Home >> Europe >> The Balkans

     Email   Print 

Ohrid Framework Agreement: Accommodation of Minority Grievances via Ethnic or Civic Identity?

Drs.. S. Slaveski, O. Bakreski, Z. Nikoloski - 2/10/2012

Abstract

In this paper we argue that power-sharing mechanisms introduced in Macedonia have gone a long way towards guaranteeing the better representation and participation in Macedonian society of the Albanian community through the institutionalisation of a model of inter-ethnic power-sharing. Nevertheless, since they are the product of violence, they are also creating a largely bi-national state with little integration between groups on societal level and even less so of smaller communities in the country, and a state where the question of ethnicity remains dominant on the political scene. In contrast to this option, the author maintains that building the civic identity of the Macedonian state is the best solution for preserving all ethnic groups in the country.

Introduction

Thе purpose of this paper is to look at the ways the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) was negotiated, and the impact it had on post-conflict developments. This paper focuses on the repercussions the Agreement and the subsequent constitutional changes in Macedonia have had on the development of the civic identity of the country that, according to the liberal model for peace building, moderates conflict and facilitates integration (Ikenberry, 2006, p. 101). First, a background on inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia is given. Then, particular focus in the study is put on the process of how the constitution was shaped by the negotiations, especially minority status and rights. A short overview is offered of the circumstances in which this accord was made, and a comparison is drawn to the provisions of the old Macedonian constitution adopted in 1991. It is argued that the changes to the constitution put forward a political identity of the country that can best be described as ‘ethnic’ rather than ‘civic’.

When compared to a liberal peace-building framework, it is further argued that the constitutional amendments envisioned by the agreement in Ohrid do not fully support a liberal understanding of the Macedonian political nation and the equality of all its citizens. The new amendments rather put the emphasis on the collective meaning of the individual citizens, and their rights are as a consequence not solely considered within a liberal peace building. Moreover, the subsequent adoption of amendments to the constitution modified from that proposed in Ohrid, put the emphasis on the rights of individuals as members of groups, rather than as individuals per se. Such a development of the legal system in Macedonia does not support solutions to problems in multiethnic societies. Drawing on the experiences from Macedonia, the aim is to bring to light those aspects of the peace process that could serve as lessons learnt that could be useful in the creation of future peace agreements.

Background on inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia

In the independent Republic of Macedonia, a political environment has been created for the Albanian ethnic minority to mobilize and secure representation in state and local legislatures through electoral competition. Democracy has given Albanians a platform from which to ‘speak loudly’ (Zahariadis, 2003, p. 259). Strong ethnic Albanian identity, accompanied by the effective leadership and ethnic political party of Macedonia’s Albanians, was essential for their mobilization in the early stages of Macedonian independence (Barny, 2005, p. 80). Political and cultural demands of Macedonia’s Albanians were much more substantial than those, for example, of the other minorities (Gocevski, 2003, p. 28). Albanian grievances were connected with group status, language rights, educational rights and discriminatory politics (Koppa, 2001, p. 40).

The preamble of the Constitution of the independent Republic of Macedonia states that ‘Macedonia is constituted as the national state of the Macedonian people’ in the ethnic sense, while Albanians and others were mentioned separately and have ‘full equality as citizens’. Demands about group status are narrowly connected to ethnic origin and the number of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. The Albanians argued that they are not a ‘minority’, but an indigenous population; therefore they claim the right to be recognized as a constitutional nation with their own language, culture and educational institutions (Ortakovski, 2001, p. 32). They boycotted the referendum, held in 1991, that set up the Republic of Macedonia as a sovereign and independent state. Moreover, they held a referendum on the establishment of their own state, the Republic of Ilirida . It was a signal for Macedonians that Albanians do not have a desire to live together with the Macedonians in the same state. There was a conflict between the concept of ‘nation-state’ claimed by Macedonians and the concept of ‘separation’ or ‘Bi-national State’ argued by Albanians.

Macedonian societal security dilemma

Since Macedonian independence, Albanians have had the right to education in their mother language on the primary and secondary school levels, but university education was available only in the Macedonian language. However, Albanians were dissatisfied and demanded their ‘own-language’ university since Pristina University, where ethnic Albanians from Macedonia could study in Albanian, was closed by the Belgrade authorities. Therefore they established an ‘illegal’ Albanian-language university in Tetovo in 1994, which was perceived by many Macedonians as an act of separation from society, instead of integration (Balalovska, 2002, pp. 109-125).

The Albanian language and alphabet could be used as an official language in addition to the Macedonian language, according to the previous constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. Their demands for wide use of the Albanian language in public affairs were narrowly connected to their understanding of equal status in the state. On the Albanian side, the use of one’s own language within Macedonia was seen as vital for the survival of Albanian culture and identity within the state. For the Macedonian political parties, however, such a move was not only viewed as eroding the primacy of the Macedonian language but, even more dangerously, as a step toward federalism and eventual outright secession (Slaveski, 2003b).

The Albanian political parties have participated in all existing governments of the Republic of Macedonia since independence, but many Albanians see their ministers as mere tokens with no real power and they point to the centralized system (Dimitrova, 2004, pp. 172-186). As a contrast, Macedonians in the city of Tetovo, where they comprise a minority, complained that the Albanian Ilirida is practically being realized in Tetovo (Poulton, 1995, p. 87). Nevertheless, Albanians argue that they continue to be less represented in public administration, which was partly true. However, it was a reflection more due to a lack of educated Albanian people than discriminatory politics (Brunnbauer, 2002, pp. 17-24). Hence, the Government continued to take positive steps toward the integration of Albanians in society (Ortakovski, 2001, p. 34).

On the other hand, the Macedonian people are concerned about the high birth rate of Albanians, which, they argue, will lead to the gradual Albanization of Macedonia. According to the official census information, in 1953 the Albanians accounted for 12.5% of the total population in the country, whereas according to the census in 2002, they accounted for 25.17 % of the total number of citizens in the country. Therefore, the growth of the Albanian population in Macedonia is seen as possibly fatal, not only for the territorial integrity of the state but also for the very existence of the Macedonian identity.

Considered in the context of a societal security dilemma, that which was seen in the Albanian community as something essential to the preservation of the Albanian national identity (the provision of own-language education, language rights, and especially group status), was subsequently viewed by many Macedonians as a lack of loyalty to the state and a crucial threat to theirs. Despite such misperception and ‘illusory incompatibility’ between two societies, the government continued with the dialogue mostly because of its obligation to protect minority rights as a precondition to become part of the Euro-Atlantic community (Slaveski, 2003a, p. 105). However it should be noticed that many other problems have accompanied Macedonia’s state-building efforts since 1991. These included (to mention just a few problems) an extremely weak economic base, almost non-existent state and democratic traditions, an underdeveloped political culture as well as an immature culture of peace and a turbulent, and not always friendly, neighbourhood.

Process of getting to the Ohrid Framework Agreement

Strategies of the key actors involved at the beginning of the violent conflict
According to many international experts, it is correct to say that without the spill-over from the conflict in Kosovo, there would have been no armed conflict in Macedonia in 2001 (Baros, 2003, Ragary, 2008, Balalovska et al. 2002).

However, no-one can deny that there was also a Macedonian lack of appropriate response, over a period of ten tears, to the demands of the ethnic Albanian community. These factors, together, created the conditions that eventually pushed many ethnic Albanians of Macedonia to join the survivors from the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).

When fighting broke out in the Tanusevci region of northwest Macedonia near the border with Kosovo, in February, 2001, the Macedonian government appeared to be caught by surprise (Balalovska et al., 2002, p. 18). Initially, it was unclear what the objectives of the attacks by the so-called National Liberation Army (NLA) were and their eventual demands. At the beginning ‘a distinguishing feature of the Albanian extremist’s position towards the Macedonian state was simply the intention to cement the situation on the ground and to annex the western part of Macedonia heavily populated by ethnic Albanians’ (Baros, 2003, p. 60). Therefore, initially the conflict was not only ethnic in character but territorial as well.

Becoming increasingly aware that the main international actors might support a struggle for human rights, but not for territory, the Albanian rebels operating in Macedonia changed their military strategy and claimed to be fighting for the human rights of their community. Hence, on 10 March, 2001, the fighters issued a statement setting out their political aim. The objectives were: a new Macedonian constitution which would proclaim that Macedonia is a state of Macedonians and Albanians, as well as of other minorities; better rights for Albanians, including the recognition of the Albanian language as a second official language in the country; international mediation. On the other side, at that time, the strategy of the main legitimate Albanian political parties, Democratic Party of the Albanians (DPA) in the government coalition and Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) in the opposition, was to involve international mediators and later the NLA in the political process. The DPA and PDP knew that their political credibility would be lost if they made any commitments they were unable to fulfil. Consequently they played a waiting game (Smith, 2001).

Initially the Macedonian government believed that it was controlling the situation on the ground and was determined to be firm and not to compromise. On 20 March, it refused an offer for talks by the guerrillas. President Trajkovski stated that ‘there will be no negotiations’, declaring that the security forces were ‘strong enough and determined to halt the terrorists and defend the country.’ The Macedonian parties hoped that security forces might be able to win a military victory against the NLA, and take back complete control over the country. While they still believed this was possible, they kept away from actively seeking a negotiated settlement.

In the early days of the Macedonian conflict, the position of the representatives of the international community was objectively ambiguous. They condemned violence used by ‘guerrillas’ and advised the Macedonian government to restrain itself in any military actions it would undertake. At the same time they were advocating the use of negotiations to end the violence and tried to limit the actions of the Government security forces. At this stage the conflict had not yet entered the phase of negotiating, and representatives of the international community took steps to be there and available for when the sides were ready to resolution through negotiated arrangement.

Hence in the Macedonian conflict management we can determine three involved parties, Macedonian, Albanian and the international community. On the Macedonian side, the main players were President Boris Trajkovski and leaders of two political parties: Ljubco Georgievski, at that time Prime Minister and head of the Interior Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) and Branko Crvenkovski, former Prime Minister and leader of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM). The Albanian camp was composed of Arben Xhaferi head of the (DPA), Imer Imeri leader of the (PDP) and Ali Ahmeti, political leader of the NLA. On the side of the international community, major actors on the ground were political representative of the USA, EU, OSCE and NATO.

Moving the parties towards negotiations

When a conflict is not mature for resolution, as was the case at the early phase in Macedonia, the international community can take a more pro-active role to ripen the conflict. This incorporates taking action to drive the conflict forward by supporting the creation of a deadlock and persuading sides to talk.

It can be done by using different methods (diplomacy, positive and negative incentives). At times international organizations can also recommend membership as an encouragement for parties to resolve the conflict peacefully.

In the Macedonian case, the EU presented Macedonia eventual membership if it came to an accord with the ethnic Albanians. Therefore, during the conflict the Macedonian Government signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU in Luxembourg. On 9 April, 2001, at the signing ceremony of the Agreement, the government pledged to make rapid progress in addressing the grievances of the ethnic Albanians. Although talk of changing the country’s constitution at that time had not yet started, direct pressures began to emerge. The next day, on 10 April, President Trajkovski established a commission that was to evaluate whether the constitution should be changed. This, however, was not considered to be a serious option at that time. Trajkovski stated that he thought there were more urgent issues.

The Macedonian Orthodox Church fiercely opposed it, as did VMRO-DPMNE, while the SDSM did not consider it at all. At the same time, the US still appeared to support military action against the rebels (Kim, 2005, pp. 7-10). On 12 April, although he said he was pleased with the resumed dialogue, Powell informed Trajkovski: ‘You can be sure of American support of your efforts, political support, economic support and military support.’ At this stage, the international community was not only unwilling to commit any troops to Macedonia (despite calls by the ethnic Albanian parties) but also reluctant to engage in any substantial mediation (Balalovska et al., 2002, p. 210).

It was in this context of failure to achieve any political progress, that the NLA, after a short silence in the fighting after the government’s March offensive, opened a second stage of attacks, thus exerting more pressure on the government in the military field. The threat was that unless their demands were satisfied within the framework of the initiated talks, the fighting would resume. After a pause of one month, the NLA returned to action by setting an ambush that killed eight soldiers. The government military assault began a week later. By May, the conflict had spread to the Kumanovo area. The development of the conflict on the ground in this period confirmed that the government had real difficulty in containing the guerrillas.

Shuttle diplomacy by the international actors assured de-escalation of violence and later laid the foundation for negotiations. Emblematic of the latter was Solana’s role in brokering a national unity government. The increasingly vocal calls of the international community for a political settlement led to the creation, on 8 May, of an all-party government. The coalition included, apart from the old coalition partners, the SDSM of Crvenkovski, as well as the PDP which had appeared supportive to the NLA all the while. The national unity coalition government was formed under pressure from, again, the international community, with the aim of giving broad legitimacy to any developments leading toward a political solution. The coalition government would broaden the consensus – but also the responsibility – for change. With its four main parties, two Macedonian and two Albanian, it could pass and ratify unpopular or controversial legislation. In addition, it would serve to isolate the guerrillas by opening negotiations on Albanian demands. Thus, the formation of the national unity government can be seen as a landmark of political accommodation being seriously considered for the first time.

Since the Macedonian government did not answer adequately militarily to the extremist groups, the NLA effectively took over the political programme of the Albanian parties in Macedonia (Perry, 2001, pp. 362-368). It has been done by forcing Albanian politicians to respond to the challenge to their authority and accepting the armed struggle as a political means (Bellamy, 2002, pp.117-144). In other words, they were seeking to become the political arm of the NLA in order to prevent themselves from being marginalized. All the necessary factors were in place for the extremist groups to become a viable political factor (Rusi, 2004). The turning point that signalled the irreversibility of the movement toward a negotiated solution, was the agreement on ‘common action’ concluded in Prizren on 22 May between the NLA and the two main Albanian political parties, the DPA and the PDP. Something like this could have been expected, but also in view of the fact that some device had to be conceived to bring the NLA indirectly to the negotiating table. The Prizren agreement in effect gave the NLA something that came very close to making them legitimate and gave a mandate to the ethnic Albanian political parties to represent the interests of the rebels. However the agreement also caused paralysis in the coalition government, which now included a ghost member, namely the NLA, depriving it of the capability to take coherent decisions and implement efficient policies (Rusi, 2003, pp. 29-30). Confusion reigned, and the fighting went on.

The international community can also utilize positive and negative inducements to assist create a deadlock and convince parties to continue peace negotiations. Economic measures and political force are cases of creating a negative incentive aimed at pressuring the sides to progress towards negotiations. Accordingly the pressure by the international community took the form of much more pronounced and direct arm-twisting. Macedonia is dependent on Western aid. The conflict was making the economic situation worse, with the budget melting on account of the war effort. In addition, the situation in the military field was still not favourable for the Macedonian security forces. Thus, by the time the government sat down to negotiate, one sixth of Macedonian territory was under the control of the NLA. Regardless of the reasons, it had become quite clear by then that the war could not be won.

President’s platform for a political solution of the crisis

Towards the beginning of June, Trajkovski had proposed a platform for a political solution of the crisis that included political and military neutralization of the NLA, their disarmament, and subsequent measures for building confidence: increased Albanian participation in the public administration, local self-government, a solution of the language issue, and creation of a civic concept of a nation, i.e. a change in the preamble (all of which was in line with most Albanian demands), as well as a partial amnesty for the NLA guerrillas.

The main point of disagreement was the concept of nation envisaged, indirectly connected to the territorial integrity of the country. Whereas Trajkovski’s plan largely envisaged Macedonia as a civic nation, thus guaranteeing the unitary character of the state, and the SDSM largely agreed with such a concept, the demands of the Albanian parties relied on the model of consensual multi-ethnic democracy, i.e. declaring the Albanians a second constituent nation, introducing Albanian as a second official language, creating the position of vice-president of the Republic (expected to be an Albanian), and introducing a bicameral parliamentary system to implement consensual democracy, with the right to veto.

This was a position Solana denounced as ‘maximalistic’. It would require not only a change to the constitution, but also the introduction of a new political system. Trajkovski stated: ‘Opposite to their commitment for the civic option, they [the Albanians] dramatically changed their position and now they demand […] federalisation of the country […] some sort of bi-national state.’

As for the NLA, they knew they could not win a war without dividing the country in two, since they had local support only in the northwest of Macedonia, and that territorial division was not something the international community would accept. Thus, on 14 June, they offered a peace platform that included, inter alia, an immediate cease-fire, and ‘demilitarisation overseen by NATO’, as well as ‘a political process, mediated and guaranteed by the US and the EU, with the participation of the NLA’ (Rusi, 2003, pp. 29-30).

NATO was beginning seriously to consider the deployment of a mission to Macedonia. The NLA had specifically asked for a NATO presence as Trajkovski had done earlier. NATO did not want to get involved in the fighting. According to Lord Robertson, something else had to be put in place first, i.e. a cease-fire and a political settlement. However, on 15 June, Solana stated that NATO would be likely to take up a decommissioning mission. Subsequently facilitators/mediators were sent to Macedonia towards the end of June. The US administration appointed James Pardew from the State Department as a special envoy to Macedonia, while the European Union assigned the same role to retired French politician, Francois Leotard, with a mandate to facilitate political negotiations with the purpose of reaching a comprehensive agreement (Balalovska at al., 2002, p. 33).

On 5 July, an agreement on a cease-fire was signed for the first time by both sides. The cease-fire, however, was not respected. The NLA used it to seize villages around Tetovo, and most of Tetovo itself, under the very noses of government forces and international observers. In the meantime, the outflow of ethnic Macedonians from NLA-held villages continued.

Endnotes

See: Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, NIP ‘Magazin 21’, Skopje, 1991.

An ethnic Albanian referendum for autonomy of a ‘Republic of Ilirida’ in the Albanian-dominated western part of the country was held in 1992.

See, for example, reports by the International Crisis Group. Macedonia’s Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf (ICG Balkans Report 98, August 2000), Brussels.

In 2001, for example 84.5 per cent of those employed were ethnic Macedonians compared to 7.5 per cent Albanians. Among public servants, 10 per cent were Albanians, and in 1997 only 4 per cent of the police force were of ethnic Albanian origin.

The results of the 2002 census showed that Republic of Macedonia has a population of 2,022,547 people, made up of 64.18% ethnic Macedonians and 25.17% ethnic Albanians. This is an increase of 2.42% in the Albanian content of the population since the 1994 census.

It is also noteworthy that the census shows a rapidly ageing population, and that it has been estimated that the number of ethnic Albanian children in the Republic of Macedonia schools is over a third of the total number. If these factors are taken into account, according to James Pettifer estimation, with the age profile of the ethnic Macedonian population, there is no reason to revise the view that an ethnic Albanian majority in the Republic of Macedonia might emerge in about twenty to twenty five years time, if current demographic and emigration patterns continue. (Pettifer, J., 2004, p.5).

Suggesting a link between the Macedonian Question – the issue of the origins and authenticity of the Macedonian nation – and the conflict between the ethnic Macedonian majority and Albanian minority in the Republic of Macedonia, this article put forth the argument that the former influences the latter in so far as Bulgarian, Greek, and to a lesser extent, Serbian and Albanian, perceptions of the Macedonian nation exert emotional, cultural and political influence on Macedonian attitudes and actions towards the Albanians.

The Chief of General Staff of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia in 2001, Pande Petrovski claimed in a TV interview (Pande, Petrovski, 2006. Interview. In: Five o’clock news. TV, Kanal 5, May 16 2006. 17.24 hrs) that domestic ethnic Albanians joined the insurgency in May 2001. Nevertheless, both sources recognize that in the first month, the violent conflict did not involve ethnic Albanians from Macedonia, but from Kosovo.

Communiquè No. 4 of NLA. See more: Iso Rusi, ‘From Army To Party (The Politics of The NLA)’, in The 2001 Conflict in FYROM – Reflections, Conflict Studies Research Centre, June 2004, pp. 20-21.

BBC News on line: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/English/world/Europe/newsid.stm, accessed at 11 March 2001.

MIA News on line: http://www.mia.com.mk/, accessed 20 March 2001.

See, for example, reports by the International Crisis Group. The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion (ICG Balkans Report 109, April 2001), Brussels.

MIA News on line: http://www.mia.com.mk/, accessed 10 April 2001.

MIA News on line: http://www.mia.com.mk/, accessed 12 April 2001.

MIA News on line: http://www.mia.com.mk/, accessed 7 May 2001.

See, for example, reports by the International Crisis Group. Macedonia: the Last Chance for Peace (ICG Balkans Report 113, June 2001), Brussels.

Actually, the agreement was secretly negotiated by Robert Frowick, an American OSCE official in Skopje, who was de facto a special envoy of president Bush to president Trajkovski and had a detailed plan of the various steps to be undertaken, point by point, to conduct his mediation, involving the NLA and the two main ethnic Albanian parties. However, when the news of Frowick’s mission leaked out, it produced a quarrel in the Macedonian public and among political leaders. Frowick was asked to leave the country, but by then his mission had been accomplished (Balalovska еt al., 2002, p. 30).

See more in: Peacemaking and Diplomacy, The Conflict Management Toolkit, available at http://cmtoolkit.sais-jhu.edu/index.php?print+yes&name=pm-diplomacy (accessed 13 August 2010).

The 16 June statement of the EU Foreign Affairs ministers read: ‘We urge the Macedonian authorities to achieve tangible progress now. The Macedonian government must present a report on interethnic peace efforts to EU Foreign Affairs ministers on 25 June’ (MIA News on line: http://www.mia.com.mk/, accessed 16 June 2001). A few days later, the European Commission spokesman on foreign affairs, Wigan, stated: ‘We believe that a political solution will be reached.’ (MIA News on line: http://www.mia.com.mk/, accessed 22 June 2001). He added that if such a solution were found, the European Commission would continue to provide financial assistance to Macedonia. This message, which was in every respect an ultimatum, could not be ignored.

MIA News on line: http://www.mia.com.mk/, accessed 7 June 2001.

Dnevnik, 18 June 2001: http://www.dnevnik.com.mk/, accessed 18 June 2001.
MIA News on line: http://www.mia.com.mk/, accessed 20 June 2001.

Pardew was a former US senior military intelligence officer and Leotard a former defense minister, so they seemed to combine the necessary diplomatic and security expertise required for effective mediation in the Macedonian conflict.

References

Atanasov, P. 2006. ‘Macedonia and EU Integration: Common Problems and Common Goals’, in Kostovicova, D., and Bojicic-Dzelilovic V., (ed.) Austrian Presidency of the EU: Regional Approaches to the Balkans. Viena: Center for the Study of Global Governance, 83-91

Balalovska, K. 2002. A Historical Background to the Macedonian-Albanian Interethnic conflict. In Minority Politics in Southeast Europe: Crisis in Macedonia. Roma: Ethnobarometer Working Paper Series, 109-125.

Balalovska, K. 2006. Macedonia 2006: Towards Stability?. Roma: The Ethnobarometer Working Paper Series.

Balalovska, K., Silj, A., and Zucconi, M. 2002. Minority Politics in Southeast Europe: Crisis in Macedonia. Rome: The Ethnobarometer Working Paper Series.
Barny, Z. 2005. Ethnic mobilization in the postcommunist context: Albanian in Macedonia and the East European Roma. In: Barny Z. and Moser R. G. ed. Ethnic politics after communism. London: Cornel University Press, 78-107.

Baros, M. 2003. ‘The Macedonian Conflict and International Law: Self-Determination or Self-Defence?’, in International Peacekeeping, Vol. 10, No. 3, Autumn, 60-78.

Bellamy, A. 2002. ‘New Wolves at the Door: Conflict in Macedonia’, in Civil Wars, Vol.5, No. l, Spring, 117-144.

Bieber, F. 2008. ‘Conclusions: The Ohrid Framework Agreement after 7 years’, in Bieber F., (ed.) Power-Sharing and the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Skopje: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Office Macedonia, 207-211.

Bieber, F. 2008. ‘Power-Sharing and the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement’, in Bieber F., (ed.) Power-Sharing and the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Skopje: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Office Macedonia, 7-41.

Brunnbauer, U. 2002. ‘The Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement: Ethnic Macedonian Resentments’, in Journal on Ethnpolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Issue 1, 17-24.

Crighton, A. 2003. Macedonia: The Conflict and the Media. Skopje: Macedonia Institute for Media.

Daskalovski, Z. 2002. ‘Language and Identity: the Ohrid Framework Agreement and Liberal Notions of Citizenship and Nationality in Macedonia’, in Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Issue 1/, Budapest: Central European University.

Dimitrova, R. K. 2004. ‘Municipal Decisions on the Border of Collapse: Macedonian Decentralisation and the Challenges of Post-Ohrid Democracy’, in Southeast European Politics, Vol. V, No. 2-3, December, 172-186.

Engström, J. 2002. ‘The Power of Perception: The Impact of the Macedonian Question on Inter-ethnic Relations in the Republic of Macedonia’, in The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol. 1, no. 3, March, 3-17

Eurobarometer 71, Public opinion survey, http://europa.eu.int.comm/public_opinion.index_en.htm acceded on 13 May 2010

Framework Agreement, accessed on 25 May 2008 at www.president.gov.mk

Frckovski, L. D. 2003. Negotations in Identity Conflicts. Skopje: Templum.
Gocevski, T. (ed.). 2003. Ethnic Coexistence in the Post-conflict Period. Skopje: Foundation Institute open society.

Horowitz, D. L. 2008. ‘Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-conflict States’, in William and Mary Law Review, Vol. 49, 1213-1248
Human Rights Watch. 2001. Macedonia. Crimes Against Civilians: Abuses by Macedonian Forces in Ljuboten, August 10-12, 2001, New York, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/macedonia

Ikenberry, G. J. 2006. Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition: Essays on American Power and International Order. Polity Press.

Ilievski, Z. 2008. The Role of Human and Minority Rights in the Process of Reconstruction and Reconciliation for State and Nation-Building: Macedonia, Bozen: European Academy.

International Crisis Group. 2001. Macedonia: the Last Chance for Peace (ICG Balkans Report 113, June 2001), Brussels.

International Crisis Group. 2001. The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion (ICG Balkans Report 109, April 2001), Brussels.

Ismaili, Y. 2009. Vooruzeniot konflikt vo Makedonija – 2001 godina (Poltickata terminologija & Medijalnata manipulacija). Skopje: Fondacija Institut otvotreno opstestvo.

Kim, J. 2005. ‘Macedonia (FYROM): Post-Conflict Situation and U.S. Policy’, CRS Report for Congress, June 17.

Koppa, M. E. 2001. ‘Ethnic Albanians in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Between Nationality and Citizenship’, in Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, Vol.7, No.4, Winter, 37-65.

Kostic, R. 2009. Reconciling the Past and the Present: Evaluating the Dayton Peace Agreement 1995. Uppsala: Uppsala University.

Latifi, V. 2008. Pregovorite za postignuvanje na Ohridskiot dogovor. Skopje: Fondacija Institut otvotreno opstestvo.

Lejti, M. 2009. Sprecuvanje vojna vo Makedonija (Preventivna diplomatija za 21 vek). Skopje: Fondacija Institut otvotreno opstestvo.

Mehmeti, E. 2008. ‘Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement’, in Bieber, F. (ed.) Power-Sharing and the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Skopje: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Office Macedonia, 67-89

Mitrevska, M., Grizold, A., Buckovski, V., and Vanis, E. 2009. Prevencija na konflikti – slucaj na Makedonija. Skopje: Bomat grafiks.

Ortakovski, V.T. 2001. ‘Interethnic Relations and Minorities in the Republic of Macedonia’, in Southeast European Politics, Vol. 2, No. 1, May, 24-45.

Peacemaking and Diplomacy, The Conflict Management Toolkit, available at http://cmtoolkit.sais-jhu.edu/index.php?print+yes&name=pm-diplomacy (accessed 13 August 2010).

Perry, D. 2001. ‘Macedonia’s Quest for Security and Stability’, in Current History, November, 362-368.

Petrovski, Pande, 2006. Interview. In: Five o’clock news. TV, Kanal 5, May 16. 17.24 hrs

Pettifer, J. 2004. FYROM - After the Concordia Mission, Conflict Studies Research Centre, G2129, January.

Popetrevski, V., and Latifi, V. 2003. ‘The Ohrid Framework Agreement Negotiations’, in Ohrid and Beyond. London: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 49-57.

Poulton, H. 1995. Who are the Macedonians?. London: Hurst & Company.
Ragary, N. 2008. ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: between Ohrid and Brussels’, in Batt, J. (ed.), Is there an Albanian question?, Chaillot Paper, No. 107, January, 41-60.

Reka, A. 2008. ‘The Ohrid Agreement: The Travails of Inter-ethnic Relations in Macedonia’, in Hum Rights Rev, 55–69.

Rusi, I. 2004. ‘From Army To Party (The Politics of The NLA)’, in The 2001 Conflict in FYROM – Reflections, Conflict Studies Research Centre, June, 19-34.
Schöpflin, G. 2000. Nations, Identity, Power: The New Politics of Europe. London: Hurst & Company.

Slaveski, S. 2003 a. ‘The National Security of the Republic of Macedonia end Euro-Atlantic Integrations’, in Macedonian Affairs, Vol. IV, No. 10, September, 68-78

Slaveski, S. 2009. ‘Macedonian Strategic Culture and Institutional Choice: Integration or Isolation?’, in Western Balkan Security Observer , No 14 July-September, 39-55.

Slaveski, S., 2003 b. The Macedonian Societal Security Dilemma. In:Georgieva, L., (ed.) Challenges of the Post-Conflict Reconciliation and Peace-building in Macedonia, 18-19 June 2002 Skopje. Skopje: Filozofski fakultet, 105-115.

Smith, R. J. 2001. ‘Rebels Demand Rights, Minority Albanians Say Fight in Macedonia is for Equity’, Washington Post, 17 March.

Stojanovska, G. 2001. ‘Macedonia: Church rage Over Political Reforms’. Institute for War and Peace Reporting, BCR 292, 31 October.

Sulejmani, R. 2008. ‘Consensus Democracy and Power-Sharing in Macedonia’, in Bieber F. (ed.) Power-Sharing and the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, Skopje: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Office Macedonia, 131-165.

Vankovska, B. 2005. ‘Multi-ethnicity or Bi-nationalism? The Framework Agreement and the Future of the Macedonian State’, in Current Perspectives on Macedonia. Skopje: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.

Zahariadis, N. 2003. ‘External Interventions and Domestic Ethnic Conflict in Yugoslav Macedonia’, in Political Science Quarterly, Volume 118, Number 2.