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The Changing Strategic Standing of Russia and International Security

Dr. O. Bakreski, B. Avramovska, & Z.Nikoloski, MAs - 7/29/2011

1. Multi-Polarization Antithesis of “Globalization”

After the end of the Cold War, the security structure in Europe changed from a bipolar structure during the Cold war to a principally unipolar structure dominated by the United States. We say “principally unipolar structure” not only since Russia is not a member of NATO, but because it will be limited by NATO in decision-making on security and defence in Europe in the years to come.

The determination for such strategic options will at the same time allow for a new growth of Russia as a new centre of world power, which would successfully counter the means and the powers of globalisation to provide its own place on the planet.

As antithesis of globalization, the new strategic option – multi-polarisation entails building a world with several pluralities of the world power. The inter-polar cooperation based on an equal basis would be a guarantee of the prosperity and international cooperation in the world.


2. Strategic Partnership

In response to globalization which includes utilization of the overall international relations led by one centre, Russia and China have started to come closer in an effort for common-countering the globalisation.
The first “big” meeting after the end of the Cold War, which contributed to overcoming the disparities in the period, was sanctioned by the so-called Agreement on Mutual Trust in 1996 signed, in Shanghai on behalf of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

The equal status in numerous prominent economic associations, the size of its territory, the demographic and scientific potential, as well as the natural resources it possesses, open a perspective for return of overall Russian power on a global scale until the end of the first quarter of the 21st century.

The ratification of the Agreement of Union between the Russian Federation and Belarus by the Russian Duma on 13.12.1999 de facto started the realisation of Russian’s strategic priority for the 21st century; expansion in the field of the former USSR, today the CIS. In a wider context of strategic thinking this act is the beginning of the realisation of the global Russian strategic goal: return of the power of Russia as it was in the times of the Soviet Union. Thus, Russia has started to build the “new” backyard of its own defence.
The CIS was unproductive and has not materialised into the political-military pact Moscow envisioned as a competitor to NATO and the EU. Moreover, several states rejected the May 1992 Treaty on collective security, or Tashkent Treaty, which Moscow initiated as a “regional security structure within the CIS”.

In May 2002, the collective security element of the CIS renamed itself in CSTO, with a stated focus of preserving territorial integrity and seeking for closer cooperation with other multilateral institutions, such as UN, OSCE, SCO and NATO. Russian defense minister at the time Sergei Ivanov spoke of the CSTO as a potential Eurasian partner for NATO. According to Ivanov, the next logical step may be to work out a mechanism for cooperation between NATO and the CSTO with corresponding, clearly-defined spheres of responsibility. This is definitely an attempt to re-tailor Europe.
CSTO members are Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Russia’s clear preeminence within the organisation limits its legitimacy. Neither, Turkmenistan nor Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan, or the three Baltic states are part to the CSTO.

The May 2002 decision to create the CSTO was based on the reactivation of long- standing plans to create a joint CIS rapid reaction force needed to support “collective security”. The plan also called for common air defence architecture and coordination in foreign, security and defence policies. By 2003, President Putin had invested considerable time and effort in “reenergizing” both the CSTO and the SCO, which were “ready to operate throughout the territory of all Central Asian regions”.

Russia’s envoy to NATO Dmitry Rogozin, called on the military alliance to recognise the CSTO. “I hope CSTO and NATO will soon sign an agreement on cooperation. Russia insists on signing such an agreement”.

NATO Secretary-General Andres Fogh Rasmussen, stated that the Alliance had established relations with the countries included in the CSTO and the representatives of the organization were invited to the meetings within the framework of NATO-Russia Council to Brussels. He said, “But there is no consensus in NATO on official zings the relations between the two organizations”.

Russia proposes to reconfirm, de jure, the political commitments undertaken within the OSCE and the NATO-Russia Council. Russia wants a legally binding document, a European Security Treaty.

3. From Vancouver to Vladivostok

In Berlin, in June 2008, Russian president Medvedev made the first proposal for new European security architecture in the form of a legally binding treaty. So, why Russia is pushing it? One likely reason is that Medvedev, in order to maintain his presidential image, needs a foreign-policy initiative of his own. The other (and more long-term) reason is probably the dead end that the Kremlin policies have reached in Europe: Russia’s relationship with three bodies encompassing much of Europe (the EU, the OSCE, and NATO) is chilly and, at times confrontational. But, still Medvedev’s initiative was a logical continuation of the foreign policy outlined by then-president Vladimir Putin at the 2007 Munich Conference on security. Mr. Putin said: “Security for each is security for all, and the model of a unipolar world in the 21st century is not only unacceptable but impossible” . In Moscow’s opinion, unilateral action (in the Former Yugoslavia and Iraq) only creates problems.

Russian disenchantment with existing European security structures was expressed at the highest level by President Putin at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in February 2007. Putin was sharply critical of the current situation in greater Europe, particularly with regard to the CFT Treaty and anti-missile defence. His criticism of the OSCE itself was vehement, with the organization written off as a “vulgar instrument” of the foreign policy of other states. Beneath all the emotional rhetoric, Russia argued that the OSCE had lost balance in the geographic and functional focus of its activities, with most activities occurring “east of Vienna” and in the so-called Human Dimension.

“Our predecessors during the Cold War years managed to draw up the Helsinki Final Act, and so why should we not be able to take the next step today? Namely, drafting and signing a legally binding treaty on European security in which the organisations currently working in the Euro-Atlantic area could become parties”. This new pact would be, according to him, “a regional pact based, naturally, on the principles of the UN Charter and clearly defining the importance of force as a factor in relations within the Euro-Atlantic community”.

In October 2008, in Evian, Medvedev proposed an international conference to discuss security questions in Europe. Primarily, the Treaty should clearly affirm the basic principles for security and intergovernmental relations in the Euro-Atlantic area and secondly, it should clearly affirm the inadmissibility of the use of force or the threat of its use in international relations. The Treaty could also cement a unified approach to prevention and peaceful settlement of conflicts in the euro-atlantic area. Emphasis should be on negotiated settlements that take into account positions of different sides and strictly respect peacekeeping mechanisms. Thirdly, it should guarantee equal security.

In this respect we should base ourselves on three ‘NOs‘: NO ensuring of one’s own security at the expense of others; NO allowing acts (by military alliances or coalitions) that undermine the unity of the common security space; and NO development of military alliances that would threaten the security of other parties to the Treaty. We need to concentrate on military and political issues because it is hard security that has determining role today. And it is here that we saw a dangerous deficit of controlling mechanisms recently. Fourth, it is important to confirm in the Treaty that no state or international organisation can have exclusive rights to maintaining peace and stability in Europe. This applies fully to Russia as well. Fifth, it would be beneficial to establish basic arms control parameters and reasonable limits on military construction. There is also the need for new cooperation procedures and mechanisms in areas such as WMD proliferation, terrorism and drug trafficking. New cooperation procedures and mechanisms in areas such as WMD, proliferation, terrorism and drug trafficking are needed as well.

4. Timing the Initiative

The timing of an initiative is very important. Russia presents its proposal at a time when Bush administration, which was very unpopular in Europe, was on its way out and US was preparing for presidential elections widely expected to change the policy in Washington. Many European NATO allies are dissatisfied with the Bush presidency and feel overstretched by the un-winnable guerrilla war in Afghanistan. Their response to the Russian occupation of Georgia has been extremely weak. For Moscow, this situation opened window of opportunity. Russia could argue that the Georgian crisis in August 2008 only served to underline the proposal’s central contention: The crisis itself demonstrated the structural limitations of the existing European security order. The situation in Europe was no better at that time. The Lisbon Treaty that was expected to give the EU more clout in foreign policy is in shambles and there is a general feeling of disorientation in Europe as concerns the future and direction of the European project.

Apparently, Russia published the proposal two days before the OSCE meeting in hope that the Treaty would win broad support after Kazakhstan assumes the chairmanship. This is exactly the year (2010) that Kazakhstan will chair the OSCE. The choice of Kazakhstan, close ally of Russia in the SCO and the CSTO, was highly contested because the country relatively lacks democratic credentials: so far the OSCE itself has failed to judge a single election in Kazakhstan freely and fairly. But for Russia, it will be the right chairman at the right moment.

The West had cautious reaction. NATO Secretary General Andres Fogh Rasmussen insisted that “NATO will remain our framework for Euro-Atlantic security”. The OSCE Summit was also rather uninterested. Although, both Brussels and Washington have politely agreed to study the proposal, neither has any intention of seriously debating this with Russia. The assumption is that the Russian strategy is designed to veto NATO expansion and supplant both the Alliance and the OSCE.

“While Russia faces challenges to its security, NATO is not among them. We want a cooperative NATO-Russia relationship that produces concrete results and draws NATO and Russia closer together. The Russian Government came forward with its proposals for a new European Security Treaty and a new NATO-Russia treaty. Now, we believe that some of Russia’s proposals contain constructive ideas and we welcome the opportunity to engage seriously with Russia on this important subject. But, as I made clear in my speech in Paris, the United States does not see the need for new treaties and we believe discussions of European security should take place within existing forums for European security such as the OSCE and the NATO-Russia Council”.

However, Russia’s propaganda, offensive for the new security treaty, was especially directed to the big four “friendly” EU member states: Italy, France, Germany and Spain. Leaders of these countries were invited to Moscow, Saint Petersburg, as well as the more pleasant Black Sea resort of Sochi. This strategy has, so far met with success. On a visit to Moscow on July 16, 2008, the Italian President Giorgio Napolitano expressed his support for Medvedev’s plan. Moscow’s project can equally count on the understanding of the German Foreign Minister and SPD chancellor candidate Frank-Walter Steinmeier.

However, EU member states, NATO and non-NATO members should seriously study Medvedev’s proposal. They should not react unilaterally, but co-ordinate their response with Transatlantic partners – especially with the Obama Administration. They should be aware of the hidden objectives of Medvedev’s proposal and only accept the proposal if Russia lives up to the standards of international law it pretends to adhere to, and if there is a chance for a constructive outcome that creates a win-win situation for all participants.

5. Why Would Russia Want to Change the Existing Security Architecture in Europe?

Politically, the proposed Treaty is intended to put an end to the geostrategic rivalry in the euro-atlantic area and thus release forces for effective cooperation in countering new security challenges. For Russia, the conclusion of such a treaty would substantially facilitate its democratic modernisation.

There are several reasons behind Russia’s proposal of the draft treaty.
First, it was a response to NATO’s eastward expansion. However, taking advantage of Russia’s weakness, NATO went through several enlargement rounds, even incorporating parts of the former Soviet Union.

The possibility of NATO’s expansion to Ukraine, which Russia’s elite views as a vital threat to its security, has created and maintains for a long term, as this possibility exists, a threat of a large-scale war in Europe, which may escalate unpredictably.

Also, the West supported Ukraine and Georgia in the “Colour Revolutions”, an attempt seen by Russia as a squeeze on its traditional sphere of influence and a threat to its national security. Russia has now recovered and considers that the era of unipolarity should be giving way to the “polycentric international system”. The West still has a “bloc approach” to security in Europe.

Furthermore, Russia cannot accept that a single group of countries – NATO under American leadership - has exclusive rights to shape European security. The August 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict might also be considered as a policy action reflecting these views. The rejection of Western security actions – such as the existing Euro-Atlantic security architecture, NATO expansion and the US missile shield – was incorporated into Russia’s security policy during the latter part of Putin’s second term, whereas Medvedev launched the proposal for a new Euro-Atlantic security architecture in June 2008. The emphasis on partners – states and organizations – in the East, coincided with Moscow’s closer ties to China and the upgrading of CSTO and SCO from, respectively, a treaty and a grouping into full-fledged organizations in recent years.

Another reason for Russia could be to raise the profile of the CSTO. This “Mini-Warsaw Pact” in which Russia – in contrast to the SCO – is the uncontested leader and which seven former Soviet states are members, is not only, militarily more integrated than the SCO, but it also has an equivalent of NATO’ s Article 5, defining a mutual defense obligation.

After the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact, Russia pinned its hopes on the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and on OSCE becoming the major regional security organisation in the Euro-Atlantic area. The major conflicts during the last years, from the Balkans to the Caucasus, were systematic breakdowns of the existing security architecture.

The existing system suffers from several serious shortcomings. The Western countries continue to approach security ideologically. Russia does not accept the western ideological approach to international politics: it uses the concept of sovereign democracy to underline its independence from a moral parity with the West. And finally, a plethora of security organisations and arrangements have sprung up over the last decade, so that some restructuring is overdue. The war in Georgia and the financial crisis demonstrated that sufficient critical mass has been achieved to transform the international system.

Another systematic drawback of the present security system is the global character of emerging threats and the narrow group approach to their solutions. These threats stem from lack of trust, national and religious grounds, and non-state actors. Furthermore, there is an overlap and duplication, and even competition, between the many sub-regional organisations active in the OSCE space. Moscow considers the OSCE obsolete. In Berlin, Medvedev stated:
“An organisation such as the OSCE could, it would seem, embody European civilisation’s newfound unity, but it is prevented from doing so, prevented from becoming a full-fledged general regional organisation. The problem is not just in the organisation’s own incomplete institutional developments but also in the obstruction created by other groups intent on continuing the old line of bloc politics”.

Dmitri Rogozin, Russia’s envoy to NATO said, “International organisations cannot help but include Russia in their plans and admit that nothing could be achieved without joint efforts under the current international context”. And finally, following the declaration of independence, the United States and most EU member states recognized Kosovo as an independent state. For Russia this created a dangerous precedent for other breakaways and reflected double-standards with regard to conflict settlement (why would Kosovo be recognised but not Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria?).




6. European Security Treaty

Euro-Atlantic vision today needs positive agenda. The events in the Caucasus have only confirmed how absolutely right the concept of a new European security treaty is today. It would give us every possibility to build integrated and solid system of comprehensive security. It should consolidate the Euro-Atlantic region as a whole on the basis of uniform rules of the game.

The draft treaty’s title, which speaks of ”European Security“, stands in some discrepancy with the content and the roster of eligible, which correspond with the “Vancouver to Vladivostok“ political. The document uses the concept of ”treaty participant“ to cover states as well as international organisations that would accede to the treaty. The preamble announces Russia’s goal to "create an interaction mechanism for resolving issues and differences as they arise”. The document makes clear that the proposed mechanism is intended to disorganise, sideline, and potentially override NATO.

The draft contains no definition of a situation in which the security of a party is compromised, which inevitably leads to total arbitrariness and subjectivity in the assessment of threats. Thus, if the treaty were adopted in its current form, a number of security issues which are currently regarded as NATO’s or the member and partner states’ internal affairs would become legitimate subjects of a formal debate with Russia. There is no definition of what may constitute a threat.

The draft envisages a new dispute settlement mechanism operating in parallel to dispute settlement within the UN framework. The new mechanism, however, is bound to be ineffective because of the completely unrealistic requirements for the decisions of the parties to be taken unanimously. Not only would this new arrangement be incapable of resolving any conflict situations, it would also potentially impede the effective involvement of Western states and security organisations in conflict regulation in cases such as the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict.

In his Evian speech on October8, 2008, President Medvedev mentioned as the first of the five provisions of the new treaty that “These principles include the commitment to fulfil in good faith obligations under international law: respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of states (….)”. This would mean that Russian troops would withdraw from Transnistria as was promised in the Final Act of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit. It would equally mean that Russia withdraws its troops from Abkhazia and South Ossetia that are in excess of the number present before 7 August, 2008. Furthermore, it would mean that Russia backtracks on its illegal and unilateral recognition of the independence of both Georgian provinces and works for an international UN-led solution for the breakaway provinces that respects the territorial integrity of Georgia. Especially the last precondition must be a sine qua non. Only by strictly adhering to agreements and principles of international law Russia could show its commitments to a multilateral approach and to peaceful resolution of outstanding conflicts it says it wants to promote by the new treaty.

Article 2 stipulates that ”treaty participants shall not undertake actions or steps that substantially affect the security of other treaty participants”. If, however, negotiations begin to define “substantial” for the purposes of Article 2 in Medvedev’s draft, NATO would then hardly be able to avoid the trap of discussing with Russia about what the Alliance may or may not do on the territories of certain member countries.

Under Article 3, “a treaty participant may address other participants with requests to provide information about any substantial steps of a legal, administrative or organisational nature that, in the inquiring participant’s view, affect its security interests”. This stipulation looks like a less-than-poor substitute for the transparency and confidence-building measures enshrined in the CFE. Since 2008, Russia has largely suspended the application of the Treaty (force ceilings, inspections, pre-notification of military movements) and wants a wholesale re-negotiation of the document. Article 3 awkwardly attempts to deflect concerns and attention away from that problem. Russia considers itself no longer bound by Northern and Southern Flank ceilings of the Treaty, which makes it possible to concentrate troops near the frontiers of the three Baltic States as well as near Georgia and Ukraine. Russia equally withdrew from the systems of monitoring and exchange of information, and no longer accepted inspection teams on Russian territory or the pre-announcement of movements of Russia troops.

Under Article 7 “a treaty participant is entitled to regard an armed attack on another participant as an attack on itself and it has the right to provide the necessary assistance, including military, before such time as the UN Security Council takes the necessary measures”. This procedure can justify purely unilateral Russian military intervention, outside of CSTO umbrella. Thus, Moscow claims a right to having its cake and eating it too, in terms of military intervention. And last, Moscow would breezily bypass the UN Security Council, even as it wants to hold the United States and others accountable to that very same body.

Moreover, article 8 seems custom-made for Russia to initiate or threaten military action under a CSTO flag of convenience. This is why Medvedev wants to empower an “Extraordinary Conference”, or even four or five countries to authorise collective defence measures against an attack or threat of attack on a member country. This could put a collective guise on a Russian military intervention. Moscow would be delighted to receive a stamp of approval for CSTO-flagged actions from NATO-approved forum, in the unlikely event that NATO accepts Medvedev’s proposal.

In his Berlin speech Medvedev stated that “absolutely all European countries should take part in this summit as individual countries, leaving aside any allegiances to blocs or other groups”. A treaty signed by the individual countries might not allow Moscow to block a NATO decision outright. Under Article 10 “the Treaty shall be open for signature by all States of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space from Vancouver to Vladivostok as well as by the following international organisations: the EU, OSCE, CSTO, NATO and CIS”. Medvedev’s proposal treaty is open to all countries and existing alliances and international organisations, in the Eurasian-Atlantic space, including the US and Canada. But there is an interesting exception: the one organisation of which both Russia and China are members - SCO – is not mentioned. Apparently, China is not invited. The issue of membership by itself will create a tremendous obstacle: Russia and several other Euro-Atlantic nations don’t recognise Kosovo, while no one in the treaty’s region but Russia recognizes the independence of Abkhazia or South Ossetia. The invitation to alliances and international organisations to become signatories has one objective – to strengthen the legitimacy of the weak organisations founded and supported by Russia (CSTO and CIS).

CONCLUSION

Conclusion of a new treaty requires a consensus between all states of the Euro-Atlantic region. Would it be signed by Serbia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, without revising decisions to recognise Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or without settling the Nagorno-Karabakh issue? Are such revisions and such settlements possible? Without these countries and dozen states with unsettled grievances, how would a proposed new treaty be comprehensive?

The new security treaty is unlikely to be materialised. At the same time, the discussion of its proposed provisions may be useful in specifying the positions of the parties, in their consideration of practical policy, in enhancing the effectiveness of the existing organizations and formats of cooperation and in establishing cooperation between international organisations that have never cooperated before (for example, NATO, the CSTO, and the SCO). Such debates could facilitate an elaboration of a much-needed spirit of trust and mutual understanding. Dialogue between Russia and the EU can play a key role in this process. In 2003, they agreed to build a common security space. It is essential to seal this agreement in the new Russia-EU Treaty, which is now being drafted by Moscow and Brussels.

On the other hand, the new phase of Pan-European discussions promises, therefore, to be different to previous moments. What is more, the range of tools available for these discussions have become more diverse. More than ever, it is the question of the place of Russia in the European family, that is at stake. The scope and duration of a renewed pan-European work will depend on the objective that Russia itself sets for its future. It is up to all of Russia’s partners to assist in this delicate undertaking.

It is a very limited, poor proposal which contains provisions for threats, and it can be said that the form in which it was proposed has no future. Second, the Corfu Process is an important form where issues of that type can be discussed. Third, when the time of submitting the proposal is considered, it is more than clear that it is an attempt to affect the creation of the international security agenda of the new US Administration. Besides the fact that the proposal was conditionally deferred, it can still serve as a practical goal for fulfilling certain open questions. Redefinition of the OSCE, i.e. rebalance of certain dimensions above all of the political-military as well as the possibility for continuing the arms control negotiations. On the other hand, the proposal can contribute for Euro-Atlantic legitimacy of CSTO which at the same time is one of the hidden goals of this proposal.
Russia has the time and patience.

LITERATURE
1. Television Channels Channel One, Rossia, NTV, Interview given by Dmitry Medvedev to Television (31 August, 2008), http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/warfare/statement310808en.htm

2. Van Herpen, H. M., Pan Eurorean Security Pact and its Six Hidden Objectives and How the World Should Respond, (Zbigniew Brzezinski, proposed to build additional structures into the OSCE, such as a ”Security Committee”, composed of the US, Russia and some key European countries). Cicero Foundation,
http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Marcel_H_Van_Herpen_Medvedevs_Proposal_for_a_Pan-European_Security_Pact.pdf

3. MID, Speech by President of Russia, Vladimir Putin (Russian Air Base, Kant, Kyrgyzstan, October 23, 2003), http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/aa74f9541813754dc3256ec9001c9332?OpenDocument

4. Atlantic Council, From the Azeri-Press Agency (APA), Jorge Benites, Russia calls on NATO to recognize Collective Security Treaty Organization Saturday (September 19, 2009), http://www.acus.org/content/russia-calls-nato-recognize-collective-security-treaty-organization

5. NATO, New Challenges - Better Capabilities, Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Bratislava Security Conference (Bratislava,22 Oct. 2009), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_58248.htm

6. President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev's Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders (Berlin, June 5, 2008),
7. http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type82912type82914type84779_202153.shtml

8. President of Russia, Medvedev’s Speech at World Policy Conference (October 8, 2008, Evian, France), http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2008/10/08/2159_type82912type82914_207457.shtml

9. Pal Dunay / Greame P.Herd “Redesigning Europe? The Pitfalls and the promises of the European Security Treaty Initiative”, in OSCE Yearbook 2009. 3

10. Marcel H.Van Herpen, “Medvedev’s proposal for a Pan-European Security Pact”, Paris/Maastricht,October,http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Marcel_H_Van_Herpen_Medvedevs_Proposal_for_a_Pan-European_Security_Pact.pdf

11. The Economist, “Joint the club–Kazakhstan and the OSCE”, (December 2008).

12. NATO, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Remarks at the NATO Strategic Concept Seminar (Washington, February 22, 2010), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/events_61583.htm

13. Anna Smolchenko, “Napolitano Backs New Security Pact”, The St.Petersburg Times, July 18, 2008, http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=26584

14. Russian Daily Paper, Brjansk rem’er Ispanii prizval ES I RF zaklyuchit “novyi dogovor bezopasnosti”, October 1st 2008

15. DW-World.DE. Deutche Welle, Sarkozy, Medvedev call for the New European Security Pact, October 8, 2008, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3699817,00.html

16. Marcel H. Van Herpen, Medvedev’s proposal for a Pan-European Security Pact, Paris/Maastricht,October,http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Marcel_H_Van_Herpen_Medvedevs_Proposal_for_a_Pan-European_Security_Pact.pdF

17. Center for Strategic Leadership, John A. Mowchan, The Militarization of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. http://www.csl.army.mil/usacsl/publications/IP_6_09_Militarization_of_the_CSTO.pdf.

18. Patrick Nopens,”A new security Architecture fir Europe? Russia Proposal and Western Reaction”, Security Policy Brief, ed. Egmont, Royal Institute for International Relations (Brussels 2009). 1

19. President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev's Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders (Berlin, June 5, 2008), http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type82912type82914type84779_202153.shtml

20. NATO Permanent Mission of Russia to NATO, Russia’s envoy to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin. “Moving beyond strained relations” European Voice ( Brussels, September 17, 2009), http://www.natomission.ru/en/permanente/rogozin./

21. President of Russia, Medvedev, Speech at World Policy Conference (October 8, 2008, Evian, France),, http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2008/10/08/2159_type82912type82914_207457.shtml.

22. Marcel H. Van Herpen “Medvedev’s proposal for a Pan-European Security Pact” Paris/Maastricht, October,.www.cicerofoundation.org, 2008.

23. President of Russia, European Security Treaty (29 November 2009), http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2009/11/223072.shtml.

24. Vladimir Socor, “Kremlin would re-write or kill CFE Treaty”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 18, 2007. http:// www.jamestown.org/edm/artcle.

Notes:

(1) Global Security.org, Collective Security Treaty Organization, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military

(2) Ibid. p.1.

(3) MID, Speech by President of Russia, Vladimir Putin (Russian Air Base, Kant, Kyrgyzstan, October 23, 2003)

(4) Atlantic Council, From the Azeri-Press Agency (APA), Jorge Benites, Russia calls on NATO to recognize Collective Security Treaty Organization Saturday (September 19, 2009), http://www.acus.org/content/russia-calls-nato-recognize-collective-security-treaty-organization

(5) NATO, New Challenges - Better Capabilities, Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Bratislava Security Conference (Bratislava,22 Oct. 2009), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_58248.htm

(6) Munich Security Conference, Vladimir Putin’s speech on the Munich Security Conference (February 10, 2007), http://www.securityconference.de/Putin-s-speech.381.0.html?&L=1

(7) Ibid.

(8) President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev's Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders (Berlin, June 5, 2008),
http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type82912type82914type84779_202153.shtml

(9) President of Russia, Medvedev’s Speech at World Policy Conference (October 8, 2008, Evian, France), http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2008/10/08/2159_type82912type82914_207457.shtml

(10) Ibid.

(11) Ibid.

(12) Pal Dunay / Greame P.Herd “Redesigning Europe? The Pitfalls and the promises of the European Security Treaty Initiative”, in OSCE Yearbook 2009, p. 3.

(13) Marcel H.Van Herpen, “Medvedev’s proposal for a Pan-European Security Pact”, Paris/Maastricht, October,http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Marcel_H_Van_Herpen_Medvedevs_Proposal_for_a_Pan-European_Security_Pact.pdf

(14) The Economist, “Joint the club–Kazakhstan and the OSCE”, (December 2008).

(15) NATO, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Remarks at the NATO Strategic Concept Seminar (Washington, February 22, 2010), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/events_61583.htm

(16) Anna Smolchenko, “Napolitano Backs New Security Pact”, The St.Petersburg Times, July 18, 2008, http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=26584

(17) Marcel H. Van Herpen, Medvedev’s proposal for a Pan-European Security Pact, Paris/Maastricht, October,http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Marcel_H_Van_Herpen_Medvedevs_Proposal_for_a_Pan-European_Security_Pact.pdf

(18)Center for Strategic Leadership, John A. Mowchan, The Militarization of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. http://www.csl.army.mil/usacsl/publications/IP_6_09_Militarization_of_the_CSTO.pdf.

(19) Patrick Nopens,”A new security Architecture fir Europe? Russia Proposal and Western Reaction”, Security Policy Brief, ed. Egmont, Royal Institute for International Relations (Brussels 2009), p. 1.

(20) Ibid. p. 1.

(21) President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev's Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders (Berlin, June 5, 2008),
http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type82912type82914type84779_202153.shtml

(22) NATO Permanent Mission of Russia to NATO, Russia’s envoy to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin. “Moving beyond strained relations” European Voice
( Brussels, September 17, 2009), http://www.natomission.ru/en/permanente/rogozin./

(23) President of Russia, Medvedev, Speech at World Policy Conference (October 8, 2008, Evian, France), http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2008/10/08/2159_type82912type82914_207457.shtml.

(24) Vladimir Socor, “Russian President Medvedev Submits Draft Treaty on European Security Architecture”, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 224, ed. Jamestown Fondation, (December 7, 2009). http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35808.

(25) President of Russia, Medvedev’s Speech at World Policy Conference (October 8, 2008, Evian, France), http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2008/10/08/2159_type82912type82914_207457.shtml

(26) Marcel H. Van Herpen “Medvedev’s proposal for a Pan-European Security Pact” Paris/Maastricht, October,.www.cicerofoundation.org, 2008.

(27) President of Russia, European Security Treaty (29 November 2009), http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2009/11/223072.shtml.

(28) Ibid.

(29) Vladimir Socor, “Kremlin would re-write or kill CFE Treaty”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 18, 2007. http:// www.jamestown.org/edm/artcle.

(30) President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev's Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders (Berlin, June 5, 2008) http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type82912type82914type84779_202153.shtml.

(31) President of Russia, European Security Treaty (29 November 2009), http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2009/11/223072.shtml.