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The Lessons Netanyahu Seems to Have Learned in Shaping Foreign Policy

Yoav J. Tenembaum - 10/8/2011

Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's Prime Minister, seems to have learned a few crucial lessons in shaping foreign policy from his first premiership (1996-1999) and from the premierships of Labor's Ehud Barak (1999-2001) and Kadima's Ehud Olmert (2006-2009).

The first lesson: don't take an important step forward with regard to the peace process without doing your utmost at maintaining the domestic structure that keeps you in power.

Thus, when Netanyahu first announced, at his Bar Ilan Speech, that he would be ready to accept the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state with security guarantees in the context of a peace agreement, he did so knowing, in advance, that none of his ministers would resign.

He was able to keep his coalition intact, notwithstanding the significant conceptual change he had made, due to a thorough process of consultations prior to the speech and a judicious rhetoric aimed also at placating his domestic audience during the speech.

Which leads us to the second lesson: Try to involve the most prominent members of your coalition in the decision-making process.

Netanyahu instituted a core forum of seven (later to be enlarged to eight) ministers, representing the main parties of his coalition government and the principal ideological trends within his own Likud Party, with whom he would consult before any major decision on foreign and defense policy.

By so doing, the prime minister ensured that none of those participating would feel excluded from the decision-making process, notwithstanding their individual stance on the issue in question.

US President Dwight Eisenhower used to say that if the principal factors concerned with the shaping of foreign policy feel they are part of the decision making process the chances of obstruction in implementing the policy decided upon decrease significantly.

In other words, even if a participant in the process does not agree with the policy adopted, the fact that he or she was directly involved in shaping it lessens considerably the incentive to foil its implementation.

Thus, when Netanyahu announced that he would be prepared to freeze all settlement activity in the West Bank for a period of ten months so as to encourage the Palestinian Authority to come to the negotiating table, none of his more hawkish ministers resigned or came out in public against him, even though he was the first Israeli prime minister to have agreed to such a move.

Third lesson: If you need to make a significant change in your hitherto established positions, try to convey the impression that you have hardly any alternative due to an unbearable pressure being exerted by Israel's closest friend and ally, the United States.

When Netanyahu delivered his Bar Ilan Speech in which he accepted, in principle, that a Palestinian state could be established in the framework of a peace agreement, the impression shared by many Israelis was that Netanyahu had little room for maneuver due to President Barak Obama's considerable pressure.

Something similar occurred when Netanyahu announced he would be ready to freeze all settlement activity in the West Bank. Netanyahu appeared to convey the impression that he was being pressured by President Obama in such a manner that he had almost no alternative.

Of course, President Obama did exert enormous pressure on Netanyahu on both occasions; which only helped Netanyahu in delivering his message, and in being able to maintain his coalition intact.

Fourth and last lesson: whenever you have to make a policy shift in a dovish direction, try to couch it, as far as possible, in a patriotic rhetoric. Moreover, do your best to convey the pain you feel in having to undertake the step you do.

Netanyahu did exactly that both at his Bar Ilan Speech and at his latest speech in the United Nations, when he spoke both about the unbreakable attachment of the Jews to their ancestral homeland in the Land of Israel and stressed the pain entailed in being ready to withdraw from part of it in order to achieve a peace agreement with the Palestinians.

This point is worth emphasizing. Previous prime ministers used to give the impression that agreeing to the establishment of a Palestinian state was not a painful sacrifice, but in Israel's best interest. That might be so, depending on one's point of view, but the domestic audience of Netanyahu, perhaps the majority of Israelis, prefer to hear their prime minister express his sorrow, rather than be relieved, at having to relinquish land that is the cradle of Jewish civilization and a geo-strategic asset to Israel's defence.