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Macedonian Model of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Through Intercultural Dialog to Multicultural Integration

Drs.. S. Slaveski, O. Bakreski, Z. Nikoloski - 10/4/2011

Abstract

With some 5000 to 8000 ethnocultural groups in the world, and only around 200 states, simple arithmetic shows that the most states are inevitably going to be shared by more than one ethnic group, and often by dozens. Hence the conflicts among different ethnic groups are expected.

The real issue is how these conflicts are managed. Most political theorist working on this issues focus on three methods for managing differences. Those are: territorial autonomy (e.g. federalism), non-territorial autonomy (e.g. power-sharing and conscociationalism); and multicultural integration. All these approaches involve significant elements of minority rights.

Many scholars in the ethnic conflict area advocate one or more of these three options as having proving success in managing ethnic conflict. However all of them are focused on similar challenge: how to show respect for diversity in a pluralistic society and at the same time not eroding the bonds of citizenship. In this article we will focus on the model of “multicultural integration” and its implementation in the Republic of Macedonia.


Introduction

In the ethnic conflict literature we can find different methods of eliminating and managing ethnic differences, both democratic and non-democratic. According to McGarry and Brendan O’Leary’s taxonomy of the methods of the macro-political forms of ethnic conflict regulation we can speak about forth methods for eliminating differences: (a) genocide; (b) forced mass-population transfers; (c) partition and/or secession; and (d) assimilation; and forth methods for managing differences: (a) hegemonic control; (b) territorial autonomy (cantonization or federalization); (c) non-territorial autonomy (consociationalism or powersharing); and (d) multicultural integration (Kymlicka, Norman 2000: 12).
This typology shows that there are many “methods” of ethnic-conflict resolution, however the first two methods for eliminating differences (genocide and forced mass-population transfers) are without defenders amongst contemporary Western political theorists. The first system for managing differences, namely, hegemonic control, has a few defenders as well. These methods of regulating ethnic conflict are outside the boundaries of political theorizing, not just because they are special, but because amongst Western political theories no one disputes that that these are unfair and illegitimate. The legitimacy of the remaining forms of ethnic conflict regulation is an issue of considerable debate. Also it is generally accepted that partition or secession merely relocates problems of ethnic conflict and minority rights to the successor states, often with brutal consequences.
There has been a grate debate about “the legitimacy of assimilation”, the last method for eliminating differences. According to Donald L. Horowitz, this method, which comes naturally to Anglo-American democrats, is to think of majority rule with strong minority rights. But it is instantly obvious that for the big minority (for example 30% of the total share) the prospect of continuing exclusion from governmental power makes this an unsatisfying course, both practically and theoretically. It is practically unsatisfying because without a minority share of power, or at least the threat of a share of power, minority rights are likely to become weak. It is theoretically unsatisfying because democratic theory sees electoral politics as a matter of choice, rather than origin, and does not consider “ascriptive” majority rule to be what is meant by majority rule at all. When elections are wholly governed by origin, the term election is not quite appropriate (Horowitz 2008: 1213-1248). By assimilation McGarry and O’Leary understand “the idea of trying to eliminate difference within the state by seeking to integrate or assimilate the relevant ethnic communities into a new transcendent identity” (Kymlicka, Norman 2000: 13). This can be achieved more or less coercively, but the aim is to establish a single, common national culture, that merges all pre-existing ethnic differences.
However, Will Kymlicka and Wane Norman remind us to distinguish assimilation from what they call “multicultural integration”. Although both propose a new transcendent identity, the identity of citizenship, they have different approaches how to integrate diverse ethnic groups. They see “multicultural integration” not as a means to eliminate cultural differences of various ethnic groups but rather as a tool that accepts different ethnocultural background of identities which are inherently bound to citizens. They expect, in due time, recognized and accommodated ethnic groups to transfer themselves into “multicultural citizenships” in a given state. These two concepts are still a matter of some debate. In our further analyses we will focus on the model of “multicultural integration” and challenges in its implementation in Macedonian society.

Model of multicultural integration

The theorist of multiculturalism, such as Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka, borrow the idea about the existence of collective and/or cultural rights from the communitarian critique of liberalism but they try to legitimize them using the liberal emphasis on the individual. For example, Taylor insists that individual identity is formed dialogically and in a given cultural context in which the individual is always involved. In their view, classical individualist liberalism does not offer sufficient protection of that part of the individual identity which serves the collectivity. This is why “blind” liberalism should be “corrected” in a way that would provide for the protection of some collective rights, intimately linked with the fundamental human rights. This also encompasses the specific “politics of recognition” to which multicultural societies appeal (Tejlor, 2004).
Will Kymlicka in his book Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995: 34-48) argues that it is not enough to show that minority rights are consistent with in principle with freedom and justice. We also need to determine, he adds, “whether they are consistent with long-term requirements of a stable liberal democracy”, including the requirement of a “shared identity” that can sustain the level of mutual accommodation and be deprived of that democracy requires. He argues that in a society which recognizes “group-differentiated rights”, the members of certain groups are incorporated into the political community, not only as individuals, but also through group, and their rights depend, in part, on their group membership. He concludes that the demand for representation rights by disadvantaged groups is “a demand for inclusion”. Groups that feel excluded want to be included in the larger society and the recognition and accommodation of their “difference” is intended to facilitate this. Kymlicka proposes in cases where minorities are regionally concentrated, democracy system would respond by “intentionally drawing the boundaries of units”, so to create seats where minority is in a majority. Such a way to ensure representation of “communities of interest” should not be seen as threat to national unity; on the contrary, it is rightly seen as “promoting civic participation and political legitimacy”. The basic impulse underlying representation is integration, not separation he considers. Moreover, he assumes that “a fully integrative citizenship must take differences into account”. However, while representation rights can promote social integration and political unity, he notices that “self-government rights pose a more serious challenge to the integrative function of citizenship”. Demands for self-government, however, reflect “a desire to weaken the bounds with the larger political community and question its authority.” So, democratic multinational states which recognize self-government rights are, it appears, inherently unstable for this reason.
Liberal justice requires “sense of common purpose” and “mutual solidarity” within the country. So, we need to find some way to keep multinational states together. The real question is: What are the possible sources of unity in a multinational state which affirms, rather than denies, its national differences?
One response is that social unity depends on “shared values” Kymlicka considers(2000: 191-217). It is true that there are often shared political values within multination states including a shared conception of liberal justice. However, it is not clear that these values, by themselves, provide a reason for two or more ethnical groups to stay together in one country. This suggests that shared values are not sufficient for social unity.
Hence Kymlicka concludes, the missing ingredient seems to be idea of “a shared identity”. However, a shared conception of justice throughout a political community does not necessarily generate a shared identity. What does shared identity come from? In nation states, the answer is simple. Shared identity comes from communality of history, language, and maybe religion. But these are not which are shared in a multinational states. If we look to strongly patriotic but culturally diverse countries like the United States or Switzerland, the basis of shared identity often seems to be pride in certain historical achievements (e.g. the founding of the American Republic). The shared pride is one of the basis of the strong sense of American political identity, constantly reinforced in their citizenship literature and school curriculum. But in many multinational countries history is source of division between national groups, not a source of shared pride. The people and events which rise pride among the majority nation often generate sense of disloyalty amongst national minority. Moreover, the reliance on history often requires a very selective, even manipulative, retelling the history. National identity involves forgetting the past as much as remembering it. To build a sense of common identity in a multinational state probably requires an even more selective memory of the past. Shared values and inspiring history no doubt help sustain solidarity in multinational state, but it is doubtful that either is sufficient by itself.
Therefore Kymlicka proposes promoting a sense of “solidarity and common purpose” in a multinational state. However, it involves accommodation rather than subordination of national identities that is a huge challenge. People from different national groups will support the policy by which their national identity is nurtured rather than subordinated. Here Charles Taylor calls for a theory of “deep diversity”, since we must accommodate not only a diversity of cultural groups, but also diversity of ways in which the members of these groups belong to the larger society (1998: 143).
This means that the members of a multinational state must not only respect diversity, but also respect a diversity approaches to diversity. What would hold such a multinational state together? Taylor admits that this is an open question, but suggests that citizens might “find it exiting and an object of pride” to work together to build a society founded on deep diversity, and so be willing to make sacrifices to keep it together. Hence, “the crucial idea is that people can bond not in spite of their differences but because of them”. Taylor argues that “they can sense that the differences between them enrich each party, that their lives are narrower and less full alone than they are in association with one another”. In this way, “difference defines a complementarity” (Taylor 1998: 156). However, according to Taylor, a society founded on “deep diversity” is unlikely to stay together unless people value deep diversity itself, and desire to live in a country with diverse forms of cultural and political membership. On the contrary, if two or more national groups simply do not desire to live together, it may be impossible to create solidarity from the scratch.
Regarding ethnic diversity, Robert D. Putnam, in his “The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture”, made three broad points. First, ethnic diversity will increase substantially in virtually all modern societies over the next several decades, in part because of immigration. Increased immigration and diversity are not only inevitable, but over the long run they are also desirable he considers. Ethnic diversity is, on balance, an important social asset, as the history of USA demonstrates. Second, in the short to medium run, however, immigration and ethnic diversity challenge social solidarity and inhibit social capital. Third, in the medium to long run, on the other hand, successful immigrant societies create new forms of social solidarity and dampen the negative effects of diversity by constructing new, more encompassing identities. Thus, the central challenge for modern, diversifying societies is to create a new, broader sense of “we” he concludes (Putnam 2007: 137–174).

Critics of the model for “multicultural integration”

Liberal democracies require citizens to have a fairly high level of self-restraint and mutual solidarity. Hence, the politicization of ethnic differences is not compatible with these requirements. Therе are important examples of stable multinational states, such as Switzerland, which show that there is no necessary reason why the members of national minority cannot have both a strong national consciousness and a strong sense of patriotism and commitment to the larger society. This strong sense of patriotism that have Swiss make them, in some ways, a single “people”, as well as being a federation of peoples. But there are all too many examples of countries where the institutionalization of national identities and rights has not prevented civil wars (e.g. Lebanon, Yugoslavia). Moreover, some multinational states whose long-term stability used to be taken for granted now seem rather more unstable (e.g. Belgium).
Tchavdar Marinov criticizes multiculturalism as “a very hard means for building a common civic identity” (2006: 35). Putting the stress on the “cultural community”, it does not offer a formula of common belonging, equally acceptable to bout communities that otherwise do not have problems with communitarian self-definition he concludes. The elements with which this belonging should be constructed are the mutually exclusive ethnicities. Multiculturalists would probably say he assumes “that this is precisely the advantage of multiculturalism: the fact that it is something in between – neither radical communitarism nor blind to the differences of classical liberalism and/or republican assimilationism” (Marinov 2006: 62).
Pierre L. van Den Berghe, argues that we should make a distinction between minimal multiculturalism (the simply tolerance and legal protection of cultural diversity) and maximal multiculturalism (the celebration, encouragement and official support thereof). Hence he concludes, multiculturalism can be associated with democracy, as commonly defined in the contemporary world, only if certain conditions are met: (1) the state must be denationalized; (2) multiculturalism must be clearly decoupled from policies aimed at reducing educational, economical and social inequalities; (3) the multiculturalism most likely to produce the desirable result of peaceful coexistence is the minimalist programme, namely official policies that recognize and protect diversity, but do not celebrate and actively support it (Pierre L. van Den Berghe 2002: 433-449).
The health and stability of modern democracy depends, not only on the justices of its basic institutions, but also on the quality and attitudes of its citizens; their sense of identity, and they view potentially competing forms of national, regional, ethic or religious identities; their ability to tolerate and work together with others who are different from themselves; their desire to participate in the political process in order to promote public good and hold political authorities accountable. Looking at these uses of the term “multiculturalism”, it is easy to conclude that the term itself is multi-semantic. It is used in a various senses for various purposes. It can be instructive and educational and it can be used to explain to the majority that it has to learn to coexist in harmony with certain minorities who, in turn, need to be given collective rights. In the resolution of ethnic conflicts, multiculturalism is neither a universal solution nor the best means. A variety of other elements, like the existence of a given political culture, economic interests, international context and particularly historical tradition, can be decisive for the continuation of a society with considerable minority demands. In any case, there is no standard for an institutional or other organization that would prevent the latter from demanding more and more.

The Fundament of the Framework Agreement: Multiethnic or bi-national state?

Implicit in the Framework Agreement is the objective of transforming Macedonia from an ethnic nation-state into a civic/multi-ethnic state by discriminating in favour of the Albanian population. Paradoxically, therefore, the Agreement seeks to promote the development of a civic state through ethnically defined measures. Subsequent amendments by the Macedonian parliament to some of its provisions have, however, undermined the move toward a civic state, and instead posed the seeds for the development of a bi-national state.
The interests of other ethnic groups in the country have largely been left out of the political deal, and thus the Agreement disqualifies them of ethnically inclusive, plural democracy. Rather, it is a framework for the creation of a de facto bi-national political system. Despite calls from the other ethnic communities in Macedonia for a more inclusive interethnic dialogue, the smaller minorities in Macedonia have also largely been neglected in the Agreement. Instead, the debate has focused on the question whether Macedonia is or should be a mono-national or bi-national state, not a multi-national/ethnic state.
The conflict between Macedonians and Albanians was largely a struggle over the question of who controls the Macedonian state and what kind of state Macedonia should be. Under the Framework Agreement, the Preamble of the 1991 Macedonian constitution was to be changed, removing any mention of specific ethnic or national groups, and instead referring solely to the citizens of Macedonia. Thus, the new Preamble was to effectively mark a change in the official character of the Macedonian state. Accordingly, the aim was to transform Macedonia into a civil society of equal citizens, without reference to ethnic background. This, however, failed, as the new Preamble agreed to in the Ohrid negotiations was subject to contentious debate between Macedonian and Albanian politicians, resulting in further revision before being passed by a vote in the parliament. The final version of the Preamble that was adopted again makes reference to the ethnic and national groups of Macedonia, but elevates the Albanians to a higher status than the 1991 Preamble had afforded them. A comparison of the three different versions of the Preamble – the 1991 Preamble; the re-worded Preamble that the signatories to the Framework Agreement agreed on in Ohrid; and the version subsequently adopted by the parliament – illustrates the lack of will amongst the political leaders of Macedonia (Macedonians and Albanians both) to commit themselves to a civic Macedonian state. As noted earlier, the 1991 Preamble confirmed the Macedonian people as the primary “owners” of the Macedonian state, hence the de facto creation of an ethnic Macedonian nation-state. Paradoxically, the Framework Agreement initially produced a civic Preamble, whilst promoting special provisions that effectively ethicized the constitution itself. This is noticeably in contrast with the 1991 Preamble and constitution, where the former reflected a strong ethnic orientation of the Macedonian state, whilst the latter emphasized a civic approach to citizenship and rights. The final version of the Preamble that was adopted by the Macedonian parliament thus reintroduces the ethnic factor, referring to “The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian people, as well as citizens living within its borders who are part of the Albanian people, the Turkish people, the Vlach people, the Serbian people, the Romany people, the Bosniak people and others”. Hence, the net effect is that Macedonia, through the Framework Agreement and its subsequent amendment by the Macedonian parliament, has been left with a constitution and Preamble that is ethnic in character. This does not contribute the intention of the international community, which was to promote a civic, non-ethnic yet multi-cultural Macedonian state.
The concept of civic identity, however, is still extremely weak, and many Macedonians therefore resented the proposed change of the constitution’s Preamble because they were afraid of losing the state for whose recognition they had to fight so hard. Politicians and intellectuals voiced concerns that, if the Macedonian people were not explicitly mentioned in the preamble to the constitution, the very existence of the Macedonian nation would be in danger. This view resonates with the widespread notion among ethnic Macedonians that they, as a nation, have fought for centuries for their own national state, which they now do not want to loose. Ethnic Macedonians still perceive Macedonia as their “natural” state, and involuntarily make more “space(s)” for the Albanians (Brunnbauer 2002: 11). There is still resistance for the Framework Agreement, which is especially emphasized among the ethnic Macedonians and which is often labeled as damageable for the Macedonian state (Gocevski 2003: 120).
In general, rather than providing a comprehensive, inclusive framework for a non-discriminatory political structure, the Agreement seems designed mainly to address Albanian complaints in order to prevent further armed confrontation. The Framework Agreement does not take into consideration the whole political-security and socio-economic picture of the Balkans and it is linked with EU support only in a negative sense (Hills 2004: 11-40). Hence, by offering more sticks than carrots, the Agreement fails to motivate the people of Macedonia to commit to sincere peace-building.

Is there a hope for model of multicultural integration in the country?

In Macedonia it has become prosaic when politicians say that their country is an “example of a functional multicultural democracy in the Balkans and Europe.” Multiculturalism has in Macedonia been affirmed as a synonym for all sorts of nice wishes, such as ethnic and religious “pluralism”, “tolerance”, “liberalism”, and “cosmopolitism” (Marinov 2006: 35-62).
The real question is, whether multiculturalism with its request to guarantee the collective rights and integrity of the communities (ethnic in this particular case), is an instrument for resolving conflicts, such as the ones in Macedonia? Next, is there a fruitful ground to implement the theoretical concept of “multicultural citizenship” in the multiethnic Macedonia? And finally, what are the bounds that can hold all ethnic communities together?
As multiculturalists suggest one response could be “shared liberal values”. Macedonians, Albanians and other ethnic minorities in the country are devoted to liberal values, at least in the programmes of all political parties. Hence, EU and NATO membership rank among the few projects around which both majority and minority communities rally. They may thus help build the vision of a common future in a state at harmony with itself and with its neighbours. Respectively, both NATO and the EU have tried and will most probably continue to use Macedonia’s expectations to encourage political and economic reforms as well as comprehensive implementation of the Ohrid agenda. However, the veto for NATO integration and possible delay in integration in EU community make these Euro-Atlantic values less attractive at this moment.
What about “a common identity”? Macedonians and Albanians are “deeply diverse” societies. There are sharply divided along ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious lines with own political parties, interest groups, now educational institutions, media of communication etc. What can maintain them together? It is true that Albanians do not object to the name “Republic of Macedonia”, which they regard “as being territorial without any specific national connotations” (Poulton 1995: 187). Hence, in their view the name “Macedonia” does not imply ethnic Macedonian ownership of the state. However, they are not prepared “to suffer” for it? They consider that integration into NATO and EU is much more important than preservation of the constitutional name of the country. Finally, no objection to the name of the country is it enough to build “shared political identity” based on multicultural citizenship? Shared identity comes from communality of history. However, do they have common persons to celebrate? Yes, they have, but they do not celebrate them together, instead they struggle for their ethnic origin (“mother Tereza”, “Skenderbeg” etc.). Can they find common ground on this issue? Probably yes, if they have willingness to do that. However, the reliance on history often requires a very selective, even manipulative, retelling the history. National identity involves forgetting the past as much as remembering it. To build a sense of common identity in a multinational state like Macedonia probably requires an even more selective memory of the past. If left unchanged, Macedonia’s mostly ethnically segregated educational system is likely to reinforce these conflicting understandings of the country’s recent history.
Educational system can be a powerful instrument for social change; a change in the way that history is taught in Macedonia’s schools could significantly enhance the prospects for ethnic reconciliation (Petroska-Beska, Najcevska 2004). A great portion of the ethnic Macedonians are certainly not happy with this situation: they believe that they are the only ones making “compromises”, which then have no particular impact on the Albanians’ loyalty to the state. Real changes should take in people’s mind. In that respect, education could play a crucial role in combating ethnic prejudices and decreasing inter-ethnic tension. However, responding only to the demands of one ethnic community regardless of the needs of the others can only exacerbate the problem instead of resolving it (Petroska-Beska, Najcevska 1999: 8-14). The two nationalisms, Macedonian and Albanian, are still too weak to successfully endanger the very existence of one another, and thus the international community was in a position to prevent an all-out civil war. What it cannot do however, is to “answer their identity questions for them” (Adamson, Jovic 2004: 311).
Ethnic Macedonians do not have a self-image of the “warrior”, but rather hold a collective image of peoples, all of whom have dominated by different invaders, regardless of ethnicity. Moreover, Macedonians in general view themselves as peaceful people, according to Alice Ackermann, Macedonians regard themselves as more peaceful than ethnic Albanians, and vice versa (1999). However, some Albanian politicians undertook the role of the endless skeptics, who periodically declares his pessimism about the future of the multiethnic states and particularly that of Macedonia. For some of the Albanian leaders, the Macedonian statehood can always, at any degree of “multiculturalisation”, remain to Macedonian and insufficiently Albanian. Hence, could this “deep diversity” be challenge and an object of pride to work together to build a society founded on deep diversity, and so be willing to make sacrifices to keep it together? According to Taylor, a society founded on “deep diversity” is unlikely to stay together unless people value deep diversity itself, and desire to live in a country with diverse forms of cultural and political membership. Macedonian society shares a long history of peaceful coexistence among its varied ethnic groups. Regardless of ethnic backgrounds, citizens in Macedonia first and foremost aspire to lead a normal life, unhindered by memories of previous tensions and fears about the future. Perceptions of intercommunity relations have gradually improved over the past few years.
The Ohrid Agreement aimed at promoting multiethnicity as well as a better integration of minorities in society, while institutionalising the social and cultural distance that already existed between the two major communities. Could the other minority groups (Turks, Roma, Serbs, Vlachs, etc) be the bridge which will connect them? The task of becoming comfortable with diversity will not be easy or quick, but it will be speeded by our collective efforts and in the end well worth the effort.
Liberal democracies require citizens to have a fairly high level of self-restraint and “mutual solidarity”. Hence, the further politicization, ethnic mobilization and securitization of identities, of ethnic differences is not compatible with these requirements. To form a state, in the democratic era, a society is forced to undertake the difficult and never-to-be-completed task of defining its collective identity. Macedonia faces serious questions about its ability to reconstruct itself as a stable state in new circumstances.

Intercultural dialogue: Key for the success?

Interethnic relations on the ground have gradually recovered since the end of the conflict. But social distance between communities has on average increased. Intercommunity interactions often do not go beyond the sphere of professional relations, and there is little likelihood that the trend towards self-enclosed and physically separated communities will soon be reversed. Some of the Ohrid reforms aimed at favouring multiethnicity (like equitable representation in the public sector), but others were bound to reinforce ethnic distance (decentralisation and higher education in the Albanian language, among others). Currently, the greatest source of weakness in the country lies in the interaction between ethnic and economic cleavages, and between community-based politics and political clientelism. Fortunately, Macedonia has never been like Serbia/Kosovo and has its own long history of ethnic tolerance. The two major communities may have never lived together, but it is also true that there has never been any major ethnic trauma and hostility. Even today majority citizens from all ethnic groups claim that their major problems are poverty, unemployment and corruption, rather than inter-ethnic relations
It seems that here essential is “intercultural dialogue”. That is what Parekh advocates, type of multiculturalism in which everyone adheres to the laws and values of the nation-state, but where distinct forms of culture are nevertheless maintained (Parekh, 2000). Such “interculturalism” seems to manifest itself as a kind of mutual borrowing between culturally defined groups: I take something of yours, you take something of mine. In the end, we create something new for both us, but we both still retain enough of what makes us distinct. Such a process might also be referred to as “acculturation” – a more benign form of assimilation, where members of one community adapt. In Macedonian case, finding a solution for the “name dispute” with, name which is slightly different from the currentcan satisfy ethnic Macedonian societal security requirements but at the same time live enough space for the ethnic Albanians and other ethnic communities in the country to recognise themselves and build up new political identity at the international arena. However, for such a move all ethnic communities in the country should be prepared for “giving” and “taking” and political leadership prepared to explain to its ethnic group. As George Schöpflin notices, “democratic nationhood is composed of three key, interdependent elements: civil society, the state and ethnicity” (Schöpflin 2000: 35). When civil society and the state are weak, as they are in Macedonia, ethnicity comes to dominate.
Long-term strategy for Macedonia must focus on inclusion rather than isolation. A fundamental challenge facing Macedonian citizens in the future is to identify the sources of unity of the country (Frckovski 2007: 88-93), to search for common ground, to develop patriotism that unifies them without fusing them.
Instead of conclusion
This paper has sought to highlight some of the problems, inconsistencies and paradoxes concerning the Framework Agreement. Namely, the Agreement falls short of its intended purpose of promoting a civic concept of the Macedonian state, an idea that has been endorsed by an international community that lacks a proper understanding of the complexities of the Macedonian situation. Instead of promoting a multi-ethnic civic state, the Agreement posed the seeds for the creation of a bi-national, Macedonian-Albanian state, in which other ethnic communities remain marginalized in the political sphere. The further revision of the new Preamble particularly illustrates the struggle between Albanians and Macedonians over the control of the Macedonian state. Significantly, the Agreement and its supporters, the international community in particular, also fail to take into account essential factors that condition the prospects for peace and stability in Macedonia.
New constitution was amended in times of crisis, when existing arrangements have been shown to be illegitimate (Albanians did not vote for the constitution in 1991). It was made after periods of warfare, during fragile ceasefires, when time was of the essence. Pressure was grown to get the drafting done, even if imperfectly. The possible solution is to make the new constitution based purely on the concept of citizens of Macedonia without a leading place for any society, because the former was seen as a Macedonian primacy, the letter as being forced by Albanians. Nevertheless for such a solution should have appropriate political climate and consensus among all relevant subjects. Term Macedonian should have a double meaning. “Ethnicity” on the one hand for the ethnic Macedonians and “political citizenship” on the other, for the all ethnic communities in the country. It is challenge to develop a new national, civic political Macedonian identity without great emphasis on ethnicity. Identity that is broad and inclusive may lead to more liberal society. An inclusive civic political identity in an ethnically heterogeneous state should contribute to interethnic peace.

NOTES

(1) The results of the 2002 census showed that Republic of Macedonia has, beside ethnic Macedonians and Albanians there are: Turks 77,959 (3.9%); Roma 53,879 (2.7%); Serbs 35,939 (1.8%); Bosniaks 17,018 (0.8%); Vlachs 9,695 (0.5%). and other/not stated 20,993 (1.0%).(Source: State Statistical Office, Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, 2002).

(2) The Agreement laid out also includes changes to some other articles of the constitution which previously had given the Macedonian people preferential treatment. The new wording of the constitution does not use the terms “nationalities”, and “minorities”, but rather speaks of “majority population”, “communities” and “communities not in the majority”.

(3) The citizens’ perspectives on this question are drastically changed compared to the views they expressed before NATO Summit at Bucharest, when 83% of the citizens were against changes to the name of the country in order to get NATO membership. The survey aftet tha Summit revealed that the Macedonian Albanians have changed their opinion. While a month ago 52% of the ethnic Albanians agreed to changes of the name of the country so that Macedonia gets NATO membership, now 94% of them agree to such a change. In fact two thirds of the respondents that would change the name of the country for Macedonia’s NATO membership are ethnic Albanians. Meanwhile, the number of ethnic Macedonians that are against changing the name in return for NATO membership decreased from 95% to 80%.(Source: www.crpm.org.mk) acceded on 20 May 2008.

(5) Albanians feared Macedonian civic nationalism more than ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism in a multi-ethnic state is assimilatory, and its promoters may be less likely to agree to partition than ethnic nationalists of the largest ethnic group. According to Kevin Adamson and Dejan Jovic, “fear of civic nationalism” was the main reason that Albanians voted for a VMRO-DPMNE candidate at the Presidential elections in 2000, and that an otherwise paradoxical government coalition was created by two ethnic nationalist parties, the VMRO-DPMNE and the DPA in 1998 (Adamson, Jovic 2004: 309).

(5) See: UNDP, Early Warning Report, Macedonia June 2007, Skopje, 2007, p. 49.


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