspora. Politically speaking, it is a logical move for a party that has the strongest support abroad. The decision, however, opens many new questions that have consequences for the Macedonian state. It makes a precedent that will open immigrant issues that may or may not mesh well with the state’s overall policy and interest. It has to be upheld in subsequent elections with considerable cost now made permanent. It opens a new avenue of organizational formation, first of the Macedonian political parties abroad and second of independent movements and organizations that will challenge VMRO-DPMNE at the very next election for the seats and the policy.



The story of the election does not end there. The numerous complaints and cries of anguish by the Macedonian immigrants did not only focus on the technical aspects of the election. There were more fundamental questions raised. Why would anyone be concerned or vote in an election if the outcome has absolutely no effect on their life? This is precisely why many Macedonians abroad silently see the whole affair as an internal Macedonian manipulation for domestic political purposes.



Issues that matter to Macedonians abroad



There are very few but very legitimate issues for Macedonians abroad that were raised in person and in print during the election campaign. One is the Macedonian identity issue. On this issue all Macedonians, virtually of all stripes abroad are united and to the right of any political party in the country. The firm position is that there should be no compromise; no negotiations under any auspices regarding the name of the state or any of the identity qualifiers such as the language, nationality etc. No Macedonian sovereign rights should be ceded in the UN process as it was not legitimate from the very beginning.



No political party in Macedonia promised to walk away from the negotiating table as that would likely spell a serious problem with the EU and its goodwill, money or prospects for entry into the EU. Immigrants, on the other hand do not see the need to pander to these institutions if they don’t recognize the importance of the name to the identity of the Macedonian nation.



Has the VMRO-DPMNE or any other political party in Macedonia addressed this issue in a way that they will be truly supported by the Diaspora? Hardly, and there lies the suspicion expressed by the Macedonian organizations abroad. Their message is simple; we need independent candidates who would legitimately represent our interests. In other words, not one of the major political parties represents or could represent our interests; they would only fall under the rigor of the political party discipline common to a parliamentary system. Worse, they will likely be influenced by the heavy presence of the international community and the will of the European and other world powers. Only independent individuals chosen in a wide and open election may be the only hope for true representation.



Many Macedonians living abroad travel to Macedonia with regular frequency. These Macedonians are responsible for an increasing portion of the Macedonian GDP through their direct foreign currency contributions to the country. Most trips are in the summer months when Macedonian immigrants fill the many gaps in the general tourism demand. Visiting Macedonia is the second most important issue for the Macedonians living abroad.



One problem is the relative obscurity of the country for international travelers. It is hard to reach Macedonia without thorough planning and investment in time and money. The country has done very little to organize trips and travel agencies into a network to negotiate and secure airlines, foreign tour operators and internal transportation for our immigrants to visit Macedonia. Normally, this is not a function of the state but it would be vastly beneficial to Macedonia to have made some efforts to improve its infrastructure and open the possibilities for travel to Macedonia. One development that has the potential to open up Macedonia for foreign travelers, including expatriates is the concession given to the Turkish TAV who is now responsible for the two Macedonian airports. The potential in terms of transportation and economic development is huge and it is yet to sync in with the Macedonians.



The Macedonians living abroad may wish only to reconnect with family and friends or to reconnect with their youth, their ancestral land and village or town but they also have legal, business, familial and other affairs they need to take care of while in Macedonia. The experience and treatment of the Macedonian immigrants by the Macedonian institutions is far from stellar and constitutes the third legitimate electoral issue. The time it takes to do these things in Macedonia can be long and tiring. Access to various professionals such as lawyers, notaries, doctors and many institutions of the system is a sour point and subject of many sad stories.



Macedonians want their representatives to work with the bureaucracy in Macedonia and talk/lobby the government, government institutions and everyone that matters for a better, quicker and more human treatment of fellow citizens living abroad.



Difficulty is that a country that treats its own citizens living in the country the same way cannot be expected to treat those who visit from abroad much better. If the institutions had the capacity to deal with the workload and the demand as it arises, it would be probably noted in one of the many reports by the EU as a huge success for the country on its way to full EU membership.



The counterargument is often brisk. The visitors are treated worse than locals, as they lack connections, do not know the process and are often taken for a ride and pay more than necessary for anything and everything from a simple taxi ride to a service by a professional.



The expectations from Macedonians about navigating the regulatory system, utilities, postal services and any other services for that matter are arguably high. Yet, corruption in Macedonia is a problem. It is also a way of life. For an immigrant facing this reality it is a great disappointment. Furthermore it is the specific kind of corruption that is the culprit. It is difficult to accept the normalcy of bribing for services that should be paid above the table when it is absent in someone’s everyday reality elsewhere. It is an indication of the difficult road ahead for Macedonia. The solution though coming from abroad, however, can be rather shallow and self serving: “fix the corruption that we face when in Macedonia and make it go away while I am on vacation.”



If these parliamentary representatives are not independent and are instead part of a Macedonian political party, how can they ask for such a radical change outside of the normal Macedonian speed of change (infinite transition)? The answer is the same. There needs to be a systemic change across the land for the conditions to improve.



An election abroad as an exceptional political act



If this is what the Macedonians want in terms of representation and what they care about in terms of issues it is not untoward to conclude that the elections did not fulfill the promise or the spirit of what was promised to Macedonians abroad. These Macedonians, this time were in the background and a passive observer of the affair. It is a case akin to a mistaken identity. The identity that was mistaken was that of the representatives that were chosen, put into the rink and ascended or acclaimed in parliament. The ones caught holding the bag did not have a chance to understand, assess and act on these elections. If there were ten steps to such an election, the Macedonians abroad were stuck on step one before someone told them that the ten step race was over and done.



The issue of issues in the few days that can be identified as a campaign was not about issues, representation, economic or any other aspect of the life abroad or in the Republic. It was the ability to be identified and counted as Macedonian. The issue was whether one has a Macedonian passport and the ability or chance to vote or be voted for. Having not resolved that issue in 20 years, the Macedonian government of the day showed only that it wished this problem was solved and has thrown only a small bone that was more contentious than useful when chewed. In the process the government threw a wrench in the relationship it had with the Diaspora.



Can anything nice be said about the June 4th elections? If there is solace it comes from the fact that despite its very small economic and political size Macedonia amazingly can and has acted upon an issue above its weight class. Sometimes an attempt speaks of the hidden capability of people. Yes, what an enthusiasm, what effort for only three electoral seats all done largely for one political party but it was a political act of some complexity nonetheless. It also opened in this author’s opinion one of the most subtle and intuitive sleeper issues for the Macedonian nation if there ever was one. To preserve the nation, its truths and myths in the same measure and to one day seize the day as a true nation among equals, the Macedonian nation ought to connect the Macedonians wherever they are, and they are truly everywhere. It is a tall order but in a new age it is not outside of the realm of the possible.




This preservation must be based on three other tasks. One is that the Macedonians in Macedonia must preserve the unity and viability of the Macedonian state. This can only be done with the will and collaboration of all nationalities that live in the state. Second, it must develop a set of principles that would not be disputable. The conflict over a name of the state has already served in accomplishing this task. It is an affirmation of the strength of will even over substance and economic well being. Third, it must grow its own unique path to prosperity. Macedonians must have a will to develop despite all of the obstacles they face.



Macedonians need no reminder of the fragile nature of their situation but could take pause to understand what is happening in the world today. The world around the small Macedonian state is changing rapidly. The sanctity of the European experiment is punctured in a major way. The biggest foe of Macedonia in the twenty year independence, Greece is on its economic death bed. They have closed the doors of Europe for the Macedonian Republic but they have by this act kept the Republic isolated from the dangers of the two-speed Europe scourge that is consuming the entire southern plank of the continent.



We were not allowed the benefits but also the mistakes or the debt we could have accumulated along the way. In an act that can safely be described as stupidity on its part Greece has spread the word about Macedonia in every corner of the world. If you are ever in a situation to travel very far and speak to ordinary people but also with the elites, the congressmen or parliamentarians in far flung countries and continents, you will not be stranger anymore.



I was recently at a reception deep into the countryside of Michigan and happen to sit with no less than four US congress representatives from Michigan. Once I told them I was Macedonian the conversation was lively and informed. No one questioned the existence of the nation or the country; on the contrary, there was a lot of understanding and respect. One cannot buy such propaganda of your national brand and tiny Macedonia could never afford to.



The success of the Republic nonetheless has to come from within its own borders. The most involved arguments for including immigrants in the conversation may be ultimately about their return to the country or interest in the Republic. The June 4th election was only a small step for Macedonia in being inclusive. It was not done well. It left many Macedonians asking whether this was an open hand of kinship or a slap in the face. The bigger step would be to search deeper for the goals and the proper realization of the next election.



The original question is whether the Diaspora should have a say in Macedonian affairs. Depending on the answer it is possible to construct some options for the next election. If you believe that representation without having a direct and material stake is wrong or that Macedonian immigrants affecting policy for those who actually pay taxes and live in Macedonia is wrong, there should not be another election abroad and the three seats should be scrapped.



If you believe that there is a legitimate need for all Macedonians living anywhere in the world to have a say, you would have to first justify your belief and argue how this benefits the Republic as opposed to only Macedonians living abroad.



The options in having a follow up election would be to repeat the same election, to improve the process with more polling stations, improved information flow etc. or to rethink the entire process and allow for input and feedback by the Diaspora in the creation of the next electoral vote. According to the poor perception this time around, the Macedonians would likely lean toward the last option. Macedonians living outside and inside Macedonia are part of the same people. As such, to borrow a line from a speech by Lincoln, they would all like to have a government of the people, by the people and for the people.



In the next installment of the Curious Case of the Macedonian Elections Abroad the theme is: Does the Macedonian Diaspora hold the key to Macedonia’s future?